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Abstract
Three Essays on the Structure of Property Rights to Natural
Resources
Bryan Leonard
In this dissertation I study how the structure of property rights is shaped by the
benefits and costs of defining and enforcing rights along various dimensions to inform
current policy debates by better understanding the economic structure of the resource
problems we face and saying something about the opportunity costs of policy proposals
to alter resource use. I do this by combining formal models of natural resource use with
detailed econometric analysis of novel historic and modern data sets which I build using
GIS.
In Chapter 1, Gary Libecap and I analyze the economic determinants and e↵ects of
prior appropriation water rights that were voluntarily implemented across a vast area of
the US West, replacing common-law riparian water rights. We model potential benefits
and test hypotheses regarding search, coordination, and investment. Our novel dataset
vii
of 7,800 rights in Colorado, established between 1852 and 2013 includes location, date,
size, infrastructure investment, irrigated acreage, crops, topography, stream flow, soil
quality, and precipitation. Prior appropriation doubled infrastructure investment and
raised the value of agricultural output beyond baseline riparian rights. The analysis
reveals institutional innovation that informs contemporary water policy.
In Chapter 2, Dominic Parker and I study how subdivision of land rights can af-
fect natural resource use. Land contains multiple natural resources that are e ciently
managed at di↵erent spatial scales, either concurrently or over time. We explain how
subdividing the commons to promote one resource (agricultural land) inadvertently cre-
ates anticommons problems for another (shale oil). We provide empirical tests from a
natural experiment on the Bakken, one of the world’s largest booming oil fields. Before
oil was discovered, U.S. land allotment policies created a mosaic of private, tribal, and
fragmented ownership to shale on and around the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. We
compare horizontal drilling patterns across over 40,000 parcels on and o↵ the reservation.
We find that subdivision has caused economically significant delays in compensation to
shale owners, as parcels surrounded by tribal lands are more quickly and fully exploited.
The evidence demonstrates how subdivision can inadvertently delay spatially coordinated
resource use and reduce resource rents.
In Chapter 3, Gary Libecap and I examine the emergence of spontaneous claims to
inframarginal rents in open-access resources. Although early models of open-access in
economics predicted full rent dissipation as homogeneous agents exploited the resource,
later theory and empirical observations indicated persistence of inframarginal rents. The
existence of inframarginal rents under open-access has been recognized in the literature,
viii
but agents incentives to invest in de facto institutions to protect rental streams from
competitors has not been explored. These institutions include local property rights,
specialized production, and restricted information sharing. Moreover, there has been no
recognition of how these informal arrangements might contribute to observed resistance
by inframarginal-rent earners to externally imposed schemes in order to reduce aggregate
rent dissipation. Proponents are high-cost agents, who earn low or zero rents. High-cost
agents ought to be able to compensate low-cost agents for a shift to a new property
regime if the shift makes them better o↵ than they were under open-access. Empirically,
however, this appears not to happen and formal open-access persists. We develop a simple
framework to show why “willingness to pay” and “willingness to accept” do not overlap
and that institutional change is not Pareto-improving for those who have adjusted well to
open-access. If agents are heterogeneous in search and production costs, and the resource
is large and heterogeneous in quality, then low-cost parties search for the most productive
locations and apply their superior skills and develop human and physical capital to earn
inframarginal rents. We then apply this framework to historical experiences in oil and
gas and fisheries.
ix
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Chapter 1
First Possession of Water in the
American West
1.1 Introduction
Property rights are fundamental institutions for economic decisions and outcomes.
They contribute to long-run economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2005; Mehlum
et al., 2006; Rodrik, 2008; Dixit, 2009; Besley and Ghatak, 2009a), facilitate greater
investment when returns are uncertain or delayed (Besley, 1995; Jacoby et al., 2002;
Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010; Lin et al., 2010), allow for the development of markets
(Greif et al., 1994; Dixit, 2009; Edwards and Ogilvie, 2012), and reduce rent dissipa-
tion associated with common-pool resources (Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955; Wiggins and
Libecap, 1985; Gaudet et al., 2001; Wilen, 2005; Costello et al., 2008).1 Despite their
1The role of property rights in constraining rent dissipation in open-access resource has perhaps the
largest literature. Other examples include Casey et al. (1995), Grafton et al. (2000b), and Bohn and
Deacon (2000).
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importance, the determinants of how property rights initially emerge and how the process
frames subsequent economic behavior have received little attention.2 The reason is that
voluntary major shifts in property institutions are rare, reducing empirical observation
for analysis. Property regimes more commonly change involuntarily with revolution or
military conquest, as was the case with the Russian revolution of 1917 or the expansion
of the British Empire over native arrangements (Libecap et al., 2011).
It is costly to set up a property rights system and once in place, owners (individuals
or group members, depending on the institution) form expectations about the range of
designated uses, conditions for exchange, investment opportunities, time frames, dele-
gation of associated costs and benefits and hence, the flow of net rents from the asset.
The property rights structure also defines political and social positions in societies. Ac-
cordingly, any important change in property rights imposes uncertainty and potential
losses on incumbent owners and aspiring ones across a variety of margins with significant
distributional and e ciency consequences. For these reasons, individuals and organiza-
tions within societies, economies, and political structures develop stakes in the prevailing
property rights system, suggesting the high costs of replacing them and explaining their
observed durability.
In this paper, we exploit the empirical setting of the westward settlement of the Amer-
ican frontier as a laboratory for institutional innovation. Settlers moved west across the
continent after native claims had been swept aside. Migrants, seeking ownership of
natural resources—land, timber, gold and silver, proceeded ahead of formal state and
2Demsetz (1967), Cheung (1970), Anderson and Hill (1975), and Barzel (1997) emphasize that
property rights emerge when the marginal benefit of creating, defining, and enforcing those rights exceed
the marginal costs of doing so, but do not examine the forms property rights take in di↵erent settings
or why.
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territorial governments, bringing with them basic legal norms but confronting unfamiliar
conditions that required new arrangements for successful economic development. These
institutions appeared spontaneously via local collective action and persist today, deter-
mining contemporary actors and molding markets and policy.
Our focus is on the abrupt, deliberate shift from common-law riparian water rights
that dominated in the eastern US and granted use of surface water to adjacent land hold-
ers as shares based on contiguous acreage, to prior appropriation that assigned ownership
of water based on time, as first-possession claims.3 Prior appropriation granted the right
to divert a fixed amount of water for beneficial use at sites distant from a stream. It
became the basis for large-scale investment in irrigated agriculture and the subsequent
economic development of the West. Prior appropriation displaced riparian rights across
an immense area of some 1,808,584 mi2 (17 western states and 2 Canadian provinces).4
Most prior appropriation rights were established between 1850 and 1920 when water was
valued primarily as an input to irrigated agriculture, and today 40 to 80% of western
water use remains in agriculture (Brewer et al., 2008).5 Examination of the economic
gains attributable to prior appropriation makes clear why it was adopted so broadly and
3First-possession ownership of natural resources has been criticized for encouraging a race among
homogeneous agents that dissipates rents (Barzel, 1968, 1994; Lueck, 1995, 1998). This argument does
not account for the ubiquity of first possession or its economic contribution. Indeed, when agents and
the resource are heterogeneous, dissipation is reduced (Leonard and Libecap, 2015).
4Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wyoming, Alberta, and British
Columbia. This system is often characterized by the phrase, “first in time, first in right.” First possession
in property rights allocation is discussed by Epstein (1978), Rose (1985, 1990), Ellickson (1993), and
Lueck (1995, 1998).
5Prior appropriation water rights have been described by many, including Burness and Quirk (1979,
1980a,b), Johnson et al. (1981), Smith (2000), Howe (2005), Hanemann (2014), and Chong and Sunding
(2006). Kanazawa (1996, 2015) explores the early development of prior appropriation in mining camps,
but it developed largely from demands for irrigation in the semi-arid region west of the 100th meridian.
Ostrom (1953) and Ostrom and Ostrom (1972) discuss the replacement of riparian rights by prior
appropriation.
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so quickly as well as why it has persisted even after initial conditions changed.6
Our empirical analysis of the economic advantages of prior appropriation relative
to riparian water rights begins with a model for deriving testable hypotheses. For the
empirical analysis we develop a novel data set that includes the location, date, and size
of 7,800 water claims along with measures of infrastructure investment, irrigated acreage,
crops, topography, stream flow, soil quality, precipitation, and drought in Colorado, the
state where prior appropriation was most completely implemented initially. We find that
i) search by early claimants generated positive externalities, lowering costs for subsequent
claimants; ii) secure, recognized property rights facilitated coordination among large
numbers of heterogeneous agents by reducing uncertainty and providing an instrument for
exchange; iii) coordination led to substantially higher levels of infrastructure investment,
which led to iv) long-run increases in income per acre in agriculture.
While valuable in much of Colorado, we find that formal prior appropriation water
rights were less critical in those parts of Colorado where water users were in close-knit,
small, older Hispanic communities and relied upon shared norms in farming and irri-
gation decisions (Ostrom, 1990). Finally, we provide new empirical estimates of the
contribution of irrigated agriculture made possible by prior appropriation to economic
development in the western US. We conclude by emphasizing that once prior appropri-
ation was put into place, it provided an on-going framework for water allocation, use,
and investment decisions. This framework remains today, channeling how contemporary
6Related to the economic advantages we examine, is the ability to move water from one place to
another that is possible only at very high cost with a riparian rights system. This transfer ability was
the basis for the implementation of the Reclamation Service (Bureau of Reclamation) in 1902 and its
multiple water storage and transfer infrastructures, as well as the transport of water to Los Angeles, San
Francisco and other urban centers from remote water sources (Pisani, 2002).
4
water uses respond to new urbanization, environmental, and industrial demands. Our
analysis extends the literatures on institutional change, property rights, first possession,
and path dependency.
1.2 Background
The western frontier was immense and varied in terrain, quality, and potential value,
leading to high information and coordination costs for resource claimants. Through most
of the 19th century, natural resources in the American West—farmland, timberland,
mineral land, rangeland, and water—were open for first-possession claiming (Kanazawa,
2015; Libecap, 2007).7 Examination of various resources reveals how little early claimants
knew about the location of the most promising mineral ore sites, timber stands, or
agricultural lands. Most parties had little experience with western resources, and many
California emigrants, for example, ultimately earned only their opportunity wage (Clay
and Jones, 2008).
Settlers sought to establish property rights with very limited information and un-
derstanding of the necessary conditions for successful enterprises. In the case of water,
frontier migrants could observe relatively stable resource characteristics, such as topogra-
phy, elevation, and stream location in their claiming decisions. Soil quality and variable
7Frontier resources, land, minerals, timber, and water were generally allocated via first possession
(Umbeck, 1977, 1981; Libecap, 1978, 2007; Libecap and Johnson, 1979; Reid, 1980; Zerbe and Anderson,
2001; McDowell, 2002; Clay and Wright, 2005; Stewart, 2009; Gates, 1968; Allen, 1991; Romero, 2002;
Getches, 2009). The federal government attempted to sell lands early in the century at a floor price of
between $1.25 and $2.50/acre, but given the vastness of the area and small size of the US Army, the
government could not control or police entry as squatters moved ahead of the government survey and
occupied properties under first possession. Kanazawa (1996) discusses the rapid shift from sales and
land auctions to first possession in the distribution of federal lands in the early to mid-19th century.
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stream flow due to drought, however, were not known. Variable stream flow was par-
ticularly critical because water claims could be made at a time of unusually high water
supplies but provided insu cient water during drought. There was a general misunder-
standing of the region’s dry climate and of the potential for drought to dramatically shift
production (Libecap and Hansen, 2002; Hansen and Libecap, 2004b,a).
The costs of establishing property rights to water were potentially high: learning
about stream fluctuation, soil quality, and optimal farming techniques was time consum-
ing and successful use of water required investment in major diversion infrastructure to
move water from rugged and unproductive riparian terrain. The report on the Colorado
Territory by Cyrus Thomas to the US Congress exemplifies the degree of heterogeneity
and uncertainty facing potential claimants:
I made an e↵ort to ascertain what the average cost of ditching is to the acre,
but found it next to an impossibility to do this. The di↵erence in the nature
of the ground at di↵erent points, the uncertainty in regard to the price of
labor, the di↵erence in the sizes of the ditches, would render an average, if it
could be obtained, worthless. (Hayden, 1869, p. 150)
Each additional wave of settlers brought new competition but also created the poten-
tial for cooperation in the construction of critical diversion infrastructure.8 These chal-
lenges had not presented themselves in settings where the riparian doctrine dominated—
where land was more homogeneous with established ownership, the climate was better
understood, farming practices were well established, and the terrain did not require water
8Hanemann (2014) points out that the key issue among migrants was raising capital for very capital-
intensive agriculture.
6
to be moved to distant irrigation sites. The riparian doctrine granted a right to a share
of the water on a stream to any owner of land adjacent to the stream.9 This property
rights scheme, however, was ill suited to western water resources.
Figure 1.1 depicts the distribution of major streams and types of water rights in the
United States to illustrate the dramatic nature of the shift in property rights regimes
for water that occurred west of the 100th meridian. The figure shows states/territories
with either riparian rights or prior appropriation or hybrids of both—those along the
100th meridian and those on the west coast. The dates are those of key constitutional,
legislative, or judicial adoption of prior appropriation.10 It is evident that populations in
states with abundant water resources held to the riparian doctrine; those in states with
both dry and wet regions maintained mixed systems; and those in the most arid states
with lower stream density rapidly adopted prior appropriation. We explore the economic
contributions of prior appropriation that led to this adoption.
Table 1.1 presents the results of a simple linear probability model for whether a
state/territory adopted prior appropriation, replacing common-law riparian rights in the
9Rose (1990) discusses the early evolution of riparian water rights in the eastern United States.
10Mead (1901, p. 7-15) discussions the imperative to shifting from riparian to prior appropriation
to promote irrigation in semi-arid regions. Dates of prior appropriation adoption: Arizona: Territory
Arizona, Howell Territorial Code, Ch. LV, Hutchins (1977, p. 170); Colorado: Constitution art. XVI
5 and 6; Co n v. Left Hand Ditch Co (6 Colo 443); Idaho: An Act to Regulate the Right to the Use
of Water for Mining, Agriculture, Manufacturing, and Other Purposes (1881), Hutchins (1977, p. 170);
Montana: Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 61 Mont. 152, 170-171, 201 Pac. 702, MacIntyre (1994, p.
307-8); New Mexico: Territorial Constitution Art XVI 2; Hutchins (1977, p. 228); Nevada: Lobdell v.
Simpson, 2 Nev. 274, 277, 278; Hutchins (1977, p. 170-71); Utah: Utah Laws 1880, ch. XX; Wyoming:
Constitution Art VIII 1-5; Hutchins (1977, p. 300); California: Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 40 (1855);
Hutchins (1977, p. 181, 233-34); Kansas: 1886 Kans. Sess. Laws 154, ch. 115; Hutchins (1977, p. 170);
Nebraska: Neb. Laws p. 168(1877); Hutchins (1977, p. 212); North Dakota: Terr. Dak. Laws 1881, ch.
142; Hutchins (1977, p. 213); Oklahoma: Terr. Okla. Laws 1897, ch. 19; Hutchins (1977, p. 171, 215);
Oregon: Oregon Laws 1909, Ch. 216. Oregon Revised Stat. ch. 539; Hutchins (1977, p. 170); South
Dakota: Terr. Dak. Laws 1881, ch. 142; Hutchins (1977, p. 170, 220); Texas: Tex. Gen. Laws 1889,
ch. 88; Hutchins (1977, p. 170); Washington: Wash. Sess. Laws 1889-1890, p. 706; Sess. Laws 1891,
ch. CXLII, Hutchins (1977, p. 170).
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Figure 1.1: Property Rights Innovation
contiguous United States.11 The dependent variable is equal to one for states/territories
(or their sub-regions) that adopted prior appropriation and zero for areas that maintained
the riparian doctrine.12 This simple exercise underscores the impression in Figure 1.1 that
inhabitants of states with lower stream density, less rainfall, and more rugged terrain were
more likely to implement prior appropriation. These are states where agriculture would
require diversion of water from streams that were sparsely and unevenly distributed across
the rugged terrain.
11Stream density is aggregated perennial flow lengths divided by area; high-resolution data are from
the National Hydrography Dataset (NHD). Precipitation is 30-year average annual rainfall data from
PRISM Climate Group. Terrain Ruggedness Index (TRI) uses the Riley method and classification syntax
are averaged over the area (see ArcGIS methods for TRI calculation below). Digital elevation model
(DEM) used for TRI calculations from USGS, downloaded from GeoCommunity.
12We divide the states with hybrid water rights regimes into sub-regions according to their climate.
North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas are divided along the 100th meridian,
Washington and Oregon are divided along the Cascade Mountain Range, and California is divided into
northern and southern regions at the latitude of Lake Tahoe, defining much wetter and drier regions of
these states.
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Table 1.1: Adoption of Prior Appropriation
Y = 1(Prior Appropriation)
Stream Density  0.285⇤⇤⇤  0.0875  0.576⇤⇤
(0.0887) (0.0592) (0.225)
Roughness 0.000910⇤⇤⇤ 0.000691⇤⇤⇤ 0.000750⇤⇤⇤
(0.000111) (0.000118) (0.000105)
Precipitation  0.000507⇤⇤⇤  0.000329⇤⇤
(0.000118) (0.000136)
(Stream Density)2 0.218⇤⇤
(0.0875)
Constant 0.152⇤ 0.577⇤⇤⇤ 0.539⇤⇤⇤
(0.0888) (0.148) (0.141)
N 57 57 57
R2 0.610 0.706 0.729
Robust standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
To better understand the economic factors that led to the rise of prior appropria-
tion, we focus on Colorado—the place where settlers in the westward movement of the
agricultural frontier first encountered semi-arid terrain in a territory not dominated by
preexisting riparian water rights holders.13 Colorado covers an area of some 66,620,160
acres containing over 107,000 miles of streams with elevations ranging from 3,317 to
14,440 feet.14 Settlers in the 19th century had to confront this vast resource and deter-
mine the best location in which to establish rights to land and water.
Prior appropriation emerged over a 20-year period, whereby more formal rights and
supporting institutions were adopted as competition for water increased (Demsetz, 1967).
Because the native population had been displaced and the federal government was remote,
13Prior appropriation first emerged in Colorado as a full tangible property right to water and became
known as the Colorado Doctrine. It was a general template for other western territories and states and,
generally, western Canadian provinces (Schorr, 2005). Only in the wetter states of California, Oregon,
and Washington did remnants of riparian water rights remain (Hess, 1916; Dunbar, 1950; Hobbs, 1997).
14The 1900 population of Colorado was 539,500, implying a population density of 1 person per 123
acres.
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early migrants had a relatively open slate to define property institutions to frontier
resources. Colorado migrants came primarily from the northeast and north-central US
where there was little need for irrigation and riparian rights dominated (Colorado Water
Institute, ND, 2; Dunbar, 1950, p. 42; Hobbs, 1997, p. 3; Romero, 2002, p. 527)
In Colorado, however, irrigation of crop lands and investment in conveyance capital
to move water to distant sites were required. As we show prior appropriation made
these feasible. Figure 1.2 depicts water and land resources as well as Water Divisions
in Colorado and demonstrates the scale of the information and decision problem facing
potential claimants.
Figure 1.2: Water Resources and Terrain in Colorado
The first Colorado Territorial Legislature in 1861 enacted legislation as a precursor
to prior appropriation, allowing water to be diverted from streams to remote locations,
abrogating common-law riparian principles that kept water on adjacent lands. A 1872
10
statute continued the move toward prior appropriation by granting right of way to ir-
rigation ditch companies. In 1876 the Colorado Constitution formally proclaimed prior
appropriation as the basis for water rights in the state. Statutes in 1879 and 1881 added
administrative structures for measurement, monitoring, and dispute resolution. The state
was divided into water divisions and subdivided into watershed districts with local wa-
ter supervisors and courts. A state Hydrologic Engineer’s O ce was created and county
clerks were to record appropriative claims that previously had been announced informally
at diversion sites. Finally, in 1882 the Colorado Supreme Court in Co n v Left Hand
Ditch Co (6 Colo 443) rejected remnants of riparianism in favor of prior appropriation
(Colorado Water Institute ND, pp. 3-8; Dunbar, 1950, pp. 245-60; Hobbs, 1997, pp. 6-9,
32; Romero, 2002, pp. 536-9). This legal infrastructure provided for the o cial definition
and transfer of prior appropriation water rights and investment in irrigation capital. It
has been described as the Colorado System, and it was adopted generally by most other
western state legislatures, courts, or constitutions (Colorado Water Institute, ND, p. 1;
Hess, 1916, pp. 652-6; Hemphill, 1922, pp. 15-8; Dunbar, 1983, 1985). Priority access
to water was defined by stream, so that being the first claimant on a given watercourse
granted the highest priority to water in any given year. Figure 1.3 shows the evolution
of water claims in Colorado over time and indicates that claimants arrived in waves,
primarily in the latter half of the 19th century.
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Figure 1.3: The Timing and Volume of Water Claims in Colorado
1.3 Economic Model of Riparian vs. Appropriative
Rights
We build upon the model of prior appropriation developed by Burness and Quirk
(1979) to provide new insights into the conditions under which prior appropriation is
more e cient than riparian water rights and derive testable implications. We begin by
characterizing the diverter’s problem under prior appropriation and the aggregate rents
generated by water claims under this system. Then, we present the diverter’s problem
under a share-based system that approximates a riparian regime in which shares are
based on adjacent land ownership, and we compare the aggregate rents generated by
each for a given number of users. Finally, we show that for a su ciently large positive
information externality from investment in establishing claims, prior appropriation is the
e cient rights allocation mechanism.15
15Positive return-flow externalities also existed, whereby the diversion and subsequent runo↵ by up-
stream claimants smoothed out the natural flow of rivers and made more water available downstream
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The model takes the timing and arrival of claimants as given, focusing on sequential
claims established by homogeneous users. Users establish a water right by constructing
diversion infrastructure of size x on the basis of their expected deliveries of water and earn
revenues from diversion according to the function R(x) satisfying R0(x) > 0, R00(x) < 0.
The costs of constructing diversion capacity of size x are given by the function C(x)
satisfying C 0(x) > 0, C 00(x) > 0. Define pi =
Pi 1
j=1 xj to be the total volume of water
claimed prior to user i.
Let the random variable S be the total water available in the stream in a given
year, with cumulative distribution function F (s) = Pr(S  s) and probability density
function f(s). We assume that users cannot divert more water than their diversion
infrastructure allows. Hence, in choosing diversion capacity (and claim size) users face
a trade-o↵ between the known costs of investment and variable flows that may or may
not exceed constructed capacity. For simplicity we assume that capacity investment is a
once-and-for-all decision.
1.3.1 Investment and Aggregate Rents in the Baseline Case
Under prior appropriation, users maximize their expected profits by choosing what
size claim to establish, subject to the availability of water. Each user i solves
max
xi
E [⇡(xi)] = [1  F (pi + xi)]R(xi) +
Z pi+xi
pi
R(t  pi)f(t)dt  C(xi). (1.1)
Expected profits can be broken into three parts. First, there is the revenue from
than had previously been the case (Crifasi, 2015). We note that these and other benefits existed but do
not model them explicitly.
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receiving a full allocation x times the probability that stream flows are su ciently large
for all senior claims to be satisfied and user i to receive her full allocation. Second, there
is the expected revenue from diverting a less than full allocation for levels of stream flow
that allow a partial diversion. This occurs when pi < s < pi+xi; all claims senior to user
i are satisfied, but user i exhausts the remaining water before receiving her full diversion.
Finally, the user bears the cost of constructing diversion facilities regardless of how much
water she receives. The first-order condition is
@E [⇡(xi)]
@xi
=  f(pi + xi)R(xi) + [1  F (pi + xi)]R0(xi) + f(pi + xi)R(xi)  C 0(xi) = 0
= [1  F (pi + xi)]R0(xi)  C 0(xi) = 0. (1.2)
Users maximize expected profit by setting the expected marginal revenue of a claim
equal to the marginal cost of establishing that claim. If the second-order condition for a
maximum is satisfied then, Equation 1.2 has a unique solution that defines an implicit
function xi = x⇤PAi (pi) and the profit function for user i under prior appropriation is
16
V PAi = E
⇥
⇡(x⇤PA(pi))
⇤
=
⇥
1  F (pi + x⇤PA(pi))
⇤
R(x⇤PA(pi)) + ...
...+
Z pi+x⇤PA(pi)
pi
R(t  pi)f(t)dt  C(x⇤PA(pi)). (1.3)
Define VPA =
PN
i=1 V
PA
i as the aggregate rents on a given stream from claims estab-
lished under the prior appropriation doctrine. Then we have
16The second order condition is @
2E[⇡(xi)]
@x2i
=  f(pi+xi)R0(xi)+ [1  F (pi + xi)]R00(xi) C 00(xi)  0.
This holds without further assumption because f(·) is a proper pdf and hence must be non-negative.
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Proposition 1: Under prior appropriation, aggregate profits V PA are increasing and
concave in the number of appropriators for N < N¯PA and have a unique maximum at
N¯PA.
Proof: see Online Appendix A. The intuition is that claiming will continue as long as
the marginal claimant’s expected profits are positive and that the final entrant will earn
zero expected profits. Hence, aggregate profits are increasing in N for N < NPA and
decreasing in N for N > NPA.
Under a riparian or other share-based system, users are able to divert shares of annual
flow based on the size of their adjacent land holdings. For simplicity we assume equal
shares.17 The arrival of a new claimant reduces the water available for all incumbent
claimants by reducing the size of each user’s share. In a true riparian setting, the geogra-
phy of the river determines N , the total number of claimants, by constraining how many
users can hold riverfront property. To simplify the analysis we treat N as a parameter.18
In a given year with water flow S, each user is able to divert S/N units of water. Hence,
the diverter’s problem under a share system is
max
xi
E [⇡(xi)] = [1  F (Nxi)]R(xi) +
Z Nxi
0

R
✓
t
N
◆
f(t)dt
 
  C(xi). (1.4)
The first two terms in Equation 1.4 are expected revenues for a user with diversion
17In practice, riparian systems require that other parties on the stream be allowed “reasonable use.”
18N , the number of claimants, may be endogenous in a more generalized water share system where
riparian lands are not a prerequisite for holding a water right. Under such a system the diverter’s
problem is to maximize expected profits by choosing how much diversion infrastructure to build, given
the expected flow of the river and expected number of other users on the stream. Of course, the Nash
Equilibrium of this strategic game is for users to enter until expected profits for all users are zero,
resulting in full rent dissipation.
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capacity xi in a share system with N 1 other users. The probability that user i receives
enough water for a full diversion size xi is the probability that their share of the flow is
greater than the capacity they have constructed, or Pr(S/N > xi) = Pr(S > Nxi) =
[1   F (Nxi)]. The second term is the expected revenue from diverting some amount
less than xi for levels of stream flow less than Nxi. The costs of constructing diversion
capacity are the same as under prior appropriation. The first-order necessary condition
for a maximum is
[1  F (Nxi)]R0(xi)  C 0(xi) = 0. (1.5)
Again, users set the expected marginal revenue of diversions equal to the marginal cost of
establishing a given amount of diversion capacity. The di↵erence between this condition
and the analogous condition under prior appropriation is that expected diversions in the
share system depend on the number of other users in the system. If we assume that the
second-order condition is satisfied, the first order condition defines an implicit function
xi = x⇤Si (pi, N) that can be used to generate the profit function for user i:
19
V Si = [1  F
 
Nx⇤Si (pi, N)
 
]R
 
x⇤Si (pi, N)
 
+
Z Nx⇤Si (pi,N)
0

R
✓
t
N
◆
f(t)dt
 
  C  x⇤Si (pi, N)  .
(1.6)
Define VS =
PN
i=1 V
S
i = NV
S as the aggregate rents on a given stream from claims
established under the riparian doctrine. Then we have
19The second-order condition is @
2E[⇡i(xi)]
@x2i
=  Nf(xi)R0(xi) + [1  F (Nxi)]R00   C 00(xi)  0.
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Proposition 2: V PA 7 V S. Either property rights regime can dominate for a given N .
Proof: See Online Appendix A. The intuition for is that for any particular N , the
distribution of diversion capacity will be di↵erent under each rights regime. A given
N in the prior appropriation system implies a hierarchy of both diversion capacity and
rents, with the highest-priority user establishing the largest investments and earning
the greatest rents (see Proposition 1). In the riparian system, users all establish equal
diversion capacity and earn equal rents. Aggregate diversion capacity is lower under the
riparian system, but that capacity is used more e ciently than under the appropriative
system under which some users earn higher marginal returns than do others. The result
is that aggregate rents may be higher for shares, even though less water is used.20
The relative e ciency of either system is closely related to the concavity of the profit
function. For constant marginal revenue and marginal cost, the two systems result in
equal aggregate investment and profit. As the revenue function becomes more concave or
the cost function more convex, the relative e ciency of the share system (for a given level
of investment) increases because there are larger gains from reallocating marginal units
of water equally across users. In contrast, assigning rights as shares reduces incentives
to invest and lowers available diversion capacity. Prior appropriation is more likely
to dominate when the number of potential entrants grows large because it secures the
investments of senior users, making them indi↵erent to the arrival of new claimants (see
20Burness and Quirk (1979) show these two e↵ects separately. They establish that aggregate rents
are higher with a share-based system for a given level of investment but that aggregate investment is
higher under appropriation for a given N . They do not compare aggregate rents across the two systems
for a given N .
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Online Appendix A). The fact that new arrivals cannot dissipate rents captured by earlier
claimants not only creates incentives for early investment but prevents classic open-access
dissipation of the resource due to over-entry. For this reason, prior appropriation becomes
more profitable relative to shares when the number of potential users grows large relative
to stream flow.
1.3.2 Positive Information Externalities from Prior Claims
General uncertainty about resource conditions and high information and transporta-
tion costs characterized the western frontier and created the need for coordination among
potential claimants. Prior claims would lower costs for additional claimants by i) provid-
ing valuable information about where and how it is profitable to divert and use water,
ii) providing infrastructure that can be shared or added to at lower cost, or iii) creating
general agglomeration e↵ects from clustered claiming and settlement (Crifasi, 2015). We
allow for the existence of an additive positive externality from prior claims  pi that lowers
the fixed costs of establishing subsequent claims. The claimant’s problem under prior
appropriation in the presence of this positive externality is
max
xi
E [⇡(xi)] = [1  F (pi + xi)]R(xi) +
Z pi+xi
pi
R(t  pi)f(t)dt  C(xi) +  pi. (1.7)
It is immediately apparent that the existence of an additive externality will not a↵ect
the magnitude of claims x⇤PA(pi) under prior appropriation but will increase profits for
junior users by reducing their fixed costs. Define VE =
PN
i=1 V
E
i as the aggregate rents
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on a given stream from claims established under the prior appropriation doctrine in the
presence of a positive externality. This gives
Proposition 3: In the presence of a positive externality from prior claims (  > 0), V PA
has a convex region for small N and for su ciently large  , V E > V S.
Proof: see Online Appendix A. The intuition is that aggregate rents under prior appro-
priation may increase at an increasing rate if the positive externality for junior claimants
is large enough to o↵set their decrease in profit from facing lower expected available
flows and constructing smaller capacity. Under these conditions, aggregate rents under
the prior appropriation doctrine exceed those under the riparian system.
We assume that the positive externality exists only under prior appropriation for
several reasons. First, prior appropriation protects senior users’ investments from the
arrival of junior users and thus makes them willing to engage in activities that generate
positive externalities, such as information and infrastructure sharing. In contrast, each
new arrival in a riparian system reduces the expected rents of incumbent users who thus
have an incentive to avoid generating positive externalities by concealing information and
refusing to coordinate or share infrastructure capacity. Second, users who own a share of
annual diversions rather than a fixed amount face greater uncertainty in their expected
diversion, making them less willing to bear the fixed costs of collective organization and
capital construction.
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1.3.3 Behavior of Claimants under Prior Appropriation
Next, we characterize individuals’ choice of where to establish a first-possession claim
under the baseline case relative to when there are large positive externalities generated
by prior claims. We derive testable hypotheses about the behavior of claimants under the
prior appropriation doctrine when   is high. This will allow us to test the implications of
our model despite the fact that we tend to observe either prior appropriation or riparian
rights in a given area, with relatively little variation in which regime dominates—broadly,
the eastern United States uses the riparian doctrine, and the arid western states use the
prior appropriation doctrine (Figure 1.1).
We assume that unknown streams are of equal expected productivity so that the
choice of where to establish a claim can be analyzed by comparing the value of being the
ith claimant on a stream with the value of establishing the first claim on another stream
of equal expected quality. For a new user to choose to follow prior claimants when other
sites are available, the expected profits must be higher for junior claimants for at least
some number of total users N . This gives
Proposition 4: In the convex region of V E, profits are increasing for junior claimants
relative to senior claimants, V Ei > V
E
i 1, and users follow rather than search for a new
stream.
Proof: see Online Appendix A. Proposition 4 follows directly from Proposition 3 because,
for aggregate rents to be convex in N , junior claimants must earn higher profits than the
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prior claimant so that aggregate profits are increasing at an increasing rate, due to the
positive externality. This is true only for relative small N , however, because the resource
scarcity e↵ect eventually dominates the positive externality.
Proposition 4 has direct behavioral implications for where claimants choose to locate
under prior appropriation depending on the magnitude of  . Proposition 1 makes clear
that profits decline with priority if there is no positive externality. Users would in general
be better o↵ searching for new streams, and hence have higher priority, rather than
following prior claimants. This would imply that users would on average be less likely
to locate on a particular stream in a particular year if there were more claims on that
stream in the previous year.
1.3.4 Information Costs, Excess Claiming, and Testable Pre-
dictions
Claiming e↵ort by senior claimants is more likely to generate positive externalities for
junior claimants when there is uncertainty about the quality of water and land resources
and when information and infrastructure investment is costly. In addition to directly
testing for whether new claimants follow prior claimants, we derive predictions about the
e↵ect of di↵erent resource characteristics on the decision of where to establish a water
right.
If information costs are an important determinant of behavior in allocating rights,
we expect claiming behavior to be more responsive to resource characteristics that are
easier to observe. Factors that a↵ect the value of diverted water and can be observed
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directly—topography, current flow, and elevation—are predicted to have a larger e↵ect
on claims than resource characteristics that are more costly for users to deduce such as
flow variability and soil quality. Flow variability is particularly important because users
may establish excess claims on a given stream if they do not account for the inter-annual
variability of flows. The prior appropriation system includes an inherent check against
overuse of water on a stream within any given year because new claimants can establish
rights to residual water only after senior diversions have been satisfied.
If users lack full knowledge about the probability of receiving similar flows in the
future, there is a potential systemic bias in the structure of appropriative water rights
that can lead to excess claiming. If users are especially prone to claim water in years
of high flow, then legal claims will come to exceed expected annual flows, and “paper”
water rights will exceed “wet” water rights. We can analyze claiming behavior during
drought to test for this systematic bias—if claims are less likely during drought, then
users must respond to first-order resource availability, but not to underlying variability
in flows.
Finally, our model relies on the assumption that users are more willing to coordinate
with other water claimants if their investments are more secure. The comparison in our
model is between users who own a fixed diversion and users who own a share of annual
diversions. We cannot directly test for di↵erences in behavior between these two groups,
but we can assess the e↵ect of property rights security on investment and coordination
within the prior appropriation system. The assumptions of our model imply that senior
right-holders should be more willing to coordinate and invest in infrastructure than junior
rightsholders because their expected water deliveries are more certain.
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Summary of Predictions
1. An increase in the number of claims on a stream will increase the number of sub-
sequent claims on that stream.
2. Easily observed resource characteristics such as topography and average flow will be
stronger determinants of claiming locations than are less apparent characteristics
such as flow variability and soil quality
3. Fewer claims will be established during drought.
4. Users with higher priority are more likely to cooperate in investing in diversion
infrastructure.
1.4 Empirical Determinants of Prior Appropriation
Claims
1.4.1 Location Data
We assemble a unique data set of all known original appropriative surface water claims
in Colorado. We combine geographic information on the point of diversion associated with
each right with data on hydrology, soil quality, elevation, homestead claims, and irrigation
to test our hypothesis about the determinants of first-possession claims.21 Colorado is
divided into 7 Water Divisions that separately administer water rights, as depicted in
21GIS data on water rights were obtained directly from the Colorado Department of Water Resources.
To our knowledge this is the first time such a comprehensive dataset has been compiled for water rights
in any western state.
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Figure 1.2. We focus on Divisions 1 to 3 (the South Platte (1), Arkansas (2), and Rio
Grande (3)), which compose the eastern half of Colorado, are home to the majority of the
state’s agriculture, and have more complete diversion data available than other divisions.
For each claim we know i) the date and geographic location of original appropriation,
ii) the name of the structure or ditch associated with the diversion, iii) the name of the
water source, and iv) the size of the diversion.
Our goal is to characterize individuals’ choices of where to establish first-possession
claims to water over time, so we divide Divisions 1 to 3 into a grid of 1-square-mile sections
and create measures of location quality by grid cell.22 Analyzing only the location where
rights were actually claimed ignores a substantial amount of individuals’ choice sets, so
including information on other claimable locations is critical for avoiding selection bias.
Figure 1.4 shows a map of Divisions 1 to 3 with the original location of all claims in
our data set, the major streams, and the grid squares used for the analysis.23 Areas with
productive soil are shaded in green.24 The figure makes clear the massive spatial scale
of the water resources in Colorado and the extent to which ignoring unclaimed locations
discards valuable information about individuals’ opportunity sets. We aggregate grid-
level characteristics up to the stream level and construct a panel of 1,922 streams from
1852 (the date of the first claim in our data) to 2013 (the date of the most recent claim),
resulting in 311,364 total observations of which we are able to constructing overlapping
22This grid approximates the Public Land Survey (PLSS) grid but fills in gaps where GIS data on
PLSS sections are not available. Actual homesteads and other land claims were defined as subsets of
PLSS sections, so grid-level variation is similar to actual variation in land ownership and land use.
23We discard sections that do not intersect any water features in our analysis because water claims
can be established only where there is water.
24We use soil group B, which is composed primarily of loamy soil and is the most productive for
agriculture.
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covariates for 248,745.
Table 1.2 provides variable names, definitions, and summary statistics for the stream-
level data and Online Appendix B provides detailed descriptions of how the geographic
covariates were constructed. Variables relating to the stock and flow of rights along a river
change over time, whereas measures of resource quality are fixed. We aggregate from grid
squares to streams for four reasons. First, priority varies by stream, so the fundamental
trade-o↵ between high-priority access and low information costs occurs at the stream
level. Second, we observe variation in flow at the stream level, so subdividing beyond
streams does not provide additional information about the water resource. Third, the
count of claims in a given square mile in a given year is extremely small, by construction.
Using such a fine spatial resolution reduces the variation in the dependent variable and
results in an arbitrarily large number of zeros in the data. Fourth, the potential for
measurement error in how we have delineated grid squares is reduced by aggregating to
a larger spatial unit that is defined on the basis of underlying hydrologic variation rather
than a more arbitrary partitioning of space.
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Figure 1.4: Possible and Actual Claim Sites
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1.4.2 Identification of Positive Spillovers in Establishing Water
Rights
The presence of an additional senior user on a stream reduces the availability of water
and makes any junior claimants worse o↵ and should make the arrival of subsequent
claimants less likely unless a positive externality exists. Hence, we look for evidence of
positive spillovers by estimating the e↵ect of previous claims on a given stream on the
probability and expected count of subsequent claims on that stream.25 This gives our
econometric model an inherently dynamic nature. We characterize the number of claims
on stream j in year t, which has the properties of a count variable, using a Poisson
distribution.26 The primary challenge to identification comes from the fact that there
are unobserved location characteristics that we cannot measure so that the presence of
prior claims could act as a proxy for unobserved site quality and cause us instead to
attribute the e↵ect of these site attributes to positive spillovers. We can condition on
soil quality, roughness, population pressure, stream flow, and stream variability, but any
other variation in location quality observed by claimants but unobserved by us will bias
our estimates if unaddressed.
Wooldridge (2005) provides a method for using initial values of yjt to estimate Av-
erage Partial E↵ects (APE) of yjt 1 on yjt that are averaged across the distribution of
unobserved heterogeneity. We assume that yjt has a Poisson distribution with conditional
25This is more appropriate than a multinomial approach because our hypotheses concern how changes
in the characteristics of the possible choices themselves a↵ect behavior, whereas multinomial choice
models are designed to estimate how individual characteristics a↵ect the choices that those individuals
make. We lack data on individual characteristics but are able to construct rich panel data on locations,
so we rely on dynamic panel methods for our estimations.
26In a given year most of the 1,922 streams receive zero new claims, there cannot be a negative number
of claims, and the maximum number of claims on any stream in a given year is 62.
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mean
E(yjt|yjt 1, ..., yj0,xj, uj) = uj exp(xjt  + yjt 1⇢), (1.8)
where uj is a site-specific unobserved e↵ect. Wooldridge shows that ⇢ can be identified
by specifying a distribution for ujt|yj0,xj. In particular, if we assume
uj = ⌫j exp( yj0 +  xj), ⌫j ⇠ gamma(⌘, ⌘), (1.9)
then forming the likelihood and integrating out the distribution of uj conditional on yj0
and xj results in an estimator that is equivalent to the random e↵ects Poisson estimator in
Hausman et al. (1984). We implement this solution and estimate a random e↵ects model
controlling for yj0 to recover the partial e↵ects of the variables of interest, averaged over
the distribution of uj. Placing parametric restrictions on the distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity and the conditional distribution of (yjt|yjt 1...yj0) is what allows us to use
the initial values yj0 to trace the evolution of yjt separately from the unobserved e↵ect.
We prefer this method to a fixed e↵ects approach, which would necessarily discard all
streams that never receive a claim, resulting in potential selection bias.
Identification requires several assumptions. First, we must assume that we have
correctly specified the densities for the outcome of interest in Equation 1.8 and the un-
observed e↵ect in Equation 1.9. We maintain this assumption, emphasizing the count
nature of our dependent variable and the standard use of a gamma distribution for mod-
eling random e↵ects in similar contexts.27 Second, we must assume that ⌫j is independent
27We perform a variety of simulations and confirm that the estimator is robust to alternative data
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of xj and yj0. This requires that the random component of the unobserved heterogeneity
in site quality be random and not dependent on observed covariates.28 Our covariates
are either fixed geographic characteristics or lagged values of other variables, making this
assumption plausible.
Third, we must assume that the dynamics of yjt follow a first-order Markov process—
that the dependence of yjt on the complete history of claims in the same location can
be summarized by the relationship between yjt and yjt 1.29 We argue that conditioning
on the cumulative diversions along a stream—an element of xj—alleviates concern that
the cumulative stock of claims prior to period t   1 could directly a↵ect yjt. In any
given period, users direct their location choice on the basis of what users in the previous
period did and the total amount of the resource that is still available for claiming, but
the total number of claims is not directly relevant except through its e↵ect on yjt 1.
Claims from the previous period provide a signal to potential followers about whether
claiming on stream j is profitable, given the declining rents of claiming on a given stream
as claims accumulate. Beyond this signal, the e↵ect of prior claims will be captured in
our measurement of cumulative prior diversions.
1.4.3 Empirical Estimates of Claiming Externalities
Table 1.3 reports the results of the random e↵ects Poisson estimator. We calculate and
report the estimated average marginal e↵ects of each of the covariates on the probability
of a stream receiving at least one new claim in a given year.30 All specifications control
generating processes for uj .
28But note that the unobserved component of Equation 1.8—uj—is allowed to depend on xj and yj0.
29This is implicit in Equation 1.8.
30Averaged across the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity uj .
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for stream size and variability (Summer Flow and Flow Variability), drought, land quan-
tity and quality (Roughness, Acres Loamy Soil, Watershed Acres), population pressure
(Lagged Homestead Claims), and Initial Claims (required for identification). Column 2
controls for the total amount of water already claimed on a stream, and Column 3 also
controls for the total number of acres already homesteaded in the same township as the
stream. We predict that claims will be more likely when water is abundant (higher Sum-
mer Flow, less water claimed, and Drought = 0) and when there is population pressure
(more lagged Homestead Claims). Limited information with high search costs implies
that di cult-to-assess variables like Flow Variability and Soil Quality should not a↵ect
claiming behavior. The key test for the existence of positive externalities is whether the
coe cient on Lagged Claims is positive.
Nearly all of the variables in Table 1.3 have the expected signs. Across all three specifi-
cations, the probability of new water claims is greater when there are more Lagged Water
Claims or Lagged Homestead Claims, Watershed Acres are greater, and the stream—
measured by Summer Flow—is larger. New Claims are less likely during Drought and
when more of the land around the stream has already been homesteaded. In Column
2, more Total Water Claimed reduces the probability of new claims, but the coe cient
becomes positive in Column 3 once we control for Total Homesteaded Acres, implying
that the scarcity of the water and land endowments was linked.
Consistent with our intuition, several of the variables have no e↵ect of the probability
of new water claims on a stream. Long-term Flow Variability and Acres of Loamy Soil are
insignificant, with precisely estimated zero coe cients in all three specifications. This
is consistent with our hypothesis that claimants in the 19th century faced significant
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information problems. Migrants were unable to assess the inter-annual variability of
stream flow or the viability of soil because they lacked knowledge of the long-term climate
and necessary farming techniques in the region, as was the case across the West.
Table 1.3: Empirical Determinants of Prior Appropriation Claims
@Pr(NewClaims > 0) (1) (2) (3)
@x Poisson Estimates, Y = New Water Claimsjt
Lagged Claims 0.00556⇤⇤⇤ 0.00570⇤⇤⇤ 0.00490⇤⇤⇤
(0.000658) (0.000621) (0.000622)
Summer Flow 0.0000590⇤ 0.0000594⇤ 0.0000641⇤
(0.0000330) (0.0000333) (0.0000345)
Flow Variability  0.0000167  0.0000172  0.0000198
(0.0000122) (0.0000125) (0.0000127)
1(Drought)  0.0105⇤⇤⇤  0.0101⇤⇤⇤  0.00832⇤⇤⇤
(0.00158) (0.00169) (0.00132)
Roughness  0.0000169  0.0000170  0.0000233
(0.0000168) (0.0000169) (0.0000191)
Acres Loamy Soil  0.00000191  0.00000159 0.00000182
(0.00000313) (0.00000302) (0.00000299)
Watershed Acres 0.00000500⇤ 0.00000501⇤ 0.00000520⇤
(0.00000282) (0.00000289) (0.00000293)
Homestead Claimst 1 0.000220⇤⇤⇤ 0.000254⇤⇤⇤ 0.000297⇤⇤
(0.0000451) (0.0000550) (0.000133)
Initial Claims 0.00941⇤⇤ 0.00934⇤⇤ 0.00329
(0.00394) (0.00386) (0.00505)
Total Water Claimed  4.84e-08⇤⇤ 0.000000104⇤⇤
(cfs) (2.33e-08) (5.20e-08)
Total Homesteaded  0.000000546⇤⇤
Acres (0.000000230)
N 248,745 248,745 248,745
 2 for H0 : R.E. = 0 7,979.36 7,571.86 8,322.72
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by stream and are reported in parentheses.
N= 248,745 is the number of stream-year cells for which we have overlapping
data on all covariates. ⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Table 1.3 provides strong evidence for the existence of significant positive externalities
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in the definition of prior appropriation water rights. The estimated coe cient on Lagged
Claims is statistically significant across specifications and indicates that the probability
of at least one new claim on a stream in any particular year increases by about a half of a
percentage point for each claim established on that stream the previous year. This is an
e↵ect size of roughly 20%, as the mean probability of new claims is just 2.5%, meaning
that the presence of just five new claims on a stream doubles the probability of new
claims on the same stream in the following year. Combined with the finding that critical
resource characteristics did not influence location choice, this result suggests that early
claimants generated important information for subsequent claimants.
We are able to rule out the possibility that claimants’ decisions to locate near prior
claimants are driven by other benefits not related to water claims by examining the role
of population growth in the evolution of water rights. Although the existence of new
homestead claims in the same township as a stream makes new claims on that stream
more likely by about 0.02 percentage points in the following year, a single water claim
has the same e↵ect on the probability of new claims as roughly 22 homestead claims.
This indicates that water claimants’ decision to follow prior claimants was driven by
benefits specific to the definition of water rights rather than by a general positive benefit
of locating near other settlers on the frontier. In Section 1.5 we analyze the mechanisms
for this resource-specific externality.
The estimated e↵ect of Lagged Claims is also large relative to other covariates. Claims
are more likely to be established on larger streams, but the e↵ect of a single lagged claim
is equivalent to a 95 cfs increase in Summer Flow, about 1/3 greater than the average
stream’s Summer Flow of 68 cfs. Similarly, although claims are about 40% less likely
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during a major drought, the presence of just two prior claims on a stream could o↵set
this major resource shock. These relative magnitudes demonstrate the economic signif-
icance of the externalities generated by early claimants—the information and potential
coordination benefits of locating near prior claimants are on par with major shifts in the
availability of water resources.
Information benefits provided by early claimants included demonstration of where
and how irrigation ditches could be established. As we detail below, the best locations
to divert water from the stream were not obvious initially and had to be discovered by
experimenting. Techniques for irrigating flat, plateaued lands above stream channels
were particularly valuable but not initially apparent. The development of these methods
attracted waves of subsequent settlers to jointly claim water and land in areas previously
considered unproductive (Boyd, 1890).
Though information generated by early claimants generated a positive externality
by lowering information costs for subsequent claimants, it also created the possibility
for rent dissipation. The fact that claims were less prevalent during drought, combined
with users’ unresponsiveness to stream variability, points to the possibility of dissipation
through over-claiming of the resource identified in our theory (although we note that a
share-based allocation would have exacerbated rent dissipation due to over-entry). Claims
are more likely when water is more abundant, indicating a first-order responsiveness to
resource abundance that does not account for the underlying variability in the resource.
It so happens that much of the settlement of the Great Plains and the western United
States occurred during a period of unusually high rainfall (Libecap and Hansen, 2002;
Hansen and Libecap, 2004). This bias in the timing of water claims, rather than some
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inherent institutional weakness in the initial allocation of property rights, can explain
the mismatch between legal water rights and available supplies observed today.
Early claims generated real value for subsequent claimants equivalent to major changes
in expected resource availability, but the accumulation of prior claims itself reduced re-
sources available for future claimants. Column 2 of Table 1.3 indicates that an increase
in the cumulative volume of claimed water on a stream reduces the probability of new
claims on that stream by an statistically-significant but economically-small margin—an
increase in the volume of claimed water of over 100,000 cfs would be required to o↵set
the positive e↵ect of a lagged claim. In contrast, an increase in the cumulative total of
homesteaded acres along a stream reduced the probability of new claims by about 1%
for every 1,800 acres claimed (roughly ten homesteads).
Reductions in available resources had a real e↵ect on claimants’ behavior, although
the e↵ect of water availability is quite small. This minuscule e↵ect may be driven by
claimants’ lack of full knowledge of the legal volume of prior claims—the sum of “paper”
water rights may not have been of primary concern to settlers as they observed flows and
chose claim sites. If claimants imperfectly understood or partially disregarded the actual
measurement of water, then the average Summer Flow of a stream is likely to be a better
measure of what they perceived the resource constraint to be.
To assess the the trade-o↵ between resource availability and information externalities,
we estimate the e↵ect of Lagged Claims on the probability of New Claims for di↵erent size
streams and plot the results in Figure 1.5.31 The vertical axis is the estimated marginal
31We do this by including an interaction term between Lagged Claims and Summer Flow, which is
present in all of the models whose marginal e↵ects are presented in Table 1.3.
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e↵ect of Lagged Claims on the probability of at least one new claim on a stream, and
the horizontal axis is average stream size. The figure shows how the e↵ect of Lagged
Claims on Pr(New Claims) varies with stream size and depicts a clear trade-o↵ between
the benefits of following earlier users and the reduced expected benefits from decreased
water availability. The positive e↵ect of lagged claims is monotonically increasing in
stream size.32 Claimants were more likely to follow prior users on larger streams than on
smaller ones, indicating a direct positive e↵ect of following that depends on there being
enough water for subsequent claimants.33
Figure 1.5: The Information-Resource Trade-O↵
The development of water rights on South Boulder Creek near Boulder, Colorado,
illustrates the economic behavior we identify in Table 1.3. The earliest claims on South
Boulder Creek are associated with the Jones and Donnelly Ditch, which was established
in 1859 to irrigate fertile land near the creek (Crifasi, 2015, p. 105). Seven other water
32Figure 1.5 is a visual depiction of the cross-partial derivative @
2Pr(NewClaims)
@LaggedClaims@SummerFlow .
33It may also be that the range of learning opportunities was narrowed on smaller streams, where the
number of possible diversion sites and techniques was smaller than on large streams.
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Figure 1.6: Evolution of Claims Near Boulder, Colorado
rights were established on South Boulder Creek in that same year. This prompted an
additional eight claimants to follow suit and establish water rights the following year,
1860. Finding the fertile lowlands already homesteaded, these new claimants developed
methods for irrigating more remote lands that were often on blu↵s above the creek.34
This discovery prompted a subsequent wave of similar “high line” ditches on Boulder
and South Boulder Creeks, including the north Boulder Farmer’s Ditch, which would
eventually supply much of the water for the city of Boulder (Crifasi, 2015, p. 187).
Eventually, claiming on both streams ceased as all available farmland and water was
fully appropriated. Figure 1.6 depicts the early development of claims on Boulder and
South Boulder Creeks.35 Claiming fell in 1861 on South Boulder Creek after two years
of heavy claiming—between 1859 and 1861 the volume of claimed water went from zero
34Lemuel McIntonish, who filed his claim in 1862, built one of the first “high line” ditches in Colorado,
demonstrating for the first time that highlands could be irrigated by diverting water further upstream
and guiding it to one’s land at a shallow grade (Crifasi, 2015, p. 187).
35Most water rights established after 1875 in the Boulder Valley were for “tailings” or return flows of
preexisting claims (Crifasi, 2015).
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to over twice our estimate of the mean summer stream flow. Similarly, when the multi-
year wave of new claims on Boulder Creek ceased in 1866, prior claims exceeded average
summer flow by a factor of ten.36 The trade-o↵ between resource availability and positive
externalities from prior claims is borne out in analysis of claiming behavior on particular
streams—new claimants are initially quick to follow prior claimants, but they are equally
quick to find new streams once the resource constraint binds.
We find strong evidence of high information costs, resource constraints, and positive
spillovers in the search and investment required to establish prior appropriation water
rights. Conditional on resource availability, homestead pressure, and unobserved site
quality, an increase in the number of new water claims along a particular stream in-
creases the probability of new claims along that same stream in the next year by 20%.37
When deciding where to establish a claim, new users are more responsive to choices
of earlier claimants than they are to many important, but di cult-to-observe, resource
characteristics. The fact that claims are more likely when water is abundant indicates
a systematic bias in the timing of claims that explains the overcapacity of irrigation
infrastructure described by Coman (1911), Teele (1904), Hutchins (1929), and Libecap
(2011).
36The excess of claimed water above estimated flow can be explained by the ability of parties to
re-appropriate return flows from prior users and our inability to measure actual flows prior to 1890.
Early measurements of water rights were notoriously rough, making exact comparisons between water
rights and flow di cult (Crifasi, 2015).
37In a series of robustness checks, discussed in Online Appendix B, we find evidence of attenuation bias
due to excess zeros and find that alternative estimators produce larger estimated marginal e↵ects than
our main results reported in Table 1.3, which should be interpreted as a lower bound on the magnitude
of positive spillover e↵ects from investment.
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1.4.4 Robustness
We reestimate our model using a set of alternative estimators to evaluate the ro-
bustness of our identification strategy given the unique character of our data set. Three
primary concerns could threaten identification. First, our data set contains a large num-
ber of 0s because in any year most streams receive 0 claims.38 Second, the distribution
of unobserved heterogeneity may be incorrectly specified in Equation 1.9 if ⌫j is not in-
dependent of xj. Third, estimates of ⇢ are biased if the errors in our model are serially
correlated. More broadly, we rely on a distributional assumption for identification and
wish to show that our estimates are robust to alternative assumptions.
We address the first problem by reproducing the estimated marginal e↵ects from
Table 1.3 using a random e↵ects Probit—also discussed in Wooldridge (2005)—where
the dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if there was a new claim along
stream j in year t. The Probit is more robust to the presence of excess zeros because it is
designed for only 0 and 1 outcomes, whereas the Poisson distribution is more sensitive.
The results are reported in Appendix Table C1. To alleviate concern over our identifying
assumptions about the relationship between ⌫j and xj, we estimate fixed e↵ects Poisson
and fixed e↵ects Logit models and find results similar to the random e↵ects Poisson and
Probit. These results are reported in Appendix Tables C2 and C3.39
We address the problem of potential serial correlation in the error in two ways. First,
38In any given year, most of the 1,922 streams in our sample do not receive new claims. Moreover,
the identifying assumption for the random e↵ects probit is slightly less restrictive for our setting in that
it requires that the probability of a new claim in year t depends only on whether there was a claim in
the previous year and not whether there were claims in other, earlier years.
39We not not estimate marginal e↵ects in these models. Instead, we report the raw coe cient esti-
mates.
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we restrict the data set to claims prior to 1950 and estimate the model by using a linear
GLS technique from Hsiang (2010) that allows for an AR(1) structure in addition to
spatial autocorrelation in the error term. Second, we perform a series of Monte Carlo
simulations to understand the behavior of the random e↵ects Poisson estimator in the
presence of serially correlated errors and/or excess 0s in the dependent variable. Our
results suggest attenuation bias in the presence of either complication, suggesting that
our estimates are lower bounds on actual e↵ect sizes.
1.5 Economic Implications of Prior Appropriation
1.5.1 Claim-Level Data
Next, we analyze the economic outcomes associated with prior appropriation claims
to understand the specific mechanisms for the externality identified in Section 4, focusing
on coordination and investment. We use a single water right as the unit of analysis in
this section and develop separate, rights-level measures of the geographic covariates from
the previous section by matching rights to the characteristics of the grid sections within
10 miles of each right, providing measures of the quality of nearby lands that would have
been available for development. We also construct the variable CoOp, which is equal
to 1 for claims established on the same stream on the same day as other rights. We
argue that these rights are associated with ditch companies and other forms of formal
cooperation (Hutchins, 1929). We obtained GIS data on irrigation canals and ditches for
Divisions 1 (South Platte) and 3 (Rio Grande) in addition to GIS data on crop choice
40
and irrigated acreage by crop for certain historical years from the Colorado Department
of Water Resources.40 Each right has a unique identifier number that we use to match
to ditches and irrigated lands, resulting in 550 rights for which we have complete data.
Table 1.4 provides summary statistics for the claim-level data.
Stream flow, flow variability, and homesteads are defined by stream as in Section 4.
We measure the quality of the land endowment or potential land endowment associated
with each right slightly di↵erently in this section than in Section 4. For each right we
calculate the number of acres of loamy soil within 10 miles of the point of diversion in
addition to the roughness of the terrain within a 10-mile radius of the point of diversion.
We also calculate the total acreage of all 1-mile grid squares that are adjacent to the
stream. These variables capture the quality of the land endowment available for claiming
in proximity to each right. For the subset of our data that we are able to match to actual
irrigated areas, we calculate the characteristics of irrigated lands associated with each
right. We control for these important geographic covariates because the quality of the
land and water resources near each right may have a direct e↵ect on agricultural output
that would bias our estimates of the e↵ect of property rights on returns to irrigation if
unaddressed.
To measure farm size, we calculate the total number of acres irrigated associated with
each right for which we have matching data, captured in the variable Irrigated Acres. Our
irrigation data also tell us how many acres of which crops were irrigated with the water
from each right. We use estimates of average yield per acre and prices for Colorado for
each crop in our data set from the Census of Agriculture from 1936 and 1956 to estimate
40We use data for 1956 for Division 1 and 1936 for Division 3. No data are available for Division 2.
41
the total value of irrigated agricultural output for each water right. The variable Total
Income reports the crop income associated with a right in a given year, in 2015 dollars.
These data form our primary basis for estimating the returns to irrigated agriculture in
Colorado.41
41Because there are potentially other irrigated parcels for which the Department of Water Resources
does not have data, our estimates of the value of agricultural production due to the expansion of irrigated
acreage made possible by the prior appropriation doctrine may be biased downward.
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In this section we document the role of formal property rights as a coordinating
institution for resolving collective action problems associated with the development of
natural resources. To do this, we estimate the e↵ect of priority-di↵erentiated water
rights on coordination and investment in irrigation infrastructure in Colorado. First, we
examine the determinants of cooperation across all of eastern Colorado, focusing on the
hypothesis that users with more secure (higher-priority) water rights are more likely to
coordinate. Then, we use a subset of our data to estimate the e↵ect of coordination
on investment and how this e↵ect varies across di↵erent institutional settings. We do
this using data on ditch investment and income per acre for Divisions 1 (South Platte)
and 3 (Rio Grande), which comprised markedly di↵erent institutional settings for the
development of prior appropriation.
1.5.2 Formal vs. Informal Institutions: Division 1 vs. 3
Di↵erences in resource and user characteristics between Water Divisions 1 and 3
in Colorado provide a novel setting for analyzing the comparative advantages of formal
property regimes relative to informal institutions for collective action. Broadly, conditions
in Division 3 were consistent with the necessary conditions for successful common-pool
resource management laid out by Ostrom (1990), whereas conditions in Division 1 were
not. Di↵erences in geography between Divisions 1 and 3 meant that there was much
greater potential for entry of subsequent claimants in Division 1; the average number
of potential riparian homesteads across all streams was 50 in Division 1 but just 28
in Division 3. Similarly, Division 1 was much more heavily settled than Division 3,
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increasing potential bargaining costs of water users. The average township in Division 1
had 84 homestead claims, compared to 11 homesteads per township in Division 3.
Division 3, composed mainly of the San Luis River Valley, had a predominantly
Hispanic population living in small, close-knit communities with relatively long use of
communal norms to govern ditch management and irrigation water allocation (Mead,
1901; Hutchins, 1928; Smith, 2016). Community-owned large ditches or acequia madres,
were managed by ditch bosses or mayordomos who oversaw construction and annual
maintenance contributions by local users, rotated water access, and arbitrated disputes.42
This setting required little outside capital investment and the collective action problem
was solved by custom (Hutchins, 1928; Meyer, 1984, pp. 64-73, 81; Smith, 2016). In
contrast, Division 1 was comprised of larger numbers of heterogeneous migrants from
elsewhere in the US (Hicks and Pen˜a, 2003). In this setting, the legal doctrine of prior
appropriation was the common denominator among parties seeking to form and finance
an irrigation network (Hobbs, 1997, p. 4; Crisfasi, 2015). This key di↵erence between the
two jurisdictions allows us to assess the role of formal property rights as a coordinating
mechanism with and without the presence of informal institutions.43 Our prediction is
that appropriative rights will generate larger benefits across a variety of outcomes in
Division 1 than in Division 3.
42In fact, observation of these and other acequias in northern New Mexico prompted the first settlers
to attempt irrigation in eastern Colorado (Crifasi, 2015).
43See Appendix Table C7 for a comparison of the two groups.
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1.5.3 Property Rights Security and Coordination
First, we examine the determinants of cooperation, focusing on the hypothesis that
users with more secure (higher-priority) water rights are more likely to coordinate. Prior-
ity is an ordinal ranking of rights along a stream. Including this simple priority measure
in a regression would force the e↵ect of priority to be linear, implying that the di↵erence
between being the 1st and 2nd claimant is the same as the di↵erence between being, say,
the 14th and 15th claimant. To allow for a non-linear, semi-parametric e↵ect of priority
on cooperation in ditch construction, we rank rights by priority and create bins for each
decile of the distribution of priority by stream, yielding 10 dummy variables—one for
each decile. For example, if the 1st Decile Dummy is equal to 1, the associated water
right was among the first 10% of claims along its stream and had high-priority access to
water during drought. This approach allows changes in priority to a↵ect the probability
of coordination di↵erently at di↵erent points in the distribution of priority.
We use a fixed-e↵ect logit regression to obtain semi-parametric estimates of the
marginal e↵ect of priority on coordination among rightsholders in infrastructure invest-
ment, relying primarily on within-watershed variation for identification.44 The dependent
variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 for rights that are established on the same stream
on the same day. We control for stream characteristics, land quality within ten miles,
population pressure, and watershed and year fixed e↵ects. Table 1.5 presents the esti-
mated marginal e↵ects of each priority decile on the probability of cooperation, relative
44We use watershed fixed e↵ects rather than stream fixed e↵ects because coordination and spatial
competition over irrigation works was often not limited to a single stream. Rather, development occurred
based on what lands where arable, which varies by watershed.
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Table 1.5: Marginal E↵ects of Priority on Cooperation
Y = CoOp Divisions 1-3 Division 1 Division 3
1st Priority Decile 0.123⇤⇤⇤ 0.119⇤⇤⇤ 0.0207 0.194⇤⇤
(0.0359) (0.0390) (0.0779) (0.0861)
2nd Priority Decile 0.0541 0.0725 0.0154 0.123
(0.0456) (0.0472) (0.0929) (0.102)
3rd Priority Decile 0.0882⇤ 0.119⇤⇤  0.00675 0.202⇤
(0.0468) (0.0488) (0.0861) (0.119)
4th Priority Decile 0.0318 0.0419 0.0624 0.00619
(0.0432) (0.0431) (0.0855) (0.0905)
6th Priority Decile  0.0154  0.00285  0.0558 0.0391
(0.0518) (0.0495) (0.0698) (0.0997)
7th Priority Decile 0.0366 0.0359  0.0761 0.146
(0.0401) (0.0421) (0.0674) (0.107)
8th Priority Decile  0.0591  0.0910⇤  0.181⇤⇤  0.0301
(0.0447) (0.0485) (0.0753) (0.0902)
9th Priority Decile  0.160⇤⇤⇤  0.211⇤⇤⇤  0.238⇤⇤  0.292⇤
(0.0465) (0.0522) (0.0939) (0.175)
99th Priority Percentile  0.236⇤⇤⇤  0.330⇤⇤⇤  0.488⇤⇤⇤  5.193⇤⇤⇤
(0.0643) (0.0774) (0.189) (1.314)
Homesteads Yes⇤⇤ Yes⇤ Yes Yes
Summer Flow Yes⇤⇤⇤ Yes⇤⇤⇤ Yes⇤ Yes⇤⇤
Flow Variability Yes Yes Yes Yes⇤
Roughness Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acres of Loamy Soil Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acres Yes Yes Yes⇤ Yes
Watershed Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,756 4,354 1,206 937
Standard errors are clustered by watershed and reported in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
to the 5th decile.45 Columns 1 and 2 are estimated jointly for all three divisions, whereas
columns 3 and 4 report the results for Divisions 1 and 3 separately.
45Marginal e↵ects are estimated at the median values of the controls, and standard errors are clustered
by watershed.
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We find a higher probability of coordinating for investment in infrastructure for rights
above the 5th Decile and a lower probability of coordinating for rights below the 5th
Decile. Figure 1.7 depicts the marginal e↵ects of each priority decile on cooperation
associated with the model in Column 2 of Table 1.5. Users with prior appropriation
water rights in the top 10% of priority on a given stream are about 12 percentage points
more likely to jointly establish claims and ditches than are users in the middle decile,
while very junior right-holders in the 10th decile are 20-30 percentage points less likely
to coordinate. Taken together, these estimates imply that water right-holders with the
highest priority on a stream were 40 percentage points more likely to coordinate with
one another than were the most junior rightsholders. This general pattern holds within
Division 1 and Division 3 separately, particularly with respect to the lowest-priority right-
holders. As Figure 1.7 indicates, much of this e↵ect is concentrated in the bottom half of
the distribution of priority—the e↵ect of priority on investment is larger for users with
low priority.
Those righsholders with the most variable water supply were the least likely to jointly
invest in irrigation capital. By contrast, rightsholders in the top half of the priority
distribution face relatively small di↵erences in their exposure to stream variability and
have a high likelihood of securing water and not stranding ditch capital and hence have a
similar probability of coordinating. However, each drop in priority in the lower half of the
distribution represents a larger shift in real access to water, generating larger e↵ects on
the probability of coordination. The more heterogeneous users become in their exposure
to risk, the less likely they are to cooperate. This finding is consistent with that of
Wiggins and Libecap (1985), who find that cooperation among oil field operators in oil
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Figure 1.7: Marginal E↵ects of Priority on Cooperation
field coordination and investment becomes less likely as they become more heterogeneous.
1.5.4 Formal Coordination as a Basis for Investment
Next, we assess the extent to which ditch investment di↵ered according to whether
or not claimants coordinated with other water rightsholders. Our measure of investment
is the length of the ditch (in meters) associated with a given water right. Longer ditches
were costlier to construct but allowed users access to more valuable farmland, particularly
in Colorado, where land adjacent to streams was often rugged and unsuitable for farming
(Hayden, 1869). The costs of ditch investment had to be borne up front, before there
was reliable information about the availability of water over time. Mead (1901, p. 8)
estimated that private irrigation systems valued nearly at $200,000,000 (nearly $6 billion
in 2015 $) were in place as of 1901 in the western United States. He also describes the
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complexity of raising capital and the coordination and consolidation among irrigation
companies in the Cache La Poudre valley, one of the first areas in Colorado to be placed
under large-scale irrigation.46
Coordination between water rightsholders could increase ditch investment because i)
it allowed users to share these up front costs, ii) it allowed for the possibility of pooling
water claims during times of limited flow to maximize the value of irrigated agriculture,
iii) it created a framework for governance and assignment of maintenance responsibilities,
and iv) it helped prevent post-contractual opportunism from informal promises of water
deliveries (Hanemann, 2014; Crifasi, 2015, p. 158). Users who cooperated still developed
individual ditches known as laterals to bring water to their own particular fields (see
Figure 1.9 below). This gives us unique ditch lengths for each water right in this portion
of our sample, even if those users were part of a cooperative e↵ort.
Prior appropriation facilitated the cooperation necessary for development by mak-
ing users in any given period secure against the arrivals of future claimants. A share
system must confront the problem of how to incorporate demands of future claimants,
whereas prior appropriation right-holders are ensured that their rights are paramount
relative to future arrivals. In fact, claimants eventually began constructing large ditches
for the sole purpose of selling access to future settlers in need of water (Crifasi, 2015).
This development required security of ownership so that ditch builders could reap the
rewards of their investment. Prior appropriation also provided a way to clearly delineate
group membership by creating a secure property right that could serve as a legal basis
46In the late 19th and early 20th centuries there were numerous investigations into irrigation in the
western United States including Newell (1894), Mead (1901), Adams et al. (1910). Newell (1894) reports
irrigation system values of $94,412,000 in 1890 in 11 western states. He also reports data on di↵erences
in ditch construction costs according to ditch width.
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for incorporation—new arrivals would have to buy their way into existing arrangements.
This reduced uncertainty about group size and heterogeneity, which lowered the costs of
collective action (Ostrom, 1990; Libecap, 2011). Finally, having quantified, secure prop-
erty rights made incumbent water users willing to accommodate and even transact with
new arrivals because their senior claims were not threatened by new, junior claims. As
previously noted, the additional benefits of these formal property rights are predicted to
be lower in areas where informal institutions had already supplied a remedy for collective
action problems, as in Division 3.
Table 1.6 reports our estimates of the e↵ect of cooperation and priority on Ditch
Meters using a GMM approach developed by Hsiang (2010) that adjusts for possible
spatial and time-series autocorrelation in the error term. We include watershed and
year fixed e↵ects and a variety of controls for access to water and land resources, with
complete results on the controls reported in Appendix Table C5.47 Columns 1, 2, and
3 are estimated jointly across Divisions 1 and 3, while Columns 4 and 5 are estimated
separately for each division.48 In our preferred specifications we find that cooperative
claimants’ ditches are 10,198 meters longer than those of non-cooperative claimants’ in
Division 1 but that coordination does not a↵ect ditch investment in Division 3.49
47The pattern of spatial dependence follows Conley (2008).
48Ditch data are not available for Division 2.
49One potential concern with our results on ditch investment is that investment and cooperation are
jointly determined, making CoOp endogenous in Table 1.6. If this is true, then the finding that CoOp
ditches are longer may be due to simultaneity bias. We argue that the empirical time line associated
with establishing and then developing a water claim resolves this issue. While intended ditch length
may be simultaneously determined with whether or not a right is claimed cooperatively, actual ditch
construction is a costly and time-consuming process—the average ditch in our sample is 10.5 kilometers
long. The upshot is that the cooperative status of a water claim is exogenous to ditch length because the
former necessarily predates the latter. A similar concern could be stated and similarly dismissed with
respect to the endogeneity of priority. To check the robustness of our results we reproduce them first
by omitting priority and then by using the number of claims in the same month and same watershed as
a given right as an instrument for CoOp and obtain similar estimates of key parameters. The number
of claims in the same month and same watershed as a given right a↵ects the probability of cooperation
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Table 1.6: E↵ects of Coordination and Priority on Investment
Y = DitchMeters Divisions 1 & 3 Division 1 Division 3
CoOp 5,963.9⇤⇤ 4,461.5⇤⇤ 4,472.0⇤⇤ 10,197.9⇤⇤  2,202.6
(2,736.0) (2,199.0) (2,195.7) (4,004.1) (2,139.6)
Claim Size 244.7⇤⇤⇤ 255.7⇤⇤⇤ 256.3⇤⇤⇤ 352.2⇤⇤⇤ 130.0⇤⇤⇤
(61.56) (69.15) (69.33) (102.0) (29.70)
Priority Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Summer Flow Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Flow Variability Yes Yes⇤ Yes⇤ Yes Yes⇤⇤
Roughness Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acres of Loamy Soil Yes⇤⇤⇤ Yes Yes Yes⇤⇤ Yes
Claim Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Homesteads Yes
Homestead Acres Yes Yes Yes
Watershed Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 550 550 550 292 258
R2 0.293 0.354 0.353 0.464 0.169
Spatial HAC standard errors reported in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Two possible alternative explanations for the null e↵ect of coordination on investment
in Division 3 are that the predominantly Hispanic population either i) lacked full access
to the legal system for enforcing prior appropriation claims or ii) had less wealth and
access to credit than settlers in Division 1, thereby reducing investment. The fact that
high-priority claimants are more likely to cooperate in Division 3, just as in Division 1
(Table 1.5), makes it unlikely that legal status varied sharply between groups, pointing
toward another explanation for di↵erences in investment incentives. However, di↵erences
because rights established nearby other rights (in space and time) have more other claims with which
to potentially cooperate. At the same time, the number of new claims in a given month should not
directly a↵ect the investment of any particular claim, except through its e↵ect on the cooperative status
of that claim. In general we find that after controlling for coordination, priority has no direct e↵ect on
ditch investment. For the sake of brevity we do not report the coe cients for each decile, but they are
available in Appendix Table C3.
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in wealth would result in less ditch building overall but should not reduce the role of
formal coordination for projects that were undertaken. Instead, we argue that the di↵er-
ential role of formal coordination in Divisions 1 and 3 can be explained by the dominant
communal norms in Division 3, which rendered formal property institutions less crucial in
that area. In contrast, Division 1 required formal legal rights as a basis for coordination
among many heterogeneous claimants.
To illustrate the role of priority on investment in Division 1, consider the McGinn
Ditch on South Boulder Creek and north Boulder Farmer’s Ditch on Boulder Creek. Both
ditches were large, cooperative investments. The McGinn Ditch was constructed in 1860
and had the number 2 priority on South Boulder Creek. Farmer’s Ditch was the longest
ditch in the Boulder Valley when it was constructed in 1862, costing $6,500 ($165,000 in
2015 dollars) and irrigated over 3,000 acres of land (Crifasi, 2015, p. 187). Even larger
ditches followed. The Larimer and Weld Canal from the Cache La Poudre River, was
constructed sequentially between 1864 and 1878 with the huge capacity of 720 cfs (5,400
gallons) and was 53 miles long to irrigate 50,000 acres (Hemphill 1922, p. 15; Dunbar
1950, p. 244). Construction costs for such ditches were financed either through forming
non-profit mutual ditch companies among irrigators or through organizing commercial
ditch companies with a broader group of investors, such as the Colorado Mortgage and
Investment Company of London, England (Dunbar 1950, pp. 253-58, Libecap 2011, p.
73).
Figure 1.8, from the June 20th, 1874, issue of Harper’s Weekly, depicts an arrangement
typical for eastern Colorado and highlights the increase in arable land associated with
coordinated development of irrigation canals.
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Figure 1.8: Coordinated Investment
Source: Harper’s Weekly, 6/20/1874, p 514.
1.5.5 Irrigation and Income Per Acre
Ultimately the purpose of establishing a water right in Colorado was to provide wa-
ter as an input to irrigated agriculture. Prior appropriation added value to agricultural
endeavors by encouraging search and investment and by separating water rights from ri-
parian land holdings, allowing for much greater and more productive areas to be irrigated
than would have been possible under the riparian system. To estimate the magnitude
these benefits, we begin by depicting the extent of land resources that could have been
irrigated under the riparian doctrine, given that settlers on the Western frontier were
generally constrained to homestead sites totaling 160 to 320 acres. We conservatively
assume that land within a half mile of a stream or river could have been claimed and
considered to be adjacent to the water for the purposes of assigning riparian water rights.
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Figure 1.9 depicts riparian lands in eastern Colorado—indicated by cross hatch shading—
and the location of loamy soils (hydrologic soil call B) best suited to farming—indicated
with green shading—and reveals that the riparian doctrine would have both constrained
the total area of land available for farming and have precluded the ability to irrigate some
of the most productive soils in the region that were remote from streams. We match our
data on water rights with GIS data on actual irrigated acreage prior to the advent of
groundwater pumping in Divisions 1 and 3 to calculate the actual contribution of the
prior appropriation doctrine to agriculture in the region.
Figure 1.9: Riparian and Arable Land in Eastern Colorado
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Figure 1.10 depicts riparian land and actual irrigated acreage in 1956 for Division
1 and 1936 for Division 3, the earliest years for which GIS data are available in each
division.50 We focus on these early years so that we can isolate the e↵ect of access to
surface water as from the e↵ect of access to groundwater.51 Roughly 45% of the irrigated
land in Division 1 and 34% in Division 3 were riparian. The ability to claim water from
streams and put it to use on non-adjacent land allowed for substantial growth in irrigated
acreage in both divisions, resulting in an additional 546,552 acres of usable farmland—an
increase of 133%.52
Focusing on per-acre returns allows us to better understand the contribution of prior
appropriation to farm productivity. We combine our rights-level data on irrigated acres
and crop choice with historical state-level data from the Census of Agricultural on prices
and yields for each crop to estimate the value of production on riparian and non-riparian
lands. These results are summarized in Table 1.7. The value of non-riparian irrigated
agricultural production was $228,480,781 in Division 1 and $58,583,937 in Division 3.
The ability to move water away from streams increased combined agricultural output in
50Data for a contemporaneous cross-sectional or panel comparison are not available. To alleviate
concern about the comparison over time, we collect county-level data on the number of farms, average
farm size, and average farm value for both areas in 1935 and 1954 (the closest years to our sample years
for which data are available) from the Census of Agriculture. We calculate the percentage change in
each outcome between 1935 and 1954 and find no statistically significant di↵erence in changes over time
across divisions. The total number of farms fell in both divisions, while both average farm size and value
increased. We also collect data on average yields for irrigated wheat in both periods in both divisions
and find no statistically significant di↵erence in the change in yield from 1936 to 1956 across divisions.
These tests imply that economic conditions in agriculture in the two divisions moved in similar ways
over the 20-year period.
51Estimates from later in the 20th century are contaminated by the ability of farmers to supplement
their surface water rights by pumping groundwater. The technology for groundwater pumping became
widely available after World War II.
52These land-based estimates form an upper bound on the expansion of irrigated agriculture made
possible by prior appropriation. The counterfactual scenario involving adherence to the riparian doctrine
may have resulted in more riparian land being irrigated, given that non-riparian lands would have been
unavailable.
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Figure 1.10: Riparian and Irrigated Land
(a) Division 1
(b) Division 3
Colorado in our sample years by 134%.
The variation in income per acre across land type and division is striking. In Division
1, the average non-riparian farm earned roughly $20 more per acre than the average
riparian farm, while farms in Division 3 exhibit no di↵erence.53 This suggests that non-
riparian lands were more productive than riparian lands. This is consistent with the fact
53This di↵erence is statistically significant at the 99% level. Newell (1894, p. 6) provides estimates
for the value of irrigated agricultural production/acre at $361/acre for all of Colorado (in 2015 $).
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Table 1.7: Irrigated vs. Riparian Land (2015 $)
Division 1 Division 3
Riparian Non-Riparian Riparian Non-Riparian
Irrigated Acres 337,917 408,275 72,350 138,277
Total Farm Income $183,310,710 $228,480,781 $30,948,204 $58,583,937
Median Farm Size 147 760 99 262
Average Income Per Acre $527.50 $548.32 $601.67 $600.10
(3.28) (3.05) (14.64) (12.36)
Standard error of the mean reported in parentheses for Income Per Acre.
that users incurred substantial infrastructure costs to reach non-riparian lands and left
much of the riparian corridor untouched.
Table 1.7 makes it clear that the riparian system would have constrained rightsholders
to the more rugged terrain adjacent to streams and limited total farm size, assuming only
riparian homesteads had access to water. This, in turn, would have precluded important
20th-century innovations in farming technology centered around the development of large,
flat farms in the West (Gardner, 2009; Olmstead and Rhode, 2001). Previous studies of
prior appropriation have emphasized the ability to separate water from streams as a
necessary condition for irrigation in the arid West, but this does not explain fully why
a first-possession mechanism was adopted. Another necessary ingredient for successful
irrigation was an incentive structure to facilitate costly investment. Tables 1.5 and 1.6
suggest that first possession provided this incentive structure by granting a more secure
property right and Table 1.7 confirms that nonriparian lands were in fact more productive
and allowed for larger farms.
Taken together, these results suggest that formal coordination under the prior appro-
priation doctrine was an important determinant of per-acre income for farmers. Coor-
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dination facilitated ditch investment, which in turn provided access to more productive
land and may have allowed for more e cient, larger farms and cooperation along other
productive margins. Equation 1.10 summarizes the possible channels through which
building a cooperative ditch could increase per-acre returns.
dIPA
dCoOp
=
@IPA
@Acres

@Acres
@Ditches
· @Ditches
@CoOp
+
@Acres
@CoOp
 
+
@IPA
@Ditches
· @Ditches
@CoOp
+
@IPA
@CoOp
.
(1.10)
We estimate a series of linear regressions using the GMM technique mentioned above
to obtain each of the partial derivatives in Equation 1.10 and to construct the total e↵ect
of coordination on income per acre. Table 1.8 presents our estimates of the e↵ect of
cooperation on income per acre by division. The results used to construct these estimates
are available in Appendix Table C6. The first row of Table 1.8 reports the reduced-form
estimate of cooperation on income per acre, not controlling for ditch length or farm size.
The second row contains our estimate corresponding to the various channels in Equation
1.10, estimated using GMM with spatial HAC standard errors that are uncorrelated
across equations, and the third row presents a robustness check using seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) to account for possible correlation in the errors across equations.
Income per acre was $105 to $132 higher (relative to a mean of $544 per acre) for users
in Division 1 who coordinated their water rights claims and investment. This exceeds
the average di↵erence in productivity for nonriparian vs. riparian farms reported in
Table 1.7 by a factor of five. While reaching nonriparian lands did lead to greater
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Table 1.8: The E↵ect of Coordination on Income Per Acre
Division 1 Division 3
Reduced Forma 105.7⇤⇤⇤  7.934
(28.60) (51.50)
Back of the Envelopeb 132.20⇤⇤⇤  10.53
(15.06) (29.04)
SURc 109.12⇤⇤⇤  12.32
(38.16) (49.74)
a Spatial HAC GMM standard errors reported in parentheses
b Spatial HAC GMM standard errors estimated equation-by-equation.
Standard error of the prediction obtained using the delta method and
assuming errors are uncorrelated across equations
c Correlated standard errors reported in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
income per acre, users who cooperated generated even greater benefits. This suggests that
ditch investment was critical for productivity and that the ability to build longer ditches
via formal cooperative arrangements (documented in Table 1.6) increased productivity
substantially by granting access to the most productive lands.
In contrast, we find no e↵ect of cooperation on income per acre in Division 3. This
di↵erence is driven largely by the fact that coordination promoted ditch investment in
Division 1 but not in Division 3. Both divisions faced a classic collective action prob-
lem in the development of irrigation works. In Division 3 this problem was largely
solved in a classic Ostrom (1990) manner with cultural norms and informal mechanisms,
which worked well given the small number of homogeneous users. In this settings formal
property rights added little value. Division 1 was rapidly settled by a large number of
heterogeneous claimants, making a norm-based solutions untenable. Here, the collective
action problem was solved by contracting based on formal, legal property rights.
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1.5.6 Irrigated Agriculture and the Development of the West
By the late 19th century the role of irrigated agriculture in expanding economies was
increasingly recognized (Newell, 1894). We perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation of
the contribution of irrigated agriculture and prior appropriation to economic development
in the Western United States in the early 20th century. Table 1.9 presents our estimates
of the value of irrigated crop production for western states in 1910 and 1930. We use data
from Easterlin (1960) and from the Bureau of Economic Analysis on personal income by
state and the 1910 and 1930 US Censuses of Agriculture to estimate the value of irrigated
crops and report those estimates as a percentage of state or territory income.54 Finally,
using an average of the share of non-riparian income in total agricultural income from
Divisions 1 and 3 in Colorado, we estimate the value of non-riparian irrigated agriculture
as a percentage of state income.55 This represents the estimated share of state income due
to agricultural production that could not have taken place under the riparian doctrine.
Table 1.9 indicates that irrigation of non-riparian lands contributed 2% to 14% of
54Department of Commerce, BEA Survey of Current Business, May 2002 and unpublished data,
“Personal Income and Personal Income by State, 1929-2001,” provided to the authors by Robert A.
Margo. State income values were calculated on a state basis by multiplying population by per capita
income. Population data for 1910 and 1930 from US Agricultural Data, 1840-2010, distributed by the
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). For 1910, per capita income
was calculated by taking the mean of per capita income from 1900 and 1920. Per capita income from
1900 was taken from Easterlin 1960, Table A-3. Per capita income for 1920 and 1930 were taken from
unpublished data from Easterlin and the BEA. The 1910 values of irrigated crops were calculated by
summing individual crop values by state. Data from irrigated crop values were taken from the 1910
Census of Agriculture, Volumes 6 and 7. The 1910 Census of Agriculture notes that data for irrigated
crops were taken from supplemental schedules, and the information is considered to be incomplete.
Therefore, all available irrigated crop value data were summed. The 1930 values of irrigated crops were
calculated by summing the eight most valuable crops according to state. The number of crops included
in the calculation was chosen to be eight, as the 9th crop value added less than 5% to the total irrigated
crop value. Data for irrigated crop values were taken from US Agricultural Data, 1930, distributed by
ICPSR.
55We calculate a weighted average of the share of non-riparian income of total irrigated income from
Divisions 1 and 3, weighted by total irrigated acreage in each division. We estimate that roughly 57%
of irrigated land is non-riparian and could not have been irrigated under a strict riparian system.
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Table 1.9: Contribution of Agriculture to State/Territory Income
1910 1930
Irrigated % of State Non-Rip. Irrigated % of State Non-Rip.
Crop Value Income % Crop Value Income %
AZ $109,088,226 7.8% 4.4 % $218,429,933 6.8% 3.9%
CA $1,198,335,054 5.4% 3.1% $4,730,240,019 6.6% 3.8%
CO $955,887,896 15.4% 8.8% $1,216,338,604 14.4% 8.2%
ID $411,487,005 26.0% 14.8% $1,176,322,174 38.2% 21.8%
MT $357,644,113 12.9% 7.3% $543,002,901 14.2% 8.1%
NV $129,481,278 19.7% 11.3% $199,548,712 18.5% 10.6%
NM $132,129,974 9.2% 5.2% $282,107,719 14.2% 8.1%
OR $182,079,466 3.9% 2.2% $425,281,996 5.2% 3.0%
UT $355,860,090 15.1% 8.6% $526,011,917 14.8% 8.4%
WA $182,766,338 2.9% 1.7% $896,351,083 6.2% 3.5%
WY $182,849,867 13.7% 7.8% $355,530,834 19.1% 10.9%
Notes: 1) All dollar amounts are reported in 2015 dollars. 2) Territory income is used for states prior to statehood.
3) Calculations are detailed in footnote 53.
state income in 1910 and 3% to 21% in 1930. These estimates understate the total
impact on state income due to multipliers across the economy. Adelman and Robinson
(1986), for example, estimate multipliers of 1.8 to 2.1 for every dollar of income from
agriculture. Overall, irrigated agriculture played a critical role in the development of the
West, accounting for more than 10% of total income in many states by 1930. Moreover,
we estimate that more than half of the value generated by irrigated agriculture came
from non-riparian lands.56
56This estimate is an upper bound on the value-added by prior appropriation because strict adherence
to the riparian doctrine would likely have led to the irrigation of more riparian lands, relative to what
we observe today.
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1.6 Conclusion
Prior appropriation encouraged socially-valuable search that lowered information costs
regarding the most favorable diversion locations. Prior claims raised the probability of
subsequent claims by 20%, an e↵ect equivalent to a near doubling of stream size in at-
tracting settlers. Denser settlement, in turn, brought agglomeration economies in the
joint investment in large irrigation infrastructure. The ability to coordinate and combine
formal, tradable prior appropriation rights along with greater certainty of water deliveries
for high-priority rights holders facilitated joint development of canal systems. The top
10% of senior claimants were 40 percentage points more likely to form ditch companies
than were those below the median priority. This cooperation in turn led to a doubling of
average ditch length (about 10 km) that greatly expanded irrigable, high-quality land,
especially in Division 1. Longer ditches brought more productive non-riparian land under
irrigation, with the longest, cooperative ditches adding over $100 per acre to productiv-
ity. Prior appropriation water rights not only encouraged investment, but were exchanged
routinely to consolidate and redirect water (Hemphill, 1922). There was no detectable
e↵ect, however, in Division 3 where formal rights appear not to have been required to
coordinate e↵ort. Overall, under prior appropriation between 3.5% and 20% of western
state incomes by 1930 were directly attributable to irrigated agriculture, much of which
would not have been feasible under the default riparian rights system. These estimates
do not incorporate multiplier e↵ects from higher agricultural incomes that might have
doubled the economic impact in each state.
The value of any particular form of property right to a natural resource is its ability to
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align individual incentives to reconcile competing demands and to encourage innovation,
investment, and reallocation. The western frontier provides a unique laboratory for
analyzing the development or modification of property institutions. Prior appropriation
emerged in response to new conditions in a setting where institutional change could
occur at relatively low cost with high expected net returns. The migration of thousands
of frontier claimants was fueled by anticipation of capturing resource rents that required
a new property rights regime. Although migrants were numerous and dissimilar in many
ways, they carried with them common notions of individual ownership of land and other
natural resources and an ability to modify institutions as local conditions suggested. In
case of prior appropriation of water, claimants applied existing first-possession allocation
of agricultural and mineral land to water, rather than adhering to an eastern riparian
system that o↵ered lower returns under semi-arid conditions.
Once in place, prior appropriation molded expectations for the creation and distribu-
tion of net rents and the associated range of uses, exchange, time frames, and investment
in water. These conditions remain today among property rights holders. In the face of
new demands for water for environmental, urban, and industrial use along with more vari-
able and possibly declining supplies, water rights will be exchanged and water reallocated
(Brewer et al., 2008; Murphy et al., 2009; Culp et al., 2014). Such transfers can take place
within the prevailing rights system. Doing so not only recognizes the long-term benefits
associated with prior appropriation but reflects the economic, social, and political path
dependencies associated with it. Recent policy discussions calling for a restructuring of
water rights to shares of total annual allowable uses or to mandate instream environmen-
tal flows do not su ciently consider the value of and stakes in the contemporary priority
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rights system. Unlike the earlier frontier setting, major uncompensated movement to any
new institutional arrangement would not be at low cost.
1.7 Permissions and Attributions
The content of Chapter 1 is the result of a collaboration with Gary D. Libecap.57
57For helpful comments we thank Christopher Costello, Olivier Descheˆnes, Dick Startz, Louis Kaplow,
Steve Shavell, and Henry Smith as well as participants at workshops at Indiana University, UC Santa
Barbara, Arizona State University, Columbia University, Harvard, UCLA, Montana State University,
the Society for Organizational and Institutional Economics, and the Western Economics Association.
We also thank the Walton Family Foundation and the Sustainable Water Markets program at UC Santa
Barbara for supporting this research. Excellent research assistance was provided by Cody Wilgas, Love
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Chapter 2
Creating Anticommons: Historical
Land Privatization and Modern
Natural Resource Use
2.1 Introduction
Much of the world’s indigenous populations lack formal property rights to land and
many economists consider this a hindrance to development. The main argument is that
informal rights are too insecure to encourage current users to invest in land improve-
ments that would increase future income streams (see Demsetz (1967); Alchian and
Demsetz (1973); Feder and Feeny (1991); Besley (1995); Goldstein and Udry (2008);
Besley and Ghatak (2009b)). Land privatization programs attempt to address underin-
vestment problems in tribal areas of Africa, South America, and elsewhere, and are now
being debated for indigenous populations in Canada (Flanagan et al., 2010; Brinkhurst
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et al., 2013). Through subdivision and codification of land rights, privatization programs
seek to enclose the “commons”, which are areas or resources for which individual users
lack defensible exclusion rights (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968; Barzel, 1997). In theory,
having title over a specific parcel strengthens individual exclusion rights and hence makes
future claims on prior investments secure (Alston et al., 1996).1
In this paper, we study an unintended consequence of strengthening individual exclu-
sion rights via top-down privatization. Even when subdividing land successfully encloses
the commons for one type of land use (e.g., agriculture), the process can create anticom-
mons problems for other resources. Anticommons arise when too many exclusion rights
are granted relative to the e cient scale of resource use, potentially causing underutiliza-
tion and delays in resource exploitation (Heller, 1998; Buchanan and Yoon, 2000; Heller,
2010). Our concern is that subdividing land rights will raise the transaction costs of man-
aging larger-scale resources such as shale oil and wind that are best managed at scales
exceeding those required for agriculture (Lueck, 1989; Fennell, 2011; Bradshaw Schulz
and Lueck, 2015). This is important because in some areas with large indigenous pop-
ulations the value of large-scale natural resources—if managed well—may dominate the
value of farming.
We study this issue by examining the legacy of the U.S. government’s sweeping pro-
gram for “allotting” Native American land over 1887-1934. During this period, roughly
41 million acres of Indian land was subdivided into 320, 160, 80, and 40 acre parcels
1Galiani and Schargrodsky (2012) review empirical studies on privatization. Most recent studies find
that private ownership has stimulated productivity-enhancing investments in land and agriculture (see
Banerjee et al. (2002); Field (2005); Do and Iyer (2008); Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010). But some
studies fail to find significant improvements in agricultural investment after titling (Brasselle et al., 2002;
Jacoby and Minten, 2007).
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and allotted to individual Native American families with the goal of encouraging pro-
ductive farming (Carlson, 1981).2 Some allotted lands were fully privatized and others
were not, with multiple family heirs retaining exclusion rights as we explain in section
3. Other tribal lands were never allotted and remain held in common by tribal members
through their governments. The upshot is that modern Indian reservations are a patch-
work of commonly owned land, individually owned parcels, and fractionated ownership
of allotted trust lands (Trosper, 1978; Anderson, 1995; Banner, 2009). This patchwork
enables comparisons of long-run investments under di↵erent tenure arrangements. Em-
pirical research suggests that non-privatized Indian lands have less housing investment
(Akee, 2009) and lower agricultural investments (Anderson and Lueck, 1992), as standard
models of property rights and investment would predict.3
We contribute to literatures on land privatization, anticommons, land assembly, and
path dependence by examining how exogenous variation in the subdivision of mineral
ownership a↵ects the timing and density of modern shale oil extraction focusing on
one of the world’s largest and currently booming oil fields.4 Our empirical analysis is
based on a detailed case study of drilling on and around North Dakota’s Fort Berthold
reservation and combines GIS files of land and mineral tenure with publicly available
data on horizontal wells from the North Dakota Oil and Gas Commission. The parcels in
our sample sit atop the highly productive Bakken oil field and represent a mosaic of tribal
2A less charitable interpretation is that land allotment policies were devised to transfer land from
Native Americans to white settlers (see Carlson (1981); Banner (2009).
3A common challenge to identification in this literature is possible selection bias due to the fact that
tenure is not exogenous to land characteristics (see Akee and Jorgensen (2014).
4Our study relates to a working paper by Holmes et al. (2015) who study agglomeration economies
of density, also in the context of the Bakken. One key di↵erence is that our study focuses to a greater
extent on property rights and tenure, exploiting the di↵erent systems that exist on Forth Berthold.
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land, allotted trust land, and fully privatized parcels. The history of land and mineral
tenure on the Fort Berthold reservation, as described in section 3, almost guarantees that
tenure is exogenous to shale quality and we provide evidence that this is true within oil
field units.
Our focus on shale oil is important for three reasons. First, modern technology of
oil extraction sometimes called horizontal fracking requires coordinated exploitation
of a landscape’s subsurface. This is because shale extraction is executed by drilling a
horizontal line that extends up to three miles from a vertical well pad. Exploiting this
technology in a subdivided landscape can generate large land assembly transaction costs.5
Importantly, we argue that transaction costs are plausibly lower under tribally governed
common lands.
Second, the spatial nature of horizontal drilling allows us to study how the economic
use of a natural resource by one owner is a↵ected by the property rights governing
neighboring parcels. When exploitation requires coordination across parcels, even those
parcels with advantageous bundles may not be able to utilize the resource due to the
tenure of neighboring parcels. The cross-parcel development of horizontal wells in the
tenure mosaic of Indian reservations provides a rich setting for identifying parcel-level
spillover e↵ects. In this way our study relates to Arago´n (2015) who finds that property
rights in one area can have local economic spillovers on other areas in the context of
Canadian aboriginal lands.
A third reason for focusing on shale oil is that land allotment and the resulting
tenure arrangements were exogenous to shale endowments. The ownership of shale was
5There would be 24 separate square 40-acre parcels along a three-mile line.
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inadvertently subdivided in patterns determined by surface characteristics, primarily
agricultural potential. Because of this exogeneity, we are able to credibly estimate the
e↵ects of property rights, parcel sizes, and parcel shapes on the speed and extent to which
horizontal drilling has occurred.
We compare patterns of horizontal drilling across over 40,000 parcels o↵ and on the
reservation during the 2005 to present day oil boom. We find the timing and density
of drilling under a parcel is negatively impacted by increases in the number of private
parcels in a radius around a parcel: for example, an increase in subdivision within the
radius by one standard deviation is associated with a 75 percent decline in the probability
the parcel owner has been compensated for his shale and a 1,516 day delay in the time
elapsed before his parcel is first penetrated by horizontal fracking line. The delays are
longer for land that was subdivided into allotted trust tenure. In contrast, we do not find
a negative neighbor e↵ect for neighboring tribal parcels, which share a common owner
and hence do not require spatial coordination amongst additional owners with exclusion
rights. Our back-of-the-envelope estimates suggest the costs of tribal shale subdivision,
in terms of delayed oil-royalty earnings, exceeded the overall income earned by American
Indians on Fort Berthold in 2010 under reasonable discounting assumptions.
We also find that a parcel’s size and shape has large e↵ects on the timing and probabil-
ity of oil development, with larger and more rectangular parcels exploited before smaller
squares. This finding complements studies that detail how the “wrong” parcel allocation
(at least for one type of resource use) can impair current productive use because rights
and resource use are path dependent (Libecap and Lueck, 2011; Bleakley and Ferrie,
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2014; Hornbeck and Keniston, 2014).6
Our study also provides context to Kunce et al. (2002), who argue that conventional,
vertical natural gas drilling was more costly on U.S. federal land when compared to
neighboring private parcels.7 On one hand, our evidence is consistent because it suggests
that oil developers avoid placing the vertical portion of horizontal wells on tribal and
government lands. On the other hand, we find that extending horizontal lines through
additional tribal lands causes less delay than the extension through private parcels. This
finding suggests the marginal contracting cost of horizontal drilling, per unit of distance,
is lower in areas with contiguous government ownership and our supplementary estimates
of drilling delays on and around federal and state land on the Bakken support this
interpretation. This is an economic rationale for government ownership of shale that we
return to in the paper’s conclusion.
2.2 Exclusion, Commons, and Anticommons
In this section we articulate a fundamental tension in the design of property rights
over land harboring large and small scale resources with di↵erent physical attributes.
It is not possible to simultaneously match the scale of property rights with the optimal
management scale of all resources unless use and exclusion rights are unbundled for every
resource (Lueck, 1989; Barzel, 1997; Fennell, 2011; Bradshaw Schulz and Lueck, 2015).
6Our study also contributes to the literature on how historical, top-down imposed institutions im-
posed on indigenous societies has a↵ected modern economic outcomes. This literature includes Feir
(2013), Dippel (2014), Akee et al. (2015), Akee (2009), Cookson (2010), Anderson and Parker (2008),
Dimitrova-Grajzl et al. (2014), Cornell and Kalt (2000), Anderson (1995), Anderson and Lueck (1992),
Carlson (1981), and Trosper (1978) among others.
7The study was retracted due to data errors (Gerking and Morgan, 2007).
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We study the case where the privatization of a tract of land is bundled, meaning the
surface owner also obtains some combination of use and exclusion rights to the subsurface
(e.g., oil reservoirs, ground water, coal, shale oil).
2.2.1 Land Subdivision and Enclosure of the Commons
The “commons” is often conceptualized as an agricultural landscape on which a group
of N individuals have use rights. The group can exclude outsiders, but each individual
lacks the right to exclude other members.8 The inability to exclude leads to overuse of
a fixed, congestible resource such as grazing land because each user bears only 1/N of
the long-run costs of his current use but accrues the full current benefit. Similarly, the
inability to exclude can result in under-investment in crops and other commodities for
which there is a time lag between labor and capital investments and the flow of output.
The incentive problem is that the individual investor bears the full current cost but
expects to accrue only 1/N of the returns on investment in later periods.9
Two solutions to these problems involve privatizating the landscape. The first is to
grant ownership to one individual by vesting her with a single use and single exclusion
right. The enclosure movement of eighteenth century England is a leading empirical
example. Access to communally used fields was restricted and land was converted to
large private farming estates (Smith, 2000). The second solution is to subdivide the
landscape into individual parcels and assign a single exclusion and single use right per
8Group exclusion distinguishes common property from open access (Dietz et al., 2003; Ostrom, 1990).
9Merrill (1998, p. 730) argues that the ability to exclude is crucial for private property: “Give
someone the right to exclude others from a valued resource, i.e., a resource that is scarce relative to
human demand for it, and you give them property. Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not
have property.”
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parcel. Examples of privatization schemes like this include homesteading in the United
States, Canada, and Australia during 18th and 19th century (Allen, 1991), programs in
modern sub-Saharan Africa (Mwangi, 2006), and the allotment of Native American lands
during 1887-1934.
Sole private ownership of the landscape is a useful theoretical construct that we
return to below, but we focus on subdivision because it is the empirically dominant form
of privatization.10 In the Mathematical Appendix we present a model that compares
agricultural productivity generated from a landscape of size L by N users under common
property with agricultural productivity from the same landscape when it is subdivided
into L/N private parcels. Suppose that constant returns to scale in land dominate for
parcels larger than LA and that N <
L
LA
so that each user experiences constant returns
to scale.11 In the appendix we prove that 1) aggregate agricultural investment under
the subdivided regime depends on land area and output and input prices only—it is
not a function of N , and 2) productivity is the same under subdivided parcels or sole
ownership.
In summary, when considering only agriculture, subdivision is a politically feasible
(and empirically dominant) alternative to sole ownership that can solve the tragedy of
the commons as long as parcels are not too small. Next, we examine potential drawbacks
10There are several reasons why subdivision may dominate sole ownership as a solution to the tragedy
of the commons. First, vesting ownership of an entire resource to a single individual is politically
unpopular. The enclosure movement in England generated widespread political backlash and prompted
a generation of classical economists including Adam Smith and David Ricardo to consider “land rents” as
a fundamental source of economic value. Second, sole ownership over a landscape creates principle-agent
problems because tenant farmers are not the resource owners (see (Smith, 2000; Barzel, 1997; Allen and
Lueck, 2003).
11This follows from the assumption that there is some minimum e cient scale LLA , but that constant
returns to scale are operative above this minimum farm size.
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to subdivision.
2.2.2 Subdivision and the Creation of Anticommons
Whereas common property problems are due to the lack of exclusion rights, anticom-
mons problems are caused by too many exclusion rights. Heller (1998) draws attention
to the problem by describing the puzzle of underused Russian resources in the wake of
post-Soviet privatization. The problem, according to Heller, was that the post-communist
privatization scheme allocated exclusion rights to too many people, creating prohibitively
high contracting costs to resource use. Buchanan and Yoon (2000) formalize Heller’s rea-
soning with a theoretical model intended to demonstrate how the under-use of a fixed
resource worsens with the number of owners holding exclusion rights.
Buchanan and Yoon (2000) argue that an anticommons is essentially a pecuniary
externality, caused by an input assembly problem. If multiple agents have the right to
exclude others from the use of a required resource, each will fail to consider the e↵ect on
others when setting their own use fee. The result is an aggregate price that is economically
too high; hence underutilization of the resource relative to sole ownership.12
Subdivision solves the commons problem for agriculture described above and it does
not in general create an anticommons for agriculture because the scale of exclusion rights
matches the scale of profitable agricultural use, by design. In our empirical case, for
example, land was typically subdivided into square parcels that varied in size with rainfall
conditions in an e↵ort to create individually profitable units based on historical farming
12This argument assumes the sole owner does not have monopoly power in the consumption or use
market.
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technology. Subdivision can, however, create an anticommons for any resource that
requires coordinated agreement across multiple parcels. When the resource is too finely
subdivided, an investor or entrepreneur must contract with each owner thereby slowing
the use of resources requiring large scale coordination (see Brooks and Lutz 2016).
The problem is perhaps best illustrated using the parking lot example from Buchanan
and Yoon (2000). There are two parking lots, one near and one distant. A tragedy of the
commons arises if no one holds exclusion rights for the nearer parking lot and it becomes
congested to the point where its value is dissipated entirely. In contrast, the tragedy
of the anticommons occurs if multiple users hold exclusion rights to the entire lot, so
that anyone wishing to park must purchase a ticket from each exclusion-right holder.
Sole ownership of the lot averts both tragedies. To extend the analogy to the case of
subdivided ownership, imagine users are allocated property rights to individual parking
stalls so there is a single use and exclusion right per stall. This solution solves both
problems because the scale of use and exclusion rights match, at the scale of resource use
(a single stall).
The problem we study arises when a new use for the resource is discovered that exceeds
the spatial scale of subdivision. Suppose a developer wishes to convert the parking lot
to an o ce building or a public park. Though the tragedy of the parking commons was
solved by privatizing parking stalls, doing so created an anticommons at the scale of the
lot itself. To undertake lot-scale investment, the developer must contract with each stall
owner because each holds an exclusion right.
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2.2.3 Constraints on Subdivision for Optimal Resource Use
The tension we study can be defined with reference to two constraints that interact to
determine optimal ownership for di↵erent land-based natural resources. The first is the
incentive-based set of rules necessary for avoiding economic dissipation due to commons
and anticommons discussed above. This constraint requires a property rights system that
delineates one and only one use right for each exclusion right. The second constraint is
defined by the physical and technological characteristics of the resource.
Figure 2.1 plots the number of use rights against exclusion rights for a resource, or
landscape, of size L. Parcel size is increasing towards the origin because increasing the
number of rights via subdivision of a fixed land area results in smaller parcels. The 45
degree ray characterizes the set of subdivision schemes for which the number of use rights
matches the number of exclusion rights. This is the incentive-based constraint on the
property rights system. Whereas the commons is characterized by an abundance of use
rights relative to exclusion rights (lightly shaded area), the anticommons is characterized
by an abundance of exclusion rights relative to use rights (heavily shaded area). The
classic agricultural tragedy of the commons occurs at point A, where there is a single
(group level) exclusion right and N use rights. Subdivision of the landscape forces a
move to point B by creating N exclusion rights (one for each use right).
The physical/technology constraint varies by resource, and over time with technologi-
cal changes. For agriculture, subdivision beyond LLA creates parcels that are smaller than
the minimum e cient scale for agriculture, violating the physical/technology constraint
for optimal ownership.13 Hence, the set of subdivision schemes that achieve the e cient
13Bleakley and Ferrie (2014), for example, explain how the 19th century subdivision of parcels that
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Figure 2.1: Use vs. Exclusion Rights
outcome for agriculture lies along the CA line.
The physical/technology constraint on optimal ownership is more restrictive for large-
scale resources such as shale oil and conventional oil. To illustrate, we plot the physi-
cal/technology constraint for both types of oil in Figure 2.1. Subsurface shale oil is tightly
trapped and relatively immobile. Profitable extraction of it requires the exploitation of
a large contiguous subsurface area via horizontal drilling and fracturing. If we assume
that L is the size of a commercially feasible fracking project, the physical/technology
constraint implies that only one user can profitably engage in fracking. This means the
de facto use rights for shale oil will lie along the vertical line of Figure 2.1 at one, re-
gardless of the de jure property rights regime. Hence, full subdivision of the landscape
were too small for productive agriculture in the U.S. state of Georgia necessitated di cult contracting
in order to combine the small parcels into larger, economically viable parcels.
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into N parcels moves the property rights regime for shale oil to point D. This point is an
anticommons because there are many exclusion rights (i.e., each parcel owner) but only
one use right can be e↵ectively exercised.
The physical/technology constraint on conventional oil implies that subdivision also
fails to incentivize its e cient use, but for a di↵erent reason. Oil in conventional reservoirs
can migrate across property lines, making exclusion rights to it costly to enforce.14 For
a reservoir of size L, oil mobility implies only one de facto exclusion right, resulting in
the constraint depicted by the horizontal line at 1 in Figure 2.1. Subdivision above the
reservoir grants multiple use rights but only a single exclusion right is feasible, resulting
in a commons at point A. The upshot is that, for shale oil or conventional oil, the
only intersection between the incentive constraint (the use = exclusion nexus) and the
resource/technology constraint is sole ownership at point C. Conventional oil and shale
oil pose symmetric problems—commons and anticommons—with the same solution: sole
ownership.
More generally, spatial anticommons can arise when subdivision fails to anticipate a
larger scale (and shape) of technologically feasible and economically profitable resource
use in the future and inadvertently raises future costs of transitioning to the new uses.
Square 160 acres parcels, for example, do not match well with the optimal scale of land
use for horizontal shale drilling, wind energy from a line of turbines, and linear biking
trails.15
14One landowner can deplete the resource without physically accessing the subsurface below his
neighbor’s land by sucking oil from under his neighbor’s parcel (Libecap and Wiggins, 1984; Wiggins
and Libecap, 1985).
15One might alternatively refer to spatial anticommons as spatial externalities, which are ultimately
caused by a too fine subdivision of property and include a broad array of problems studied by environ-
mental and urban economists. Hansen and Libecap (2004a), for example, show that the prevalence of
78
2.3 Inadvertent Subdivision of Shale: Natural Ex-
periment on the Bakken
To assess the importance of anticommons, we study the subdivision of the Bakken
shale.16 It sits beneath the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation and surrounding North
Dakota land. The historical subdivision of these lands creates an ideal natural experiment
for two reasons. First, the “allotment,” homesteading, and later flooding of Fort Berthold
created three types of tenure with di↵erent exclusion rights per parcel. Second, the
subdivision of shale was inadvertent to the intentional subdivision of farm land, which
occurred long before shale was profitable to extract and even before conventional oil
was discovered in North Dakota. The resulting patterns of modern parcel sizes, shapes,
and tenure types are largely exogenous to the quality of shale that only recently became
valuable via horizontal drilling.
2.3.1 Background on Land Allotment
The allotment of Fort Berthold during the late and early 19th centuries was governed
broadly by the U.S. Allotment Act of 1887. It authorized the U.S. government to sequen-
tially subdivide communal Indian reservations and allot parcels to families and individuals
(see Figure 2.2). Allotment was promoted to encourage agricultural investment17 and,
small farms limited private contracting solutions to controlling wind erosion and contributed to the Dust
Bowl of the 1930s.
16The Bakken, which began to boom around 2005, is one of the world’s largest oil fields. Because of it,
by 2012, North Dakota had surpassed California and Alaska to become the second largest oil producing
state after Texas. By the end of 2012, the Bakken accounted for 10 percent of the entire nation’s oil
production (Zuckerman, 2013).
17The sponsor of the Act, Senator Henry Dawes, argued that under communal ownership Indians had
not “got as far as they can go because they own their land in common, and under that [system] there
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consistent with this claim, research indicates the scale and timing of allotment across
reservations was determined primarily by agricultural land quality (Carlson, 1981).
The Act allotted land to Indians with the intention of granting private ownership in-
cluding the right to alienate after 25 years or once the allottee was declared “competent.”
The distribution of acreages for arable land was as follows: 160 acres to each family head,
80 acres to each single person over 18 and orphans under 18, and 40 acres to each other
single person under 18. On reservations for which total acreage exceeded that necessary
for allotments, the surplus land was privatized and opened for white settlers.
Through a combination of land sales once allotment owners were declared competent,
and through the declaration of surplus land, millions of reservation acres are now fully
privatized parcels, many owned by non-Indians.18 The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)
of 1934 halted further privatization, declaring those acres not already alienated to be
held in trust by the Bureau of Indian A↵airs. Allotted lands not privatized prior to 1934
are held in trust to this day, and interests in the land are divided among the heirs of
the allottee. Hence, the “allotted trust” parcels on Indian reservations today often have
multiple owners with exclusion rights, sometimes more than 100 (Russ and Stratmann,
2014). On the Fort Berthold reservation, a study reported the following breakdown
of ownership: 13 percent of allotted trust tracts had two owners; 38 percent had 3-10
owners; 26 percent had 11 to 25 owners; 14 percent had 26 to 50 owners; and 8 percent
had more than 50 owners (U.S. Government Accounting O ce 1992).
Figure 2.2 shows that many reservations that were allotted overlap shale deposits,
is no enterprise to make your [land] any better than that of your neighbors.” The quote is cited from
Ambler (1990, p. 10).
18Some of the land cleared for fee simple ownership remains owned by Native Americans, but there
are no systematic sources on how much this is.
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Figure 2.2: Timing and Distribution of Allotted Reservations
Notes: This map is based on our digitization of an 1890 O ce of Indian A↵airs map of 97 reservations that were west of
the Mississippi River and clearly visible in the original map. With the exception of the Osage Reservation, we exclude
Oklahoma because reservations in that state are no longer federally recognized. The data on surplus land and the timing
of allotment come from Indian Land Tenure, Economic Status, and Population Trends prepared by the O ce Indian
A↵airs of the U.S. Department of Interior in 1935. Based on that report, 68 of the reservations in our sample were
allotted to some extent, and surplus land was given to white settlers in 21 reservations. Of the 68 reservations that were
allotted, some land was alienated and sold out of trust on 56 reservations. The spatial definitions of shale basins and
plays come from the U.S. Energy Information Administration.
but agricultural quality, rather than shale, was the main determinant of cross-reservation
allotment (Carlson, 1981).19 Allottees on Indian reservations, settlers who acquired sur-
plus lands, and homesteaders before 1916 also acquired subsurface rights to oil, even if
it was not yet discovered. After 1916, the Stock-Raising Homestead Act split oil own-
ership, reserving subsurface rights to the federal government on new homesteads. For
19The Allotment Act mimicked the 1862 Homestead Act, which promoted settlement of the U.S.
West (Allen, 1991). The Homestead Act granted to settlers 160 acre parcels except that certain parcels
near railroad lines were 80 acre grants. To promote the settlement of less productive agricultural land,
homestead acts of 1909 and 1916 raised the size of homesteads from 160 to 320, and then to 640 acres.
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reservations not yet allotted at this time, subsurface rights under future allotments were
often reserved for tribes by specific laws.20 In general, only reservations allotted after the
mid-1910s have their communal mineral interests fully intact today. Most reservations,
including the Fort Berthold, are mosaics of subdivided subsurface tenure.
2.3.2 Shale Ownership under Fort Berthold and Surrounding
Counties
Figure 2.3 shows our study area, which is the Fort Berthold reservation and the
surrounding shale-endowed counties of Dunn, McKenzie, and Mountrail. Today, there
are several active shale oil fields in this area as defined by the North Dakota Oil and Gas
Commission. These are relatively homogenous areas of terrain beneath which shale can
be extracted in amounts that justify drilling. Figure 2.3 also shows that some land in our
study area is owned by North Dakota, the U.S. forest service, and the U.S. Bureau of Land
Management (BLM). The state trust lands were granted from the federal government in
1889 and are typically sections 16 and 36 of every township. The forest service and BLM
land comprise failed homesteads, many that were purchased back during the 1930s. The
forest service land mostly comprises the Dakota Prairie Grasslands: it is managed for
wildlife and recreation and drilling for oil there is constrained.
Fort Berthold was established in 1851 by treaty. Though the treaty established a
reservation of over 12 million acres for three tribes—the Arikara, Mandan, and Hidatsa—
subsequent policies reduced the reservation to its contemporary size of 988,000 acres.
20These reservations include Blackfeet in 1919; Crow in 1920; Fort Peck in 1920 and 1927; Fort
Belknap in 1921; Northern Cheyenne in 1926; and Wind River in 1928 (Ambler, 1990).
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Congress approved Fort Berthold for allotment in 1894, and the northeastern section
was opened for surplus homesteading settlement in 1910. The surface and subsurface
rights in the surplus section were quickly privatized (see Figure 2.4).21 The majority of
Fort Berthold was allotted but not released from trust. Some allotted parcels were later
privatized (Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.3: Study Area: Fort Berthold and Surround Counties with Oil Fields
Notes: This map depicts parcel boundaries and present-day oil fields on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation and
surrounding counties. The surrounding counties are Dunn, McKenzie, and Mountrail. Data on oil fields come from the
North Dakota Oil and Gas Commission.
21Land in the surplus section was closer to a late 19th century railroad line, and it has a gentle slope,
suggesting it was of higher agricultural value than the rest of the reservation. Although not the focus
of our present study, this observation is consistent with studies of land privatization which emphasize
the endogenous selection of lands for privatization (Besley, 1995; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010; Field,
2005; Akee and Jorgensen, 2014).
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After the allotment era, 150,000 acres of land reverted back to tribal ownership when
the reservation was flooded for an Army Corp of Engineers dam project in 1951. This
Garrison Dam project was controversial and it forced the relocation of families o↵ of
allotted trust land near the Missouri River and into other areas of the reservation. The
Garrison Dam episode explains why so much of the tribally owned shale today is by the
river (Figure 2.4); some of the land is dry now but it was in the original flood basin. Today,
the reservation is a mosaic of tenure—privatized parcels (i.e., “fee simple”), allotted trust,
and tribal. Within the part of the reservation that is on an oil field, there are 285,651
acres of allotted mineral tenure, 176,820 acres of fee simple tenure, and 109,016 acres of
tribal tenure.
The variation in Fort Berthold parcel sizes and tenure are plausibly exogenous to
the quality of shale beneath because this variation resulted from historical processes
that were unrelated to shale oil, which became profitable only recently. Moreover, the
reservation was established, allotted, and opened for surplus settlement long before even
conventional oil and gas was discovered. As Ambler (1990, p. 42-43) notes: “When it
surveyed [Fort Berthold] in the 1910s, the U.S. Geological Survey found no oil and gas
potential, which is not surprising because oil and gas was not discovered in the state until
1951.” The Garrison Dam project was approved in 1947, also before the discovery of oil.
2.3.3 Statistical Comparisons of Ownership and Shale Quality
Although ownership patterns were not intentionally selected based on shale endow-
ments, the process may have unintentionally biased some patterns towards higher quality
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Figure 2.4: Parcels and Mineral Tenure on Fort Berthold Reservation
Notes: This map depicts parcel boundaries, oil fields, and mineral tenure types on the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservations. The surrounding counties are Dunn, McKenzie, and Mountrail. The data sources are described in Table
2.2. The areas lacking parcel boundaries are areas for which parcel level data are lacking.
shale. We investigate this possibility empirically by examining how shale thickness and
depth correspond to tenure, parcel sizes, and shapes. In general, thicker shale holds more
oil. Shale depth can be important too, because drilling costs tend to rise with greater
depth. For these reasons, we follow the lead of Weber et al. (2014), by measuring the
economic quality of shale with its thickness-to-depth ratio at the parcel level. We first
multiply thickness by 100 to reduce the number of decimal places in the regression below.
For parcels within an oil field, this variable ranges from 0.13 to 1.82 with a mean of 0.98.
O↵ of oil fields, the variable has mean of 0.85.22
22The thickness and depth data come in the form of contour lines. To convert those data to numerical
values, we employed the “Topo to Raster” interpolation tool in ArcGis. Shale thickness for parcels on
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Panel A of Figure 2.5 shows the depth of the Bakken formation. Darker areas indicate
deeper shale formations. Lighter areas in panel B indicate thicker shale. The visual
evidence in Figure 2.5 indicates there is variation in the quality of shale within and
across tenure types. Visually, it is di cult to detect any clear patterns of bias but we
note the following. First, the western part of the reservation has deeper but thicker shale
than the eastern part. Second, the northern part of the reservation covers relatively thick
shale.
To evaluate the exogeneity of shale quality, we run parcel-level regressions with
thickness-to-depth as the dependent variable. The full data set consists of 51,083 parcels
but we constrain our attention to the 41,979 parcels on oil fields, which are depicted in
figures 2 and 3. For the reservation, we obtained parcel-level GIS data on mineral tenure
for allotted and tribal parcels from the Bureau of Indian A↵airs (BIA) in addition to
GIS data on which areas of the reservation have fee simple mineral rights. Because the
BIA does not identify the parcel boundaries for fee parcels, we overlapped the reservation
tenure files with GIS data on parcels for Dunn, McKenzie, and Mountrail counties to fill
in the missing parcel boundaries. We explain the data set and sources in more detail in
section V.
We estimate Equation 2.1 using OLS, where i indicates the parcel and j is one of
the 203 oil fields spanning the 41,979 parcels. The variable Tenure encompasses allotted
trust, fee simple, forest service, BLM, and state lands. The variable Acres represents the
size of the parcel. The variable Longside is a measure of parcel shape. It is the length of
an oil field ranges from 10.6 to 141.9 with a mean of 78.4 feet. Shale depth ranges from 5,494 to 8,644
feet with a mean of 8,070.
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the parcels’ longest side, in miles. Holding constant parcel acres, an increase in Longside
means the parcel is skinnier (e.g., progressively more linear than square).
Thick   to Depthij = ↵j +  Tenureij + Acresij + Longsideij + "ij (2.1)
Table 2.1 presents the estimates. The even numbered columns include oil field fixed
e↵ects and the odd numbered columns do not. The omitted category in the odd-numbered
columns is private parcels o↵ the reservation. The omitted category in the even numbered
models is a private parcel, o↵ reservation, in oil field 1.
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Table 2.1: Correlations between Thickness-to-Depth and Parcel Characteristics
Across Within Across Within Across Within
Fields Fields Fields Fields Fields Fields
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fee 0.348⇤⇤⇤ 0.0259 0.325⇤⇤⇤ 0.0236
(0.0882) (0.0185) (0.0823) (0.0195)
Allotted 0.139⇤⇤ 0.0241 0.134⇤⇤ 0.0224
Trust (0.0535) (0.0175) (0.0517) (0.0182)
Tribal 0.181⇤⇤⇤ 0.0235 0.165⇤⇤⇤ 0.0205
(0.0555) (0.0159) (0.181) (0.0107)
State 0.00875 -0.001 0.043 0.00236
(0.0348) (0.00574) (0.0358) (0.00627)
U.S. Forest -0.316⇤⇤⇤ -0.00164 -0.181⇤⇤⇤ 0.0107
Service (0.0744) (0.00467) (0.0687) (0.00838)
U.S. BLM 0.0208 0.0104 -0.00636 0.00736
(0.0452) (0.0127) (0.0452) (0.0126)
Parcel Acres -0.000516*** -0.0000311 -0.000277*** -0.0000378
(0.000123) (0.0000216) (0.000102) (0.0000269)
Longside -0.0937** -0.00596 -0.0748** -0.00455
(0.0426) (0.00751) (0.035) (0.00770)
Constant 0.937*** 0.255*** 1.066*** 0.279*** 0.993*** 0.271***
(0.0471) (0.0047) (0.046) (0.0130) (0.0507) (0.0103)
Oil Field No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fixed E↵ects
N 41979 41979 41979 41979 41979 41979
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.955 0.052 0.955 0.138 0.955
Standard errors are clustered by oil field and reported in parentheses.
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
The results in the odd numbered columns reveal systematic relationships between
shale quality and ownership across oil fields. The results in columns 1 and 5, for example,
suggest that average shale quality on the reservation exceeds average quality o↵ the
reservation, and that fee parcels tend to be endowed with the highest quality shale.
Columns 3 and 5 show that larger, skinnier parcels sit above lower quality shale
By contrast, results in the even numbered columns demonstrate no statistically sig-
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nificant relationships within oil fields, which are relatively homogeneous spatial units
by design. This is an important consideration for testing hypotheses about the causal
e↵ects of ownership on oil drilling patterns. In our tests, which appear in section V, the
empirical specifications that include oil field e↵ects are most credible.
To summarize, the inadvertent subdivision of shale created variation in tenure, parcel
sizes, and parcel shapes that we expect to influence the speed and probability of horizontal
drilling, based on anticommons logic. Moreover, the variation is verifiably exogenous to
a critical measure of shale quality, within oil fields. We exploit these natural experiments
in shale ownership in the section V tests.
2.4 Theoretical Motivation for Empirical Tests
In this section we integrate the anticommons literature (section II) with details about
contracting for horizontal drilling in order to formulate hypotheses about the e↵ects of
subdivision and tenure on drilling in our study area. We begin with a description of
drilling, in order to define the technologically optimal length of a horizontal line, h⇤.
This concept is analogous to L in section II, in that both refer to the scale of profitable
extraction.
2.4.1 Technological Costs
Although hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and horizontal drilling were experimented
with on a small scale for several decades, their large-scale use did not emerge in the United
States until about 2005 (Zuckerman, 2013). The technology makes oil trapped in tight
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shale formations profitable. A well is first drilled vertically from a main well pad to the
depth of the shale, which runs approximately parallel to the surface and holds the trapped
oil. The well line is then turned horizontally and driven for typically several thousand
feet through the shale. When hydraulic fracturing is added to horizontal drilling, as is
the case in the Bakken, a liquid solution is pumped at high pressure through the well.
The pressure fractures the shale, thereby facilitating oil drainage. Oil is pumped out of
the well until the area around the horizontal portion of the well is mostly drained. At
that time, the well is either plugged, or drilling at a di↵erent depth within the shale
commences.
The economic costs of horizontal drilling comprise two main components, aside from
leasing. First, there is a large fixed cost of drilling the well associated with employing the
necessary labor and capital (a drilling rig) and creating the necessary infrastructure (e.g.,
pipeline, waste water impoundment facilities, compression stations).23 Second, there is a
marginal cost of extending horizontal distance into the shale. This marginal cost increases
with distance, at least on a per unit of oil drained basis (see Syed 2014). One reason
is that it becomes increasingly di cult to “steer” the line with increased distance. The
second reason is that steering and capturing oil requires an increasing amount of pressure
as horizontal distance increases.24
To set the stage for understanding contracting costs, we consider a simple benchmark
for optimal line length in a world of zero transaction costs. Consider a linear landscape
23This cost is roughly in the range of about $10 million for a well in the Bakken formation.
24We are simplifying the technology; in reality production per horizontal foot generally declines with
distance (Syed, 2014), but we argue this can be modeled as rising marginal costs per unit of oil captured
because the decline in productivity can be o↵set by increased input use (such as care, time, fluids, energy
usage, etc.) There is also a marginal cost of drilling depth that we ignore here. This marginal cost tends
to increase linearly with depth (Syed, 2014).
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endowed with shale of distance D. Assume constant production per unit distance, de-
noted by q. The oil extracted is homogeneous in quality and sells for an exogenously
determined and constant unit price, p. Profit maximization involves choosing the num-
ber of wells to drill (w), which implicitly involves choosing horizontal line length per
well (h). Profit is given by: ⇡ = pqD   w(k + c(h)), where k is the fixed cost per well
and c(h) is a cost function of line distance that is increasing at an increasing rate. The
convexity of the cost function implies a solution for length per well, h⇤ that trades-o↵
the fixed cost of drilling additional wells versus the rising marginal cost of line length.
In this framework, the length of line that minimizes total costs (h⇤) increases with the
fixed cost. Drilling will occur if ⇡(h⇤) > 0.
To motivate why some areas of shale are drilled before others, we imagine J di↵erent
sections of shale, each of length h⇤. The areas of shale di↵er in quality, such that qj 6=qm ,
for j 6= m. If qj > qm, then ⇡j(h⇤) > ⇡m(h⇤). If a fixed capital input is scarce in
supply (e.g., large drilling rigs),25 there is a positive time discount rate on profits, and
⇡j(h⇤) > 0, then drilling should occur in shale area j before shale area m.
2.4.2 Number of Exclusion Rights
Oil companies need to contract with shale owners, and this will raise the oil developer’s
costs of drilling and lower his realized revenue. The contracting costs are critically related
toN , the number of exclusion rights holders over the horizontal line. Holding constant the
length of the line, h⇤, the number of exclusion rights depends on the degree of subdivision
25Our discussions with oil industry experts indicate that drilling rigs are in scarce supply on booming
oil fields.
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and on tenure type. As fee simple parcels become smaller, the number of exclusion rights
increase by one owner for each parcel added. Assuming there are on average z owners
per allotted trust parcel, each additional allotted trust parcel requires contracting with
an additional z users. In contrast, adding tribal parcels to a project already taking place
on tribal land adds zero new holders of exclusion rights to contract with.
Figure 2.6 illustrates how the number of exclusion rights over h⇤ increase with the
number of parcels. The slope of the fee simple line is one, representing our assumption
that fee simple parcels have one owner. The slope of the allotted trust line is steeper,
because the average allotted trust parcel has z > 1 owners. The slope of the tribal line is
zero, because tribal parcels share a common owner so that “parcelization” does not add
exclusion rights.
The vertical intercepts in Figure 2.6 depict the number of excluders for whom consent
would be needed if the entire horizontal line was under a single, large parcel. To think
about this issue, it is useful to consider the collective action problems of government
decision making, and the fact that many agencies are often involved in granting drilling
permits such as the Bureau of Indian A↵airs, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management, and
the North Dakota Oil and Gas Commission (Regan and Anderosn, 2014; Kunce et al.,
2002). Importantly, drilling the vertical portion of a horizontal well disturbs the surface
in ways that may extend jurisdiction over permitting to more agencies.
Turning back to Figure 2.6, we argue the number of exclusion rights governing the
vertical portion tends to be greatest for tribal parcels and lowest for private, fee parcels.
For fee parcels, the parcel owner must grant permission and a permit is required by North
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Figure 2.6: Number of Exclusion Rights over Horizontal Line of Length h⇤
Dakota.26 For allotted parcels, multiple owners of the single parcel must grant permis-
sion and permits are required by multiple federal agencies.27 For tribal parcels, multiple
tribal agencies may be involved—especially if there are archaeological and cultural con-
siderations regarding surface disturbances—and permits are required by multiple federal
agencies.
2.4.3 Contracting Costs of Horizontal Drilling
To motivate our empirical tests, we connect the number of exclusion rights holders just
described to the costs of contracting with those holders. To develop this connection, we
assume that contracting costs rise with the number of exclusion rights holders (N) over
26Although surface owners have no legal standing to stop a drilling project, they typically must
be negotiated with because the oil developer needs to place infrastructure such as pipelines, compressor
stations, and water impoundment facilities next to the main vertical well pad. Payments for allowing this
infrastructure one-time payments that can be large; in some areas of horizontal gas fracking development,
for example, landowner payments for compressor stations has ranged from hundreds of thousands to
millions of dollars and payments for water impoundment construction has ranged from $40,000 to $70,000
(Boslett et al., 2014).
27Drilling under allotted trust land does not formally require permission from the state of North
Dakota but the oil and gas regulations of the state and the permitting process is generally followed.
94
shale length h⇤. Contracting costs include title searches to find owners, and legal costs
of writing and recording formal leases.28 These costs should increase with N , plausibly
in a linear way as drawn in Figure 2.7. The vertical axis shows revenue and total costs
per drilling project. The technological costs of drilling the well are C = k + c(h⇤). The
labels F1 and A1 refer to the cost of a project contained within a single large fee and
allotted trust parcel, respectively. The total costs of drilling rise with subdivision, which
is characterized in Figure 2.7 by increases in parcels per h⇤ on the horizontal axis. The
revenue line assumes homogeneous shale quality and a fixed output price paid for oil.
Figure 2.7: Revenue and Costs Per-Drilling Project of Length h⇤
In Figure 2.7, whether or not a project is inherently profitable, net of contracting costs,
depends on tenure and subdivision. There are PA profitable projects under allotted land
and PF profitable projects under fee lands. All projects under tribal land are profitable
by assumption. The economic rent available from each drilling project is the vertical
distance between the revenue and cost lines. If we assume a competitive oil industry,
28These costs are typically borne via payments to so-called “landmen.” These are agents whom oil
companies hire to find rights holders and negotiate leases with them.
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then rents are earned by shale owners, in this context through their negotiations of higher
royalty payments. Note that contracting costs that rise with N dissipate rents rather
than simply redistributing them across oil companies and shale owners.
Assuming there is a scarce input (e.g., drilling rigs) and positive time discounting,
Figure 2.7 allows us to predict the timing of oil drilling projects. As long as oil companies
receive a small epsilon percentage of the available rent, they will drill the least subdivided
fee parcels first, starting with the single fee parcel case and ending when the height of
the “fee simple cost” line reaches A1. After this point, drilling between areas of fee and
areas of allotted parcels will oscillate until the Allotted Trust Costs and the Fee Simple
Costs reach the height of T . Once the fee land is su ciently subdivided such that the Fee
Simple Costs exceed Tribal Costs, drilling will exclusively take place under tribal land.
The logic is that drilling will be prioritized over sections of shale for which aggregate
rents are highest. Contracting costs prevent or delay drilling by lowering the aggregate
available rent.
In addition to reducing aggregate available rents, subdivision may encourage shale
owners to engage in wasteful competition over the distribution of rents. The problem
is that each shale owner has holdup power to leverage in bargaining over his individual
royalty amount. Royalty payments vary depending on an owner’s success in negotiating,
but have averaged around 17% in North Dakota in recent years (Brown et al., 2015).
Holding out for a higher royalty percentage may be individually rational, but it is collec-
tively wasteful if holdups raise the aggregate, well-level royalty rate demanded by owners
to a level above the rate a profitable drilling project can bear. In this case, the shale
would not be drilled even though available rent is positive, leading to an anti-commons
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problem of underutilization as in (Buchanan and Yoon, 2000), but stylized to the context
of horizontal drilling by a competitive oil industry.
To conclude, subdivision and allotted trust tenure can prevent and delay shale drilling
for two reasons. First, by raising the number of exclusion right holders; available aggre-
gate rents will fall due to higher contracting costs and make projects with more owners
less desirable. This is a su cient condition for delays and drilling prevention as illus-
trated in Figure 2.7. Second, if holdup incentives increase with N , then competition over
the distribution of rents may cause requested royalty rates to rise with N , which could be
modeled as steepening the fee simple and allotted trust cost lines in Figure 2.7. With a
competitive oil industry, however, the aggregate royalty rate paid to shale owners cannot
rise with N .
Finally, before proceeding, we note there have been two institutional responses to the
contracting problems we describe here. First, forced pooling laws are in force in North
Dakota and in other U.S. states. Forced pooling compels minority mineral owners into
horizontal drilling projects if a majority of neighboring acreage in an oil drilling unit has
already been leased. State-level forced pooling laws do not generally apply on sovereign
Indian reservations (see Slade et al. (1996)). Second, a 1998 federal law specific to the Fort
Berthold requires the consent of only a majority of owners of allotted trust lands before
a mineral lease can be executed. We view these institutional responses as decreasing but
not eliminating contracting costs and holdup problems because they reduce the number
of contracting parties, but not down to the level of sole ownership.
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2.5 Parcel-Level Empirical Tests
In this section we test for the importance of contracting costs using parcel-level data.
In the next section we employ oil well-level data. The main advantage of using parcel-
level data is that it allows us to exploit information contained in the “zeroes” (i.e., the
parcels above shale that have not yet been drilled). We explain the relative advantages
of using the well-level data below.
2.5.1 Parcel-Level Data
The parcel-level data set, as displayed in Figure 2.3, spans Fort Berthold and neigh-
boring counties. We trim the initial sample of 50,572 parcels to the subset of parcels
located on oil fields. This criterion reduces the sample size to 43,166.
The source for data on drilling is the North Dakota’s Oil and Gas Commission website.
It contains GIS data for every horizontal well bore, and for every horizontal well line,
that has been drilled in the state. Figure 2.8 shows the location of well bores which are
the vertical portion of a horizontal well. It also shows the location of horizontal lines.
We downloaded these data in May 2015, and they represent the accumulation of wells
completed as of May 1, 2015. We have also obtained data on the date in which each well
was completed, with the drilling boom roughly spanning 2005 to the present. During
this 10-year period, 7,864 horizontal wells were drilled in our study area spanning 12,017
line miles.
Table 2.2 shows summary statistics of the parcel-level outcome variables that we
have constructed and Figure 2.9 illustrates our mapping from the spatial data to the
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Figure 2.8: Location of Horizontal Well Bores and Lines in Study Area
Notes: This map depicts the location all horizontal oil wells ever drilled, and lines emanating from horizontal wells,
based on data from the North Dakota Oil and Gas Commission.
variables. The outcome variables measure the timing and extent to which a parcel has
been exploited. Approximately 41.6 percent of the sample parcels have been cut by at
least one horizontal line. Having a horizontal line is our best proxy for whether or not
the owner(s) have received financial payment for their shale.29 The first line crossed each
parcel an average of 2,324 days after January 1, 2005, conditional on the parcel having
at least one line through it by May 1, 2015. We measure the extent of drilling through
a parcel by the miles of horizontal lines. Some parcels are drilled multiple times from
29In some unusual cases, it is possible for an owner to receive compensation if a line does not cross
his parcel. Compensation is based on membership in an oil drilling unit, and sometimes a line does not
cross every member’s parcel. Lines usually cross every parcel in a unit, with the exception of very small
parcels. We discuss unitization in more detail below.
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multiple directions or at di↵erent depths. The mean number of line miles per parcel is
0.27. The presence of a well bore on the parcel is an indication that the surface owner has
received payment for accommodating drilling infrastructure. Approximately 7.9 percent
of the parcels have at least one well bore.
We include measures of parcel size, shape, and tenure to proxy variation in contracting
costs. The variable Parcel Longside measures the length of a parcel’s longest side. Holding
constant the parcel’s acreage, an increase in the longside means the parcel has a longer
and skinnier shape. The other variables indicate the ownership and tenure of the parcel.30
Not included in the summary statistics are indicators for parcels owned by the U.S. forest
service, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management, and the state of North Dakota. These
categories collectively comprise 4.7 percent of the sample parcels.
To assess the e↵ects of subdivision and tenure mixes around a parcel, we focus on
parcels within a 1-mile radius of each parcel’s centroid (see Figure 2.9). We choose
the 1-mile radius because lines from well bores typically extend 1 to 2 miles but our
results are robust to other distance choices.31 Within the 1-mile radius, the number of
30The parcels represent oil ownership on the Fort Berthold reservation. The parcels o↵ the reservation
represent surface ownership, because we do not have data on o↵-reservation mineral rights. Surface and
mineral ownership were generally aligned before oil development, because much of the land in North
Dakota was settled before the Homestead Act of 1916, which reserved subsurface mineral rights to
homesteaded land settled thereafter to the United States.
31An alternative approach is to conduct analysis at the level of an oil spacing unit. Unitization laws
require the driller to define a “unit,” which is a contiguous area of minerals that will be exploited.
Royalty compensation to each mineral owner is determined by their percentage of acres in a unit. While
analyzing unitization data from the North Dakota Oil and Gas Commission, we discovered that these are
not good candidates for our spatial observations because their definition is highly endogenous. Unit sizes
vary in size over time; from a low of 160 acres to a high of 5120 acres. As of 2015, the most prevalent unit
sizes were 1280 acres and 640 acres. These units are typically rectangular rather than square, reflecting
the fact that wells are drilled over long narrow swaths of space. However, oil units are highly fungible
on the Bakken and they change definitions frequently, as new parcels are appended and other parcels
eliminated. Most parcels in the Bakken have been part of multiple units over time, sometimes as many
as 20. This fungibility of units in the case of horizontal shale drilling is much di↵erent than unitization
over traditional oil reservoirs (Libecap and Wiggins, 1984; Wiggins and Libecap, 1985).
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neighboring parcels ranges from 4 to 1000. Note that the data sets treat government
tracts, including tribal tracts, as multiple separate parcels, even though the tracts have a
single government agency owner. Some mineral parcels are under a body of water, based
on the high flood lines of the Missouri River. We control for this in the regressions, to
account for special rules governing drilling under water.
We create a variable to measure the mix of tenure types around a parcel. The variable
“Extra Tenure Regimes” is the number of tenure types represented by the block of parcels
adjacent to the parcel. For example, a fee-simple parcel adjacent to fee, tribal, and
allotted trust land has two extra regime types in its neighborhood. Figure 2.9 illustrates.
Finally, we have collected data to measure a variety of parcel-level factors that may
influence the net value of extracting oil. One of these variables is the shale’s thickness-
to-depth ratio discussed above. We have created a “topographical roughness” variable
to account for potentially higher costs of drilling through rough terrain. We have also
created variables measuring the distance from each parcel’s centroid to the nearest body
of water (zero if the parcel is under water), and to the nearest railroad. We measure
infrastructure in the neighborhood around a parcel with the miles of roads in a 1 mile
radius. Finally, although not shown in Table 2.2, we include the spatial X-Y coordinates
of a parcel in some specifications to control for possible South-North and West-East
patterns in drilling.
101
F
ig
u
re
2
.9
:
E
x
a
m
p
le
s
o
f
o
u
r
M
a
p
p
in
g
fr
o
m
S
p
a
ti
a
l
D
a
ta
to
E
m
p
ir
ic
a
l
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
N
o
te
s:
T
h
es
e
im
a
g
es
il
lu
st
ra
te
h
ow
w
e
h
av
e
co
n
st
ru
ct
ed
o
u
r
em
p
ir
ic
a
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s.
F
o
r
th
e
p
a
rc
el
-l
ev
el
a
n
a
ly
si
s,
p
a
rc
el
i
is
in
b
o
ld
.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
s
in
cl
u
d
e
th
e
ti
m
in
g
o
f
th
e
fi
rs
t
li
n
e
u
n
d
er
p
a
rc
el
i,
th
e
m
il
es
o
f
li
n
e
p
en
et
ra
ti
n
g
p
a
rc
el
i,
a
n
d
in
d
ic
a
to
rs
fo
r
w
h
et
h
er
o
r
n
o
t
a
v
er
ti
ca
l
w
el
l
b
o
re
is
fo
u
n
d
o
n
p
a
rc
el
i.
In
th
e
F
fg
u
re
o
n
th
e
le
ft
,
th
er
e
a
re
li
n
es
th
ro
u
g
h
p
a
rc
el
i
b
u
t
n
ot
a
w
el
l
b
o
re
.
In
th
e
fi
g
u
re
o
n
th
e
ri
g
h
t,
th
er
e
a
re
li
n
es
a
n
d
a
w
el
l
b
o
re
o
n
p
a
rc
el
i.
T
h
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
n
ei
g
h
b
o
ri
n
g
p
a
rc
el
s
in
cl
u
d
es
a
ll
p
a
rc
el
s
th
a
t
a
re
co
n
ta
in
ed
w
it
h
in
o
r
to
u
ch
th
e
ex
te
ri
o
r
b
o
u
n
d
a
ry
o
f
th
e
ra
d
iu
s.
T
h
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
ex
tr
a
re
g
im
es
is
m
ea
su
re
d
b
y
th
e
co
u
n
t
of
d
i↵
er
en
t
te
n
u
re
ty
p
es
th
a
t
a
re
d
ir
ec
tl
y
a
d
ja
ce
n
t
to
p
a
rc
el
i.
F
o
r
th
e
w
el
l-
le
v
el
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s,
th
e
k
ey
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
s
m
ea
su
re
th
e
d
a
te
in
w
h
ic
h
th
e
en
ti
re
w
el
l
(b
o
re
p
lu
s
li
n
es
)
w
a
s
co
m
p
le
te
d
.
T
h
e
o
th
er
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
in
th
e
w
el
l-
le
v
el
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
m
ea
su
re
s
th
e
to
ta
l
le
n
g
th
o
f
th
e
li
n
es
em
a
n
a
ti
n
g
fr
o
m
th
e
w
el
l
b
o
re
.
T
h
e
k
ey
ri
g
h
t-
h
a
n
d
si
d
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
in
th
e
w
el
l-
le
v
el
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
m
ea
su
re
th
e
te
n
u
re
o
f
th
e
p
a
rc
el
co
n
ta
in
in
g
th
e
w
el
l
b
o
re
,
a
n
d
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
a
n
d
te
n
u
re
o
f
th
e
p
a
rc
el
s
th
ro
u
g
h
w
h
ic
h
th
e
w
el
l
li
n
es
p
en
et
ra
te
.
T
h
e
im
a
g
es
a
b
ov
e
d
o
n
o
t
sh
ow
a
ll
o
f
th
e
w
el
ls
a
n
d
li
n
es
in
th
e
a
re
a
,
in
o
rd
er
to
k
ee
p
th
e
im
a
g
es
m
o
re
si
m
p
le
a
n
d
in
fo
rm
a
ti
v
e.
F
ig
u
re
D
1
in
th
e
a
p
p
en
d
ix
sh
ow
s
th
e
sa
m
e
im
a
g
es
,
a
lo
n
g
w
it
h
o
th
er
li
n
es
a
n
d
w
el
ls
in
th
e
m
a
p
p
ed
a
re
a
s.
102
T
a
b
le
2
.2
:
S
u
m
m
a
ry
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
fr
o
m
P
a
rc
el
-L
ev
el
D
a
ta
S
et
V
ar
ia
b
le
N
a
m
es
M
ea
n
S
.D
.
M
in
M
a
x
D
efi
n
it
io
n
O
u
tc
o
m
e
V
a
ri
a
bl
es
D
ay
s
u
n
ti
l
F
ir
st
H
or
iz
on
ta
l
L
in
ea
3
1
6
8
.9
6
8
5
7
.5
6
1
3
3
7
72
D
ay
s
el
a
p
se
d
b
et
w
ee
n
J
a
n
u
a
ry
1
,
2
0
0
5
a
n
d
d
a
te
o
f
fi
rs
t
li
n
e;
ce
n
so
re
d
a
t
3
7
7
2
d
ay
s
if
n
o
li
n
e
H
or
iz
on
ta
l
L
in
e
In
d
ic
at
or
a
0
.4
1
6
3
0
.4
9
2
9
0
1
=
1
if
th
e
p
a
rc
el
w
a
s
cu
t
b
y
a
t
le
a
st
on
e
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l
li
n
e
a
s
o
f
M
ay
1
,
2
0
15
,
o
th
er
w
is
e
=
0
M
il
es
of
H
or
iz
on
ta
l
L
in
es
a
0
.2
7
8
4
0
.5
5
8
4
0
1
0
.4
7
T
h
e
to
ta
l
le
n
g
th
(m
il
es
)
o
f
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l
li
n
es
cu
tt
in
g
a
p
a
rc
el
a
s
o
f
M
ay
1
,
2
0
1
5
H
or
iz
on
ta
l
L
in
e
M
il
es
/1
00
A
cr
es
a
0
.4
0
0
8
3
.6
4
1
5
0
5
15
.8
7
T
h
e
to
ta
l
le
n
g
th
(m
il
es
)
o
f
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l
li
n
es
cu
tt
in
g
a
p
a
rc
el
a
s
o
f
M
ay
1
,
2
01
5
,
p
er
1
0
0
sq
u
a
re
m
il
es
W
el
l
B
or
e
in
d
ic
at
or
a
0
.0
7
9
6
0
.2
7
0
1
0
1
=
1
if
th
e
p
ar
ce
l
h
a
d
a
t
le
a
st
o
n
e
(v
er
ti
ca
l)
w
el
l
b
o
re
as
o
f
M
ay
1
,
2
0
1
5
,
o
th
er
w
is
e
=
0
W
el
l
B
or
es
a
0
.1
8
2
2
0
.8
4
1
2
0
3
0
T
h
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
(v
er
ti
ca
l)
w
el
l
b
o
re
s
a
s
of
M
ay
1
,
2
0
1
5
,
o
th
er
w
is
e
=
0
P
a
rc
el
S
iz
e,
S
h
a
pe
,
a
n
d
T
en
u
re
P
a
rc
el
A
cr
es
b
,c
7
9
.4
0
2
9
8
.1
9
7
5
.1
6
E
-0
9
1
2
5
9
.9
A
re
a
o
f
th
e
p
a
rc
el
,
in
a
cr
es
P
a
rc
el
L
o
n
g
si
d
eb
,c
0
.4
2
7
3
0
.3
5
5
3
9
.2
5
E
-0
6
8
.0
4
6
T
h
e
le
n
g
th
o
f
a
p
a
rc
el
’s
lo
n
g
es
t
si
d
e,
in
m
il
es
R
es
er
va
ti
o
n
P
a
rc
el
In
d
ic
a
to
rb
0
.2
4
1
9
0
.4
2
8
3
0
1
=
1
if
th
e
p
a
rc
el
is
o
n
th
e
F
o
rt
B
er
th
o
ld
In
d
ia
n
re
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
,
o
th
er
w
is
e
=
0
F
ee
P
a
rc
el
In
d
ic
a
to
rb
0
.0
9
9
1
0
.2
9
8
8
0
1
=
1
if
th
e
re
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
p
a
rc
el
is
fe
e
si
m
p
le
,
o
th
er
w
is
e
=
0
A
ll
ot
te
d
T
ru
st
P
ar
ce
l
In
d
ic
at
or
b
0
.0
9
1
1
0
.2
8
7
7
0
1
=
1
if
th
e
re
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
p
a
rc
el
is
a
ll
ot
te
d
b
u
t
n
o
t
a
li
en
a
te
d
fr
o
m
tr
u
st
,
o
th
er
w
is
e
=
0
T
ri
b
a
l
P
a
rc
el
In
d
ic
a
to
rb
0
.0
5
1
7
0
.2
9
8
8
0
1
=
1
if
th
e
re
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
p
a
rc
el
is
tr
ib
a
ll
y
ow
n
ed
,
o
th
er
w
is
e
=
0
N
ei
gh
bo
r
P
a
rc
el
s
(1
-m
il
e
ra
d
iu
s)
N
o.
of
N
ei
gh
b
or
s
15
3.
92
25
1.
22
4
10
00
N
u
m
b
er
of
p
ar
ce
ls
w
it
h
in
1
m
il
e
ra
d
iu
s
ar
ou
n
d
p
ar
ce
l
S
t.
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
o
f
N
ei
g
h
b
o
r
S
iz
e
9
.9
6
7
3
9
.3
5
5
3
0.
01
9
6
1
1
9
.2
7
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
o
f
p
a
rc
el
a
cr
ea
g
e
w
it
h
in
1
m
il
e
ra
d
iu
s
a
ro
u
n
d
p
a
rc
el
O
↵
R
es
.
N
ei
g
h
b
or
sb
,c
1
0
4
.6
6
2
1
2
.2
7
0
9
9
3
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
p
ri
va
te
p
a
rc
el
s,
o
↵
th
e
re
se
rv
at
io
n
,
w
it
h
in
1
m
il
e
ra
d
iu
s
a
ro
u
n
d
p
a
rc
el
F
ee
N
ei
g
h
b
o
rs
b
,c
3
7
.3
0
7
1
6
5
.8
0
1
0
0
0
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
fe
e
p
a
rc
el
s
w
it
h
in
1
m
il
e
ra
d
iu
s
a
ro
u
n
d
p
a
rc
el
A
ll
ot
te
d
T
ru
st
N
ei
gh
b
or
sb
,c
5
.7
4
3
3
1
4
.3
2
7
0
1
3
1
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
fr
a
ct
io
n
a
te
d
p
a
rc
el
s
w
it
h
in
1
m
il
e
ra
d
iu
s
a
ro
u
n
d
p
a
rc
el
T
ri
b
a
l
N
ei
g
h
b
o
rs
b
,c
4
.0
5
6
6
1
2
.0
7
3
0
1
0
4
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
tr
ib
a
l
p
a
rc
el
s
w
it
h
in
a
1
m
il
e
ra
d
iu
s
a
ro
u
n
d
p
a
rc
el
N
ei
gh
b
or
s
U
n
d
er
w
at
er
f
4
.9
2
4
1
1
4
.8
6
9
0
1
1
9
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
p
a
rc
el
s
u
n
d
er
a
b
o
d
y
o
f
w
a
te
r
w
it
h
in
1
m
il
e
ra
d
iu
s
a
ro
u
n
d
p
a
rc
el
E
x
tr
a
T
en
u
re
R
eg
im
es
b
,c
0
.2
8
0
5
0
.5
7
0
6
N
o
.
o
f
ex
tr
a
te
n
u
re
ty
p
es
a
d
ja
ce
n
t
to
p
a
rc
el
(o
↵
re
s,
fe
e,
fr
a
ct
io
n
a
te
d
,
tr
ib
a
l,
U
S
F
S
,
B
L
M
,
st
at
e)
O
th
er
C
o
va
ri
a
te
s
T
h
ic
k
-D
ep
th
R
a
ti
od
0
.0
0
9
8
0
.0
0
3
4
0
.0
0
1
3
0
.0
1
8
2
S
h
a
le
th
ic
k
n
es
s
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
sh
a
le
d
ep
th
T
o
p
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
R
o
u
g
h
n
es
s
S
td
.
D
ev
.
o
f
sl
o
p
e
m
u
lt
ip
li
ed
b
y
av
er
a
g
e
sl
o
p
e
F
ee
t
to
W
a
te
r
(0
0
0
s)
f
1
2
.2
3
1
1
0
.3
1
3
0
4
3.
75
9
E
u
cl
id
ea
n
d
is
ta
n
ce
(i
n
0
0
0
s
o
f
fe
et
)
fr
o
m
p
a
rc
el
ce
n
tr
o
id
to
n
ea
re
st
b
o
d
y
o
f
w
a
te
r
F
ee
t
to
R
a
il
ro
a
d
(0
0
0
s)
f
1
4
.0
7
8
1
1
.8
5
1
0
5
7.
40
3
E
u
cl
id
ea
n
d
is
ta
n
ce
(i
n
0
0
0
s
o
f
fe
et
)
fr
om
p
a
rc
el
ce
n
tr
o
id
to
n
ea
re
st
ra
il
ro
a
d
li
n
e
C
it
y
In
d
ic
a
to
r
0
.1
0
4
2
0
.3
0
5
6
0
1
=
1
if
th
e
p
a
rc
el
is
w
it
h
in
a
ci
ty
b
o
u
n
d
a
ry
,
o
th
er
w
is
e
=
0
R
o
a
d
m
il
es
in
1
-m
il
e
ra
d
iu
sf
8
.7
4
1
5
1
8
.6
2
6
0
.0
9
6
7
5
7
.4
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
ro
a
d
m
il
es
w
it
h
in
1
m
il
e
ra
d
iu
s
o
f
p
a
rc
el
ce
n
tr
o
id
,
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
a
re
a
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
su
m
m
a
ri
z
e
s
d
a
ta
fo
r
a
ll
p
a
rc
e
ls
o
v
e
r
a
n
o
il
fi
e
ld
.
N
=
4
3
,1
6
6
fo
r
a
ll
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
e
x
c
e
p
t
th
e
T
h
ic
k
-D
e
p
th
R
a
ti
o
,
w
h
ic
h
is
N
=
4
1
,3
7
6
.
D
a
ta
so
u
rc
e
s
a
re
:
a
)
N
o
rt
h
D
a
k
o
ta
O
il
a
n
d
G
a
s
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
w
e
b
si
te
,
b
)
U
.S
.
B
u
re
a
u
o
f
In
d
ia
n
A
↵
a
ir
s,
c
)
R
e
a
l
E
st
a
te
P
o
rt
a
l,
d
)
U
.S
.
E
IA
w
e
b
si
te
e
)
A
u
th
o
rs
c
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
fr
o
m
a
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l
E
le
v
a
ti
o
n
D
a
ta
se
t,
a
n
d
f)
A
u
th
o
rs
c
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
fr
o
m
N
o
rt
h
D
a
k
o
ta
G
IS
P
o
rt
a
l
d
a
ta
.
103
2.5.2 Tests for E↵ects of Subdivision on Drilling Delays
We begin by estimating the following latent-variable regression model, using the parcel
level data set.
Daysij = ↵j +  Acreij + µLongsideij +  No.Neighij +  Std.Neighij +  Res+  Xij + "ij
(2.2)
The dependent variable is the number of days elapsed since January 1, 2005 until
a line penetrated the parcel. Because this variable is censored at 3,772 days, we use a
Tobit estimator. Here i = parcel, j = oil field, the notation ↵j represents the 203 oil
field fixed e↵ects, and the notation Xij indicates the covariates. We include oil field fixed
e↵ects because our Section 2.3 analysis indicates that shale ownership is more plausibly
exogenous to shale quality within rather than across oil fields.
The coe cient estimates of  , µ,  , and   are of key interest. We expect   < 0 and
µ < 0. In words, we expect shorter delays on larger, rectangular parcels because oil
companies can limit the number of contracting parties by focusing first on these parcels.
We expect   > 0, meaning the length of drilling delays will increase with greater parcel
subdivision in the radius around parcel i. We anticipate   > 0 if more heterogeneity in
parcel sizes raises the costs of negotiating leases with heterogeneous resource owners.32
For identification of these coe cients, we rely on the exogeneity of parcel size, shape,
and tenure, conditional on the covariates and oil field fixed e↵ects (see Section 2.3).
32In her studies of common pool resource use, Ostrom (1990) argues that heterogeneity in resource
users raises the transaction costs of agreements.
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Table 2.3: Parcel-Level Estimates of Days Elapsed between Start of Fracking
Boom and First Horizontal Line
Tobit Estimates OLS Estimates
Y = Days elapsed between Jan. 1, 2005 and Y = 1 if at least one
first horizontal line (as of May 1, 2015) horizontal line cuts parcel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parcel acres -5.746⇤⇤⇤ -5.293⇤⇤⇤ -5.570⇤⇤⇤ -5.801⇤⇤⇤ 0.0015⇤⇤⇤ 0.0016⇤⇤⇤
(0.618) (0.59) (0.633) (0.737) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Parcel longside -797.4⇤⇤⇤ -757.0⇤⇤⇤ -779.8⇤⇤⇤ -739.7⇤⇤⇤ 0.212⇤⇤⇤ 0.203⇤⇤⇤
(103.9) (94.53) (95.7) (95.01) (0.0284) (0.0292)
No. of neighbors 1.655⇤⇤⇤ 6.389⇤⇤⇤ 6.160⇤⇤⇤ 6.042⇤⇤⇤ -0.0012⇤⇤⇤ -0.0012⇤⇤⇤
(0.465) (1.426) (1.303) (1.724) (0.0002) (0.0002)
St. dev. of neighbor size 26.03⇤⇤⇤ 30.01⇤⇤⇤ 27.72⇤⇤⇤ 23.69** -0.0062⇤⇤⇤ -0.0054⇤⇤
(6.844) (7.452) (7.006) (9.525) (0.0016) (0.0022)
Reservation parcel 450.7⇤⇤⇤ 325.9⇤⇤⇤ 117.5 96.01 0.0232 0.025
indicator (128.9) (119.3) (147.9) (232.5) (0.0351) (0.0502)
Covariates
Thickness-to-depth ratio -102918⇤⇤⇤ -97947⇤⇤⇤ -152927⇤⇤⇤ -112904⇤⇤ 41.84⇤⇤⇤ 33.12⇤⇤⇤
Feet to water (000s) 32.88⇤⇤⇤ 34.65⇤⇤⇤ 25.97⇤⇤⇤ 33.11* -0.00523⇤⇤⇤ -0.0107⇤⇤
# Neighbors underwater 13.93⇤⇤⇤ 12.25⇤⇤⇤ 10.92⇤⇤⇤ 13.55⇤⇤⇤ -0.00242⇤⇤ -0.00349⇤⇤
Topographic roughness 1.215⇤ 1.179⇤⇤ 1.255⇤⇤ 0.747 -0.000363⇤⇤ -0.000253⇤
City indicator 368.2⇤⇤ 275.0⇤ 417.7⇤⇤ 0.00652 -0.057
Feet to railroad (000s) 7.676 8.286 24.72⇤⇤ -0.000348 -0.00560⇤
Road density in radius -68.66⇤⇤⇤ -62.80⇤⇤⇤ -63.92⇤⇤⇤ 0.0134⇤⇤⇤ 0.0139⇤⇤⇤
x coordinate of parcel 0.634⇤⇤⇤ -0.0003⇤⇤⇤
y coordinate of parcel 0.333* -0.00005
Oil field fixed e↵ects No No No Yes No Yes
Constant 4813.4⇤⇤⇤ 4661.0⇤⇤⇤ -13655.6 5536.3⇤⇤⇤ 3.353 0.123
Pseudo R-squared 0.038 0.04 0.041 0.05
Adjusted R-squared 0.257 0.309
Observations 27,480 27,480 27,480 27,480 27,480 27,480
Censored at 3772 days 16,687 16,687 16,687 16,687 NA NA
Notes: We do not show some standard errors in order to save space. A parcel’s neighborhood includes all parcels
touching a one-mile radius extending from the parcel’s exterior boundary. All specifications control for the slight
variation in the total area of the one mile radius, due to variation in the size of parcels on the exterior of the radius.
Standard errors are clustered by oil field and shown in parentheses. ⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Table 2.3 shows coe cient estimates. In all specifications we drop from the sample
any parcel for which the 1-mile radius includes parcels owned by the USFS, the BLM, or
the state of North Dakota. We drop these 13,792 parcels in our baseline specifications
because rules on public lands—particularly the forest service tracts—limited fracking
during our time period of analysis. Later we show the results are robust to keeping all
government parcels in the sample. We also show that patterns of drilling on and around
government parcels are similar to patterns on and around tribal parcels, suggesting our
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tribal findings may generalize to other governments. All of the standard errors in Table
2.3 are clustered by oil field but the results are robust to models that allow for other
spatial error structures as discussed below.
Focusing first on columns 1-4 in Table 2.3, there are significant relationships between
days elapsed and parcel acres, longside, number of neighbors, and the standard deviation
of neighbors that are consistent with contracting cost rationales. The coe cients are
also relatively insensitive to the inclusion or omission of di↵erent covariates and to oil
field fixed e↵ects, but our preferred estimates are in column 4. In terms of magnitude,
the column 4 coe cient of -5.80 on parcel acres implies that a one standard deviation
increase above the mean (i.e., from 79 to 177 acres) is associated with a 568 day decrease
in time until drilling. The longside coe cient of -739.7 means a one standard deviation
increase implies a 263 day decrease in time until drilling. The coe cient on the number-
of-neighbors variable, which is 6.04, means that a one standard deviation increase implies
a 1,516-day drilling delay. We quantify the meaning of delays in terms of foregone royalty
income below, in Section 2.6.
The signs on the other coe cients in columns 1-4 are mostly as expected. Parcels
with greater thickness-to-depth ratios were drilled earlier in time as were parcels in areas
with greater road infrastructure. Parcels close to water were drilled later in time, if at
all, as were parcels within city boundaries. These findings make sense because regulatory
rules dissuade oil drilling in urban areas and in areas near bodies of water. The reser-
vation parcel indicator is insignificant in columns 3 and 4, suggesting that being on the
reservation is not, in general, a cause of drilling delays.
In columns 5 and 6 we estimate the probability that a parcel had at least one horizontal
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line by May 2015. The column 6 coe cient of -0.0012 means that a one standard deviation
increase in the number of neighbors around a parcel i reduced the probability that the
parcel would have a line by 30.1 percentage points. For perspective, 40.0 percent of
the sample parcels had a line drilled by May 2015. Hence, an increase in one standard
deviation in our measure of subdivision is associated with a 75.3 percent decline in the
probability that a shale owner has been compensated.
2.5.3 Tests for Subdivision E↵ects Across Tenure Types
To test for di↵erent subdivision e↵ects across tenure types, we now include four sep-
arate variables that decompose the Number of Neighbors variable into each tenure type:
o↵ reservation neighbors, fee neighbors, allotted trust neighbors, and tribal neighbors.
We also decompose the reservation indicator variable into three separate indicator vari-
ables, one for each tenure type. We also include the Extra Tenure Regime variable, and
estimate the following regression model.
Daysij = ↵j +  Acresij + µLongsideij +  OOffNeighij +  FFeeNeighij + ...
...+  AATrustNeighij +  TTribNeighij +  StD.Neighij + ⇢XtraRegij +  Feeij + ...
...+  AATrustij +  TTribij +  Xij"ij (2.3)
The estimates of  O,  F ,  A,  T , and ⇢ provide the tests. We expect  T <  O   F <  A
and also expect  T = 0 and   T > 0 for each of the non-tribal tenure types. To
understand why we expect  T = 0 and  T <  O   F <  A, recall that our main
theoretical argument is that divided shale ownership will delay and repress horizontal
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extraction because divided ownership raises contracting costs. The allotment of Fort
Berthold resulted in three types of tenure with di↵erent numbers of exclusion rights per
parcel. Based on our Section 2.4 discussion, we expect contracting costs to rise most
quickly as the horizontal fracking line expands into allotted trust parcels, because the
number of contracting parties increases at the fastest rate under this tenure system. At
the other end of the continuum, adding tribal parcels to a project already taking place
on tribal land adds zero new holders of exclusion rights to contract with and hence we
predict that it does not raise contracting costs or delay drilling.
There is also contracting rationale motivating the prediction that  O   F . As
discussed in Section 2.4, o↵ reservation parcels are subject to North Dakota forced pooling
but on-reservation parcels may not be forced into pools. If fee owners on the reservation
cannot be forced into drilling pools, then contracting costs of an additional fee neighbor
should exceed the contracting costs of an additional o↵ reservation neighbor.
We also expect ⇢ > 0, meaning that extra tenure regimes should cause delays. Con-
tracting across tenure types—e.g., fee and tribal—could raise transaction costs relative
to contracting within regime types for two reasons. First, contracting across regimes may
require the involvement of the Bureau of Indian A↵airs to approve permits and drilling
plans (Regan and Anderosn, 2014). Second, contracting across regimes creates a fixed
learning cost; for example to research the rules governing fracking under the alternative
regimes.
The  F ,  A, and  T coe cients measure the extent to which the tenure of parcel i
influences delays conditional on the degree of neighborhood subdivision and the tenure
compositions of neighbors. In this set of estimates, for which the dependent variable mea-
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sures delays with respect to getting a horizontal line, the   coe cients are of secondary
interest. If the tenure of parcel i changes total contracting costs by a small amount,
conditional on the composition of neighbors, then we expect   ⇡ 0 for all tenure types.33
Table 2.4: Parcel-Level Estimates of Days Elapsed with Mineral Tenure Vari-
ables
Tobit Estimates OLS Estimates
Y = Days elapsed between Jan. 1, 2005 and Y = 1 if at least one
first horizontal line (as of May 1, 2015) horizontal line cuts parcel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parcel acres -5.598⇤⇤⇤ -5.316⇤⇤⇤ -5.560⇤⇤⇤ -5.808⇤⇤⇤ 0.00154⇤⇤⇤ 0.00163⇤⇤⇤
(0.613) (0.603) (0.637) (0.722) (0.000135) (0.000156)
Parcel longside -802.9⇤⇤⇤ -770.4⇤⇤⇤ -786.6⇤⇤⇤ -749.2⇤⇤⇤ 0.214⇤⇤⇤ 0.203⇤⇤⇤
(100.1) (95.44) (96.33) (97.57) (0.0289) (0.0294)
St. dev. of neighbor size 26.70⇤⇤⇤ 30.19⇤⇤⇤ 28.01⇤⇤⇤ 27.70⇤⇤⇤ -0.00566⇤⇤⇤ -0.00609⇤⇤⇤
(7.914) (7.725) (7.157) (7.942) (0.00193) (0.00202)
Fee parcel indicator 214.9 301.8⇤ 98.54 131.5 0.016 0.00781
(172.2) (178.1) (223.2) (245.2) (0.0508) (0.0521)
Allotted trust -56.99 27.56 -125.4 15.95 0.0565 0.0286
parcel indicator (141.8) (145.6) (172.3) (213) (0.0463) (0.0539)
Tribal parcel indicator -74.39 43.11 -77.52 32.94 0.00964 -0.00777
(203.7) (199.9) (206.8) (228.2) (0.0513) (0.056)
Neighbor Variables
No. of tenure regimes 115.8⇤⇤⇤ 109.8⇤⇤ 109.3⇤⇤⇤ 106.5⇤⇤ -0.0243⇤⇤ -0.0266⇤⇤⇤
(42.83) (44.59) (41.96) (42.11) (0.0103) (0.00987)
O↵ reservation neighbors 1.162⇤ 5.947⇤⇤⇤ 6.400⇤⇤⇤ 8.058⇤⇤⇤ -0.00116⇤⇤⇤ -0.00179⇤⇤⇤
(0.6) (1.642) (1.513) (1.701) (0.000382) (0.000373)
Fee neighbors 2.269⇤⇤⇤ 6.069⇤⇤⇤ 6.292⇤⇤⇤ 7.283⇤⇤⇤ -0.00122⇤⇤⇤ -0.00164⇤⇤⇤
(0.47) (1.382) (1.286) (1.355) (0.000302) (0.000293)
Allotted trust neighbors 10.34⇤⇤⇤ 11.19⇤⇤⇤ 10.98⇤⇤⇤ 14.92⇤⇤⇤ -0.00190⇤⇤ -0.00334⇤⇤⇤
(2.269) (2.674) (2.725) (3.113) (0.000788) (0.000868)
Tribal neighbors 7.592 6.673 3.968 0.2 0.00136 0.00165
(8.996) (7.601) (6.995) (8.318) (0.00107) (0.00112)
Covariates
Thickness-to-depth ratio -107468⇤⇤⇤ -99180⇤⇤⇤ -153020⇤⇤⇤ -111286⇤⇤ 42.81⇤⇤⇤ 34.61⇤⇤⇤
Feet to water (000s) 35.13⇤⇤⇤ 35.21⇤⇤⇤ 26.36⇤⇤⇤ 36.28** -0.00563⇤⇤⇤ -0.0118**
No. Neighbors underwater 13.02⇤ 13.73⇤⇤ 13.59⇤⇤ 20.52⇤⇤⇤ -0.00401⇤⇤⇤ -0.00575⇤⇤⇤
Topographic roughness 1.281⇤ 1.196⇤⇤ 1.246⇤⇤ 0.662 -0.000382⇤⇤ -0.000241⇤
City indicator 373.2⇤⇤⇤ 270.8⇤ 382.7⇤⇤ -0.00439 -0.0533
Feet to railroad (000s) 7.294 7.721 23.23⇤⇤ -0.000355 -0.00498⇤
Road density in radius -0.0637⇤⇤⇤ -0.0658⇤⇤⇤ -0.0867⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000124⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000205⇤⇤⇤
x coordinate of parcel (000s) 6.413⇤⇤⇤ -0.00276⇤⇤⇤
y coordinate of parcel (000s) 3.237⇤ -0.000569
Oil field fixed e↵ects No No No Yes No Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.039 0.04 0.041 0.05
Adjusted R-squared 0.259 0.312
Observations 27,480 27,480 27,480 27,480 27,480 27,480
Censored at 3772 days 16,687 16,687 16,687 16,687 NA NA
Notes: We do not show some standard errors in order to save space. A parcel’s neighborhood includes all parcels touching a one-mile
radius extending from the parcel’s exterior boundary. All specifications control for the slight variation in the total area of the one-mile
radius, due to variation in the size of parcels on the exterior of the radius. Standard errors are clustered by oil field and shown in parentheses.
33Below we explain why the tenure of parcel i is likely more impactful on well bore drilling.
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Table 2.4 shows estimates of the empirical model in (3). The sequence of specifica-
tions and covariates mimics those of Table 2.3. In column 4 of Table 2.4, which is our
preferred specification, the point estimates indicate  ˆT = 0.2 <  ˆF = 7.3 ˆA = 14.9. This
ordering follows our predictions, and the di↵erences between coe cients are statistically
significant.34 Note that adding an allotted trust neighbor doubles delay time, relative to
adding a fee neighbor. Adding a tribal neighbor does not increase delay time as predicted.
With respect to the Extra Tenure Regimes variable, we find evidence that a tenure
mosaic immediately adjacent to a parcel has discouraged drilling through that parcel.
The column 4 point estimate of ⇢ˆ indicates that adding another tenure regime around
parcel i is associated with a 106 day drilling delay. The column 6 coe cient of -0.026
is striking. This estimate indicates that adding one extra tenure regime decreases the
probability that a shale owner has been compensated for his shale by 65 percent.
To summarize the results in Table 2.4, parcel owners wait longer to be compensated
for their shale with increases in the number of exclusion rights holders in the surrounding
one-mile radius. Delays increase especially with the number of allotted trust parcels and,
to a lesser extent, with the number of fee parcels in the radius. By contrast, we find
no evidence that delays increase with an increase in the number of tribal parcels in the
radius. Table D1 in the appendix shows the results are robust to estimates that include
both parcel X-Y coordinates and oil field e↵ects, to subsamples that omit parcels in
cities or parcels that have neighboring parcels in cities, and to the use of the full sample
that includes federal and state government parcels. Table D2 indicates that our main
34The coe cient runs counter to our reasoning that the neighbor e↵ect o↵ reservation should be
smaller, due to forced pooling. These coe cients are not statistically di↵erent from each other , however,
and they are sensitive to the inclusion of parcels within cities in the sample. When we omit city parcels,
the relationship flips so that as expected (see appendix Table D1).
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inferences are also robust to the use of a linear model that allows for arbitrary spatial
correlation in the error structures following Conley (2008) and Hsiang (2010).
To assess whether the empirical patterns might generalize, Table D3 in the ap-
pendix compares private subdivision versus government ownership for the sample of
o↵-reservation parcels. O↵ the reservation, government parcels are managed by the
state of North Dakota, the U.S. BLM, and the USFS. These government parcels are
sometimes situated within oil fields alongside privately owned parcels (Figure 2.3). Re-
gression results in Table D3—which employ the same specifications as Table 2.4—show
that days elapsed prior to line penetration increase with the number of private neigh-
bors within the 1-mile radius. By contrast, increases in the number of BLM neighbors
have no e↵ect on timing, and increases in the number of neighboring state-owned parcels
actually reduce the number of days elapsed. Both findings are consistent with one of
our main arguments, that private subdivision around a parcel reduces the parcel owner’s
leverage in attracting oil development. We do not emphasize drilling patterns around
and on USFS parcels because the USFS Dakota Prairie Grassland area in our sample
has unique drilling restrictions. The observed timing of drilling on and around BLM and
state parcels, however, are similar to those on and around tribal parcels suggesting the
tribal results generalize to other forms of collective ownership.
2.5.4 Estimates of Other Outcome Variables
Table 2.5 present tests for the e↵ects of subdivision and tenure on the extent to
which a parcel has been drilled, measured by the length of lines penetrated a parcel.
111
This outcome variable is important because a parcel’s shale can often be drilled multiple
times, enabling parcel-owner compensation for multiple drilling projects.
The Table 2.5 estimates employ the same set of independent variables as those used in
Table 2.4. We estimate the Table 2.5 coe cients using a Tobit estimator that is censored
at zero for approximately 60.7 percent of the parcels (i.e., those lacking any horizontal
lines). Whether drilling extent is measured by total line length (columns 1 and 2) or
by line length per acre (columns 3 and 4) we find the same pattern of e↵ects as those
reported in Table 2.4. In the case Table 2.5, parcel acres and longside correlate positively
with line miles. As in Table 2.4, an increase in the number of neighbors in the 1-mile
radius is also associated with decreases in line miles, unless the neighbor’s tenure type is
tribal.
In Table 2.6 we estimate the e↵ects of subdivision and tenure on whether or not
parcel i has a well bore, and on the number of bores. Recall that a bore is the vertical
portion of a horizontal well. It’s placement on a particular parcel is important because
the surface owner of that parcel is positioned to benefit financially for allowing well-pad
infrastructure to be housed on his land. The Table 2.6 estimates in columns 1-2 employ
a linear probability model for Y = 1 if the parcel has a well bore. The estimates in
columns 3-4 use a Poisson model to estimate the count of well bores, which ranges from
0 to 30 across parcels.
The two most noteworthy results in Table 2.6 are the coe cient estimates on  T
and  F in column 2. These coe cients indicate that tribal parcels are less likely to
have well bores, and that fee parcels are more likely to have them when compared to
the omitted, o↵-reservation private parcel category. The column 2 coe cients are large.
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Relative to the mean probability of 7.96 percent, the  ˆT =  0.037 point estimate means
the probability of having a well bore decreases by 46.5 percent on tribal parcels. The
 ˆF = 0.032 point estimate means the probability of having a well bore increases by
40.2 percent on fee parcels. This finding suggests that oil companies prefer to locate
on-reservation well bores on fee and not tribal land, presumably because negotiating a
surface access contract with the tribe entails a higher cost when compared with the cost
of negotiating with a private surface owners.
To summarize the parcel-level results in tables 2.3-2.6, they suggest that subdivision
and allotted trust tenure reduce the probability that a parcel owner has been compensated
for her shale, and also delay drilling where it has occurred. Oil companies seem to prefer
to place well bores on fee simple parcels, but they also apparently prefer to run horizontal
lines through contiguous tribal tracts, or through swaths of private land that have not
been finely subdivided. These findings draw attention to the following question: is there
a threshold amount of subdivision that makes drilling exclusively through tribal land
more attractive to oil companies than drilling exclusively through private parcels? We
address this question in the next section, using well-level data.
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Table 2.5: Parcel-Level Tobit Estimates of Extent and Density of Horizontal
Lines
Y = Linear Miles of Y = Linear Miles per
Horizontal Lines 100 Acres
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parcel acres 0.00569⇤⇤⇤ 0.00591⇤⇤⇤ 0.00418⇤⇤⇤ 0.00450⇤⇤⇤
(0.000273) (0.000307) (0.000873) (0.00101)
Parcel longside 0.236⇤⇤⇤ 0.209⇤⇤⇤ 0.534⇤⇤⇤ 0.570⇤⇤⇤
(0.0391) (0.0381) (0.168) (0.176)
St. dev. of neighbor size -0.0136⇤⇤⇤ -0.0105⇤ -0.0283⇤⇤⇤ -0.0320⇤⇤⇤
(0.00497) (0.00584) (0.00940) (0.0100)
Fee parcel indicator 0.0251 0.0683 0.167 0.0698
(0.0970) (0.0856) (0.216) (0.254)
Allotted trust 0.123 0.0802 0.406⇤ 0.198
parcel indicator (0.0989) (0.110) (0.229) (0.259)
Tribal parcel indicator 0.0398 0.0213 0.347 0.150
(0.118) (0.119) (0.300) (0.288)
No. of tenure regimes -0.0550⇤⇤ -0.0595⇤⇤ -0.110⇤⇤ -0.110⇤⇤
(0.0242) (0.0247) (0.0514) (0.0544)
O↵ reservation neighbors -0.00160⇤ -0.00264⇤⇤⇤ -0.00238 -0.00680⇤
(0.000952) (0.000871) (0.00358) (0.00378)
Fee neighbors -0.00199⇤⇤⇤ -0.00264⇤⇤⇤ -0.00341 -0.00656⇤⇤
(0.000764) (0.000695) (0.00305) (0.00312)
Allotted trust neighbors -0.00496⇤⇤⇤ -0.00673⇤⇤⇤ -0.00717⇤ -0.0132⇤⇤
(0.00184) (0.00217) (0.00429) (0.00564)
Tribal neighbors 0.00177 0.00271 -0.000982 -0.00535
(0.00345) (0.00365) (0.0129) (0.0138)
Covariates
Thickness-to-depth ratio 108.6⇤⇤⇤ 70.46⇤⇤⇤ 242.8⇤⇤⇤ 146.6⇤⇤⇤
Feet to water (000s) -0.0159⇤⇤⇤ -0.0230⇤⇤⇤ -0.0217⇤⇤⇤ -0.0354⇤⇤
No. Neighbors underwater -0.00802⇤⇤⇤ -0.0103⇤⇤⇤ -0.0139 -0.0165
Topographic roughness -0.000901⇤⇤ -0.000496 -0.00207⇤⇤ -0.00137
City indicator -0.0896 -0.176⇤⇤ -0.268 -0.361
Feet to railroad (000s) 0.00243 -0.0125⇤⇤ -0.000866 -0.0283
Road density in radius 0.0154 0.0290⇤⇤⇤ 0.0247 0.0776⇤
x coordinate of parcel (000s) -0.00660⇤⇤⇤ -0.0174⇤⇤
y coordinate of parcel (000s) -0.00212⇤⇤ -0.00659⇤⇤⇤
Oil field fixed e↵ects No Yes No Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.247 0.313 0.053 0.074
Observations 27,480 27,480 27,480 27,480
Censored at 0 16,682 16,682 16,682 16,682
Notes: We do not show some standard errors in order to save space. A parcel’s neighborhood includes all parcels
touching a one-mile radius extending from the parcel’s exterior boundary. All specifications control for the slight
variation in the total area of the one mile radius, due to variation in the size of parcels on the exterior of the radius.
Standard errors are clustered by oil field and shown in parentheses. ⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
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Table 2.6: Parcel-Level Estimates of the Probability and Number of Horizon-
tal Well Bores
OLS estimates of Y = 1 if parcel Poisson Estimates of
has a horizontal well bore Y = No. of horizontal well bores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parcel acres (100s) 0.04786⇤⇤⇤ 0.04668⇤⇤⇤ 0.3362⇤⇤⇤ 0.3349⇤⇤⇤
(0.005376) (0.005514) (0.05412) (0.05695)
Parcel longside -0.008175 -0.01033 0.03533 0.05411
(0.009072) (0.009452) (0.1263) (0.1308)
St. dev. of neighbor size -0.001856⇤⇤⇤ -0.001607⇤ -0.03108⇤⇤⇤ -0.02719⇤⇤⇤
(0.0006303) (0.0008656) (0.008889) (0.008916)
Fee parcel indicator 0.03231⇤ 0.03202** 0.1873 0.1546
(0.01871) (0.01452) (0.1795) (0.1921)
Allotted trust 0.01836 0.02382 0.3390 0.1909
parcel indicator (0.02049) (0.01696) (0.2831) (0.2754)
Tribal parcel indicator -0.04978⇤⇤⇤ -0.03791** -1.5861⇤⇤⇤ -1.6604⇤⇤⇤
(0.01560) (0.01631) (0.4406) (0.4439)
No. of tenure regimes 0.0005092 -0.0004315 0.03530 0.03388
(0.004955) (0.004892) (0.09659) (0.09267)
O↵ reservation neighbors -0.0006307⇤⇤⇤ -0.0007883⇤⇤⇤ -0.01312⇤⇤⇤ -0.01665⇤⇤⇤
(0.0001340) (0.0002202) (0.003168) (0.003860)
Fee neighbors -0.0006228⇤⇤⇤ -0.0007358⇤⇤⇤ -0.01265⇤⇤⇤ -0.01538⇤⇤⇤
(0.0001072) (0.0001717) (0.002528) (0.002963)
Allotted trust neighbors -0.001604⇤⇤⇤ -0.001467⇤⇤⇤ -0.02214⇤⇤⇤ -0.02211⇤⇤⇤
(0.0003020) (0.0004127) (0.004877) (0.006652)
Tribal neighbors -0.0005451 -0.0005099 -0.007279 -0.0001790
(0.0003628) (0.0004410) (0.01159) (0.01064)
Covariates
Thickness-to-depth ratio 3.5450⇤⇤ 2.3342 113.49⇤⇤⇤ 24.724
Feet to water (000s) -0.002142⇤⇤⇤ -0.003572⇤⇤ -0.03152⇤⇤⇤ -0.05262⇤⇤⇤
No. Neighbors underwater -0.0007712⇤⇤ -0.0009464⇤⇤ -0.01393 -0.01964⇤⇤
Topographic roughness -0.00006101 -0.00002546 -0.0004564 0.0004475
City indicator 0.009665 0.0001227 -0.4851 -0.7611
Feet to railroad (000s) 0.0002839 0.0005732 0.007782 0.001662
Road density in radius 0.0007139⇤⇤⇤ 0.0009311⇤⇤⇤ 0.0001238⇤⇤⇤ 0.0001730⇤⇤⇤
x coordinate of parcel (000s) 0.00006507 -0.004853⇤⇤⇤
y coordinate of parcel (000s) 0.0002370⇤⇤ -0.0002760
Oil field fixed e↵ects No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.056 0.075
Observations 27,480 27,480 27,480 27,480
Notes: We do not show some standard errors in order to save space. A parcel’s neighborhood includes all parcels
touching a one-mile radius extending from the parcel’s exterior boundary. All specifications control for the slight
variation in the total area of the one mile radius, due to variation in the size of parcels on the exterior of the radius.
Standard errors are clustered by oil field and shown in parentheses. ⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
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2.6 Well-Level Estimates, Delay Costs, and Qualifi-
cations
In this section we test theory with well-level data. These tests have the following
advantages relative to parcel-level tests: 1) well-level coe cients are more intuitive to
interpret, 2) the well-level estimates measure the delays based on the drilling path actually
taken, rather than equally weighting all of the drilling paths that might be taken as
in our one-mile radius variables, and 3) the well-level estimates better facilitate the
monetization of delay costs. Monetizing delay costs helps us understand the estimates’
economic significance.
2.6.1 Well-Level Estimates of Delay
Table 2.7 summarizes the well-level data. The data set comprises the 6,554 horizontal
wells for which we were able to match the bore with the horizontal lines emanating from
the bore.35 The number of lines emanating from a single bore ranges from 1 to 12, with
some lines radiating like rays from the bore and others extending in opposite directions
from the bore (see Figure 2.8). The mean total length of all lines from a single bore is
2.22 miles. The number of tenure regimes penetrated by lines from a single well range
from 1 to 3, but 91 percent of the lines from a well are contained within a single tenure
regime.36 The maximum number of parcels cut by lines from a well is 85, and the mean
is 7.3 parcels. Figure 2.9 illustrates an example of how our well-level variables map to
35We match well bores to horizontal lines by matching first on API number and then using proximity.
36There are 1261 wells on the reservation in this sample, with 61 percent penetrating multiple regimes.
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the spatial attributes of a well.
Using the well-level data, we estimate the following empirical model
Dayswj = ↵j +  FFeewj +  AATrustwj +  TTribwj +  OOffParcwj + ...
...+  FFeeParcwj +  AATrustParcwj +  TTribParcwj + ⇢Regimeswj +  Xwj + ...
...+  Linemileswj + "wj
(2.4)
The dependent variable is the number of days elapsed before the well was drilled. Here w
= the 6,554 wells, j = oil fields, the ↵j notation represents the 203 oil-field fixed e↵ects,
and the notation Xwj indicates the covariates, measured at the parcel containing the well
bore. We also control for line length in some specifications with length growing slightly
over time due to changing technologies. Controlling for length makes the estimates
consistent with our theoretical reasoning, which holds constant line length (at h⇤).
117
T
a
b
le
2
.7
:
S
u
m
m
a
ry
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
fr
o
m
W
el
l-
L
ev
el
D
a
ta
S
et
V
ar
ia
b
le
N
am
es
M
ea
n
S
.D
.
M
in
M
ax
D
efi
n
it
io
n
D
ri
ll
in
g
D
a
te
a
n
d
D
is
ta
n
ce
D
ay
w
h
en
D
ri
ll
ed
a
23
15
.3
74
0.
8
13
37
72
D
ay
s
el
ap
se
d
b
et
w
ee
n
Ja
nu
ar
y
1,
20
05
an
d
d
at
e
in
w
h
ic
h
th
e
li
n
e
w
as
d
ri
ll
ed
L
in
es
fr
om
W
el
l
B
or
ea
2.
22
23
0.
62
12
1
12
N
u
m
b
er
of
h
or
iz
on
ta
l
li
n
es
st
em
m
in
g
fr
om
w
el
l
b
or
e
M
il
es
of
H
or
iz
on
ta
l
L
in
ea
1.
88
92
0.
50
94
0.
00
02
8.
13
36
T
h
e
to
ta
l
le
n
gt
h
(m
il
es
)
of
h
or
iz
on
ta
l
li
n
es
fr
om
th
e
w
el
l
b
or
e
L
oc
a
ti
o
n
o
f
W
el
l
B
o
re
F
ee
P
ar
ce
l
In
d
ic
at
or
a
,b
0.
08
71
0.
28
2
0
1
=
1
if
th
e
w
el
l
b
or
e
is
on
fe
e
si
m
p
le
p
ar
ce
l,
ot
h
er
w
is
e
=
0
A
ll
ot
te
d
T
ru
st
P
ar
ce
l
In
d
ic
at
or
a
,b
0.
09
81
0.
29
75
0
1
=
1
if
th
e
w
el
l
b
or
e
is
on
al
lo
tt
ed
tr
u
st
p
ar
ce
l,
ot
h
er
w
is
e
=
0
T
ri
b
al
P
ar
ce
l
In
d
ic
at
or
a
,b
0.
00
72
0.
08
44
0
1
=
1
if
th
e
w
el
l
b
or
e
is
on
tr
ib
al
p
ar
ce
l,
ot
h
er
w
is
e
=
0
O
↵
R
es
.
P
ar
ce
l
In
d
ic
at
or
a
,c
0.
77
2
0.
41
95
0
1
=
1
if
th
e
w
el
l
b
or
e
is
on
an
o↵
re
se
rv
at
io
n
,
p
ri
va
te
p
ar
ce
l,
ot
h
er
w
is
e
=
0
N
o
.
o
f
P
a
rc
el
s
W
el
l
L
in
e
s
C
u
t
T
en
u
re
R
eg
im
es
a
,b
1.
10
17
0.
35
14
1
3
N
u
m
b
er
of
d
i↵
er
en
t
te
nu
re
re
gi
m
es
th
at
al
l
li
n
es
fr
om
a
w
el
l
p
en
et
ra
te
A
ll
P
ar
ce
ls
a
,b
,c
7.
27
23
3.
71
11
1
85
N
u
m
b
er
of
p
ar
ce
ls
th
at
al
l
li
n
es
fr
om
a
w
el
l
p
en
et
ra
te
O
↵
R
es
er
va
ti
on
P
ar
ce
ls
a
,c
5.
90
49
4.
41
69
0
85
N
u
m
b
er
of
o↵
re
se
rv
at
io
n
p
ri
va
te
p
ar
ce
ls
th
at
al
l
li
n
es
fr
om
a
w
el
l
p
en
et
ra
te
F
ee
P
ar
ce
ls
a
,b
0.
53
83
1.
76
38
0
28
N
u
m
b
er
of
fe
e
si
m
p
le
p
ar
ce
ls
th
at
al
l
li
n
es
fr
om
a
w
el
l
p
en
et
ra
te
A
ll
ot
te
d
P
ar
ce
ls
a
,b
0.
63
52
1.
93
01
0
15
N
u
m
b
er
of
al
lo
tt
ed
tr
u
st
p
ar
ce
ls
th
at
al
l
li
n
es
fr
om
a
w
el
l
p
en
et
ra
te
T
ri
b
al
P
ar
ce
ls
a
,b
0.
19
39
1.
11
54
0
16
N
u
m
b
er
of
tr
ib
al
p
ar
ce
ls
th
at
al
l
li
n
es
fr
om
a
w
el
l
p
en
et
ra
te
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
su
m
m
a
ri
ze
s
d
a
ta
fo
r
a
ll
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l
w
el
ls
in
o
u
r
st
u
d
y
a
re
a
th
a
t
w
er
e
d
ri
ll
ed
b
et
w
ee
n
2
0
0
5
a
n
d
M
ay
2
0
1
5
th
a
t
w
e
co
u
ld
sp
a
ti
a
ll
y
m
a
tc
h
th
e
w
el
l
b
o
re
s
w
it
h
th
e
li
n
es
em
a
n
a
ti
n
g
fr
o
m
th
e
b
o
re
.
N
=
6
,5
4
4
fo
r
a
ll
va
ri
a
b
le
s.
D
a
ta
so
u
rc
es
a
re
:
a
)
N
o
rt
h
D
a
k
o
ta
O
il
a
n
d
G
a
s
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
w
eb
si
te
,
b
)
U
.S
.
B
u
re
a
u
o
f
In
d
ia
n
A
↵
a
ir
s,
c)
R
ea
l
E
st
a
te
P
o
rt
a
l.
d
)
A
u
th
o
rs
ca
lc
u
la
ti
on
s.
118
Table 2.8: Well-Level OLS Estimates of Duration between Jan. 1, 2005 and
Drilling of a Horizontal Well
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Location of Well Bore
Fee 206.8⇤⇤ 309.9⇤⇤⇤ 233.4⇤⇤⇤ 306.4⇤⇤⇤ 306.9⇤⇤⇤ 347.8⇤⇤⇤
(94.67) (85.61) (89.27) (79.64) (87.28) (78.65)
Allotted Trust 226.4⇤⇤ 299.8⇤⇤⇤ 260.6⇤⇤⇤ 306.8⇤⇤⇤ 308.2⇤⇤⇤ 330.2⇤⇤⇤
(89.78) (89.18) (84.69) (83.20) (79.86) (83.82)
Tribal Trust 280.0 346.0 342.4 385.2⇤ 367.0⇤ 386.0⇤
(257.7) (228.7) (247.5) (230.2) (212.9) (201.8)
No. of Parcels Cut by Lines
Tenure Regimes 94.49⇤⇤ 82.44 99.02⇤ 86.90 70.84 60.21
(47.81) (56.98) (52.75) (60.64) (58.49) (64.82)
O↵ Res. Parcels 16.69⇤⇤⇤ 14.56⇤⇤⇤ 5.150 3.625 14.42⇤⇤⇤ 12.33⇤⇤⇤
(4.387) (3.077) (5.103) (4.596) (4.721) (3.260)
Fee parcels 21.73⇤⇤⇤ 21.21⇤⇤⇤ 9.132 9.808 11.63 11.53
(7.990) (8.115) (8.080) (8.943) (7.947) (9.335)
Allotted parcels 43.45⇤⇤⇤ 36.12⇤⇤⇤ 25.71⇤⇤⇤ 19.93⇤⇤ 27.20⇤⇤⇤ 23.12⇤⇤
(9.180) (9.952) (9.802) (9.922) (8.848) (9.094)
Tribal parcels 19.15 16.96 -1.572 -2.152 2.211 2.220
(18.81) (17.62) (20.03) (19.23) (16.79) (15.54)
Line Distance and Number
Miles of Lines 171.3⇤⇤⇤ 166.7⇤⇤⇤ 281.7⇤⇤⇤ 268.9⇤⇤⇤
(54.77) (54.02) (54.36) (54.85)
Lines from Well -258.8⇤⇤⇤ -232.5⇤⇤⇤
(23.52) (21.56)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
X and Y coordinates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field E↵ects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 6545 6545 6545 6545 6545 6545
Adjusted R-squared 0.095 0.234 0.104 0.242 0.141 0.270
Notes: The regressions include all horizontal oil wells for which we could identify the completion date.
The tenure variables represent the total number of parcels from each tenure type through which lines
from a single horizontal well project penetrate. Covariates are measured at the well-bore and include:
thickness-to-depth, roughness, feet to water, feet to railroad, and road density.
Standard errors are clustered by oil field and shown in parentheses. ⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
Table 2.8 presents results. We focus here on columns 2, 4, and 6, which include oil
field fixed e↵ects. In those columns,  ˆT ,  ˆF , and  ˆA are all positive, meaning that having
a vertical bore on reservation land is associated with a delay, relative to wells with bores
o↵ the reservation, on private land. The estimates of  ˆT are largest, which is consistent
119
with the fixed cost of surface access being highest for wells emanating from tribal land.
With respect to the  ˆ coe cients, the main patterns are  ˆA >  ˆF >  ˆT and  ˆT = 0 as
expected.37 The column 2 point estimate of  ˆA = 36.1, for example, means that drilling
delays increased by 36.1 days for each allotted parcel penetrated by a well. By contrast,
 ˆT = 0 means that penetrating an additional tribal parcel is not associated with longer
delays.
Figure 2.10 graphically represents the results, based on the column 6 coe cient esti-
mates. Focusing first on the left panel, the height of the vertical intercepts denote the
point estimates of  ˆT ,  ˆF , and  ˆA. As we move right along the horizontal axis, the oil
well penetrates a greater number of parcels (P ). Hence, the total delay is  ˆ+  ˆP for each
tenure category.38 As the graph demonstrates, a drilling project through allotted trust
parcels takes longer to execute than a project through tribal tenure if the well will pen-
etrate three or more allotted trust parcels. A drilling project through fee simple parcels
takes longer to execute than a project through tribal tenure if the well will penetrate four
or more fee parcels.
The graph on the right side of Figure 2.10 puts these estimated delays in the context
of scenarios in which formerly communal (tribal) land is subdivided into 1280, 640, 320,
160, 80, 40, and 20 acre parcels. We treat the 1280 acre scenario as the benchmark, single-
parcel case because the most prevalent oil drilling unit on the Bakken is 1280 acres. This
implies that a 1280 acre parcel can fully accommodate most modern oil wells. When
the landscape is subdivided into 640 acre parcels, Figure 2.10 assumes the well must
37The di↵erences in coe cients are not all statistically significant.
38Figure 2.10 is drawn under the assumption that the statistically insignificant  ˆT coe cient is zero,
but that the statistically insignificant  ˆF = 11.5, because the latter coe cient is more precisely estimated.
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penetrate two parcels.39 When the landscape is subdivided into 320 acre parcels, the
well must penetrate four parcels. When subdivision involves 160 acre parcels, the well
must penetrate eight parcels and so on.
Applying the Table 2.8, column 6 estimates to the subdivision scenarios just described
yields the Figure 2.10 plots. These simple illustrations demonstrate that, once subdivision
is finer than 320 acre plots, there are delays associated with fee simple and especially
allotted trust parcels. For private land o↵ of the reservation, the delays become longer
than delays under tribal ownership once subdivision is 40 acres. Under the 40 acre
scenario, 32 parcels must be consolidated to create a 1280 acre unit, although forced
pooling rules in North Dakota requires the consent of only half of the owners.
39Other common oil unit sizes are 640 and 2560 acres.
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2.6.2 Monetizing Delay Costs
We monetize the cost of delays using back-of-the-envelope approaches. Our calcula-
tions are based on the monthly productivity of a typical well in the Bakken, as estimated
by Hughes (2013, p. 57). According to his estimates, a typical well produces 213,488
barrels during the first 48 months. Production from the well declines rapidly at first,
and then the decline rate slows. For example, 19 percent of the 213,488 barrels are ex-
tracted during the first 3 months, 47 percent are extracted during the first year, and 70
percent during the first two years. We fit a hyperbolic decline-curve function (see Satter
et al. (2008)) to the Hughes numbers in order to extend the production estimates from
4 to 29 years, which is a predicted length of production (see MacPherson (2012)2). This
process leads us to estimate total production of 396,395 barrels in 29 years, which is a
conservative estimate of well productivity on the Bakken.40
To monetize expected impacts of delays on royalty earnings, we take the following
steps. First, we multiply monthly production of barrels by the average price per barrel
over 2005 through May 2015, which was $78.89.41 Second, we discount monthly revenue
by annual rates of 1, 3, and 5%. Third, we multiply this discounted revenue by a royalty
rate, assumed to be 17 percent based on Brown et al. (2015)’s reported averages for the
Bakken.
Table 2.9 shows the monetized costs per well under the di↵erent discounting scenarios.
With no delay and a 3% annual discount rate, the expected stream of royalty payments
40Note that this “typical” well from Hughes (2013) is less productive than other estimates. MacPher-
son (2012), for example, reports that a typical well produces 540,000 barrels.
41This is the West Texas Intermediate Price, downloaded from the U.S. Energy Information Admin-
istration website at www.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/TblDefs/pet_pri_spt_tbldef2.asp.
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has a present value of $4.47 million. If this royalty earning is shared across 7.3 mineral
owners, which is the mean number of parcels penetrated by a well in our sample, then
the present value is $614,665 per parcel. A one year delay under this 3% discounting
scenario leads to an expected aggregate royalty loss of $131,905 or $18,144 per parcel.
The one-year delay represents a loss of 2.95% of royalty value, compared to the no-delay
benchmark scenario. The other cells in Table 2.9 can be interpreted in the same way.
Table 2.10 monetizes the expected royalty delay costs of subdivision, which we illus-
trate in terms of days in the graph on the right-side of Figure 2.10. Table 2.10 employs the
3% discounting scenario. Here we highlight the subdivision scenario that best matches
the observed mean size of parcels over oil fields in our sample area today, which is 79.4
acres. Rounding up to 80 acres, consider the delay costs associated with subdividing
a 1280 acre oil unit of communal tribal minerals into 16 separate, 80 acre plots. The
per-well expected delay costs, in terms of the present value of foregone royalties, are
$197,718-$143,382 = $54,336 for subdivision into fee simple. The per-well delay costs are
$260,064-$143,382 = $116,682 for subdivision into allotted trust.
How large are these royalty delay costs in aggregate? Consider there are 592 wells
with bores on fee land in our well-level sample and 660 wells with bores on allotted
land. Under the 80 acre subdivision scenario, this suggests the expected aggregate delay
costs of fee simple subdivision were in the range of 592 ⇥ $54, 336 = $32.2 million.
The aggregate delay costs of subdivision into allotted trust parcels were in the range of
660 ⇥ $116, 682 = $77.0 million. Fort Berthold had an American Indian population of
6,341 in 2010. Hence, the aggregate per-capita delay costs were in the range of $5,073
for fee simple subdivision and $12,145 for allotted trust subdivision. For perspective, the
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Table 2.9: Costs of Drilling Delays for a Typical Horizontal Well
Aggregate Royalties from Well Royalties Per Parcel
r=1% r=3% r=5% r=1% r=3% r=5%
Royalty $s, No Delay $4,993,516 $4,468,611 $4,062,254 $686,866 $614,665 $484,324
Delay cost (% of Total)
1 Month 4,158 11,144 16,856 572 1,533 2,319
(0.08) (0.25) (0.48)
3 Months 12,463 33,348 50,358 1,714 4,587 6,927
(0.25) (0.75) (1.43)
6 Months 24,895 66,447 100,092 3,424 9,140 13,768
(0.50) (1.49) (2.84)
1 Year 49,666 131,905 197,717 6,832 18,144 27,196
(0.99) (2.95) (5.62)
2 Years 98,837 259,917 385,811 13,595 35,752 53,069
(1.98) (5.82) (10.9)
Notes: The notation r refers to the annual discount rates. The columns showing royalties
per parcel are based on the mean number of parcels penetrated by a horizontal well, which is
7.27 (see Table 2.3). We assume that each parcel in the drilling unit is equal in size so that each
parcel owner is paid a 1/7.27 or 13.76% share.
2010 American Indian per capita income on the Fort Berthold reservation was $13,543,
based on U.S. Census data. Hence, the per capita delay costs from subdivision of $17,218
exceeded per capita income.
The back-of-the-envelope simulations are rough, and there are reasons why they might
overstate or understate actual delay costs. The simulations might overstate delay costs
because they assume 1280 acre oil units, but some units were smaller. If we assume
an oil unit size of 640 acres, then the per capita delay costs were $1,874 for fee simple
subdivision and $4,994 for allotted trust. The simulations might understate delay costs
because they hold constant oil prices at the sample period mean of $78.89. However,
oil prices fell after our sample period ends, from $59 per barrel in May 2015 to $37 per
barrel in December 2015.42 The declining price of oil raises the delay costs for owners of
parcels that were not drilled prior to our sample period, and it highlights an important
42See https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DCOILWTICO/downloaddata.
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issue that we do not consider here. If excessive supply of oil from horizontal fracking has
driven down world prices, then areas of shale burdened by subdivision and suboptimal
tenure will face larger delay costs than our estimates imply. Finally, the simulations hold
constant royalty rates at 17 percent but the royalties paid on projects in oil units with
subdivided and allotted trust parcels may have been lower. We lack data on royalty
rates so we cannot directly address this contention. Our theoretical reasoning in Section
2.4, however, implies that these projects must pay lower royalty rates if the oil drilling
industry is competitive.
Table 2.10: Monetized Delay Costs from Di↵erent Subdivision Scenarios
(r=3%)
Cost of Delay per Well (Present Value of Delayed Royalties, in $s)
Parcel Acres Parcels in Oil Unit Tribal Fee Allotted Trust O↵ Reservation
1280 1 143,382 133,475 131,243 4,580
640 2 143,382 137,758 139,831 9,160
320 4 143,382 146,324 157,007 18,320
160 8 143,382 163,455 191,359 36,640
80 16 143,382 197,718 260,064 73,281
40 32 143,382 266,245 397,472 146,562
20 64 143,382 403,297 672,290 293,123
10 128 143,382 677,401 1,221,926 586,246
Notes: The calculations monetize the days of delay in Figure 2.10 using the discounting procedure
summarized in Table 2.9, for the r = 3% discounting scenario.
2.6.3 Alternative Interpretations, Caveats, and Generalizations
We focus on a contracting cost mechanism through which subdivision delays drilling,
but alternative causal channels are possible. If smaller parcels have higher surface quality,
conditional on oil field fixed e↵ects, and drilling through shale damages surfaces, then
our estimates might be capturing systematic resistance from small-parcel owners due to
environmental damage concerns. We do not think this alternative mechanism is driving
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the results for two reasons. First, environmental damages from shale drilling whether
perceived or real - spill across neighboring parcels and are not generally contained to
surface areas above a particular section of drilling line (see, e.g., Olmstead et al. (2013),
Muehlenbachs et al. (2015)). This implies an owner of a small parcel cannot prevent
exposure to external e↵ects from drilling simply by trying to prevent drilling beneath his
parcel. On the contrary, contracting costs caused by subdivision can actually prevent
neighbors from joining together to prevent oil drilling at a scale large enough to eliminate
exposure to adverse e↵ects. This argument is similar to Hansen and Libecap (2004a), who
explain how high contracting costs among small landowners exacerbated environmental
pollution during the U.S. dust bowl era.
We focus on a contracting cost mechanism through which allotted trust tenure has
delayed drilling relative to fee simple but alternative causal channels are possible. If the
average American Indian owner of allotted trust is more resistant to drilling than the
average non-Indian fee simple owner, for cultural reasons, then di↵erences in preferences
might explain longer delays associated with allotted trust. A test for this alternative could
compare drilling uptake on fee parcels with uptake on allotted trust parcels with only a
single owner, but we lack data on parcel-specific allotted trust ownership numbers. In any
case, an explanation focused on preferences rather than contracting is di cult to reconcile
with the observation that the tribal government on Fort Berthold which is democratically
elected - has aggressively pursued drilling. Moreover, our interpretation that contracting
costs rather than preferences explain the slower uptake of drilling in allotted trust areas
align with assessments by local experts, such as Ogden (2011), who asserts that because
of a “highly fractionated [allotted trust] land base it is almost impossible for companies
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to gather the approval of all the landowners of any given tract.” Even if di↵erences in the
timing of drilling on fee simple versus allotted trust parcels reflected cultural preferences,
preferences would not explain di↵erences in drilling through allotted trust versus tribal
parcels.
Finally, our study might be criticized on the grounds that the findings narrowly
apply to the Fort Berthold reservation, and to the peculiar institution of allotted trust
tenure. While a fuller investigation of other settings is outside the scope of our study, we
think the contracting cost and anticommons logic should apply to other comparisons of
government versus subdivided private land. Evidence that it does is found in Table D3
of the appendix, which shows that patterns of drilling on and around federal BLM and
North Dakota state land resemble patterns on and around tribal land. We do speculate,
however, that the potential scale advantages of government ownership, whether tribal,
state, or federal, is conditioned by the quality and transparency of governance.
2.7 Conclusion
Land privatization programs are appealing to economists because most agree there
are stronger incentives to invest in individually owned land when compared to communal
land. Where programs have been implemented, they have generally induced investment
on privatized parcels, particularly with respect to agricultural production and household
quality (see Galiani and Schargrodsky 2012). In the specific case of North American
indigenous lands, there is also evidence that movement towards privatization has im-
proved parcel-specific surface investments (Anderson and Lueck, 1992; Akee, 2009) and
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improved overall measures of Native population incomes (Arago´n, 2015).
We examine an important qualification to the benefits of privatization. Creating more
exclusion rights through the subdivision of communal land can frustrate the e cient use
of natural resources that cannot be profitably exploited without the consent of all (or
most) owners. The problem is that subdivision raises contracting and coordination costs
and may lead to the underutilization of large-scale resources, such as wind and shale oil,
which is the focus of our study.
We study shale oil extraction from the Bakken, through the Fort Berthold Indian
reservation and surrounding lands.43 In that setting, we find that having more subdi-
vided and private neighboring parcels reduces and delays oil drilling on a parcel, thereby
reducing the expected compensation or rents from ownership. In general, we find that
well drilling on a parcel is encouraged if the surrounding land is owned by a single entity,
namely the tribe.
Our findings provide another angle from which to view the allotment of Native Amer-
ican lands that complements other research on the legacy of this era. Accounts written
by sociologists, historians, and legal scholars characterize the injustices of allotment by
documenting the large transfers of land wealth from Native Americans to non-Indians
that resulted (see, e.g., Banner (2009)). We join other economists by emphasizing that
allotment did much more than transfer land wealth; it also fundamentally a↵ected land
productivity, both positively and negatively, by creating new systems and mixtures of
land tenure. Our contribution is to emphasize, with specific detail, how the subdivision
43Our arguments and study are similar to a working paper by Holmes et al. (2015) who study ag-
glomeration economies of density, also in the context of the Bakken. One key di↵erence is that our study
focuses to a greater extent on property rights and tenure, exploiting the di↵erent systems that exist on
Forth Berthold.
129
of tribal tenure has derailed the coordinated development of a valuable natural resource.
Back-of-the envelop estimates suggest the subdivision of tribal land reduced Fort Berthold
per-capita earnings from the fracking boom by an amount exceeding annual per capita
incomes from other sources. Moreover, we expect that subdivided tenure has reduced
rents on other Native Americans lands that harbor large stocks of oil and natural gas
shale, and hold other spatially expansive resources with value such as wind.
Beyond the context of Native American reservations, our finding that land subdivision
has delayed horizontal drilling on the Bakken is relevant to a burgeoning literature on
the local economic benefits from the fracking boom (e.g., Manilo↵ and Mastromonaco
(2014)). Our study may help explain why some locales boomed earlier than others, and it
suggests that local benefits may have been even larger if delays due to contracting could be
avoided. The findings here also provide context to research suggesting that conventional
oil and gas drilling is more costly and subject to more delays on U.S. government land
(Kunce et al., 2002). The evidence here suggests that government ownership may be
relatively more beneficial for shale oil, due to the horizontal nature of drilling.
We recognize there are attractive alternatives to managing shale oil besides communal
ownership of land. One alternative used extensively in the United States is the regulation
of horizontal fracturing by state oil and gas commissions, including forced pooling rules
that limit contracting costs and the power of individual landowners to holdup develop-
ment. The findings here suggest that significant contracting delays persist in spite of
these rules, at least on the Bakken. Another alternative is split estates and government
ownership of minerals (Fitzgerald, 2010). Subsurface ownership by government is com-
mon throughout the world, and it could in principle solve the coordination problem we
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have highlighted, but it does so at a large cost of creating principal-agent problems. We
are interested in the costs and benefits of government mineral ownership but the issue is
beyond the scope of our study. Our study does raise questions about how new fracking
and horizontal drilling technologies have changed the optimal ownership of oil, however,
and we hope to see future research on that topic.
2.8 Permissions and Attributions
The content of Chapter 2 is the result of a collaboration with Dominic Parker.44
44For helpful comments on earlier drafts, we thank Jane Friesen, Terry Anderson, Shawn Regan,
Tim Fitzgerald, Dan Benjamin, and participants at seminars and workshops hosted by Simon Fraser
University, the Society for Organizational and Institutional Economics, the University of Wisconsin,
the UC Santa Barbara Occasional Conference on Environmental Economics, and the Property and
Environment Research Center. We are grateful to Matt Kelly, an attorney of Tarlow and Stonecipher
PLLC for helpful discussions about oil and gas leasing on the Bakken.
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Chapter 3
Endogenous First-Possession
Property Rights in Open-Access
Resources
3.1 Introduction
Losses of competitive entry and production in open-access resources have long been
recognized.1 In the absence of formal property rights, there are no restrictions on entry,
and agents do not bear the full costs of their production decisions. Classic externalities
arise with the use of excessive capital, other inputs, short-time horizons, races to pro-
duce, congestion, reduced investment in the resource stock, and lower output value. To
mitigate these externalities, governments implement various regulatory and rights-based
1See Gordon (1954) for an outline of the situation in fisheries and Hardin (1968) for a more general
description.
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instruments to constrain entry, limit output, and internalize external costs. We are in-
terested in a particular set of institutions that establish a total resource extraction cap
and then distribute shares of the resource or resource rents to individual users. These
institutions are termed rationalization, which is how we will refer to them in this Es-
say. The potential for open-access exists for many natural resources. Here, we examine
attempted rationalization of fisheries and U.S. hydrocarbon deposits in the presence of
informal property rights to streams of rents under open-access resource use.
Rationalization can create large gains by internalizing externalities in use decisions
and instituting extraction levels consistent with maximizing long-term rents from the
resource stock. The existence of net surplus from mitigating aggregate open-access losses
suggests beneficiaries of rationalization ought to be willing and able to pay opposing
parties for their consent whenever rationalizing creates a surplus. In such settings, will-
ingness to pay for transfers exceeds the willingness to accept transfers, and institutional
responses to address open-access dissipation should be observed. Empirically, the process
is far more complex, with certain parties systematically holding out.
The existence of heterogeneity, both in users’ costs and in the resource itself, has im-
portant implications for the emergence of informal institutions to protect inframarginal
rents. Informal institutions are locally devised and may not be recognized in formal
statutes, regulatory actions, or court rulings. These institutions emerge due to low-cost
users’ ability to discover and invest in more productive resource deposits and those users’
desire to protect their claims. In settings where individuals interact with the resource in
particular locations with di↵erential information about the overall stock and invest in pro-
tecting their rent-generating skills, rationalization imposed by governments at the behest
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of less-productive users may strand investments in the resource made by more productive
agents, their claims to it, and any associated human capital. In this case, rationalization
e↵ectively expropriates the informal property rights of low-cost users. Unless compen-
sated, this expropriation is a basis for opposing otherwise socially beneficial institutional
change.
The view that inframarginal rents—positive economic profits earned by low-cost pro-
ducers in competitive setting—exist in open-access settings has been explored in the
fishery-economics literature.2 Johnson and Libecap (1982) show how di↵erential produc-
tion costs generate inframarginal rents captured by highly skilled agents that are vulner-
able to redistribution or loss if uniform quotas or shares in a total allowable output are
installed. Anderson et al. (2011) and Johnson (1995) argue that Pigouvian taxes or the
auctioning of production shares transfer rents from low-cost agents. Despite the recog-
nition that inframarginal rents exist in open-access resources, the economics literature
has not explored the connection between sustained open-access and the establishment of
endogenous, informal institutions to protect these rents.3
Long-term expectations regarding the profits to be earned from resource exploita-
tion under open-access are di↵erent for inframarginal-rent earners. If users with low
expected rents view the resource stock as at risk, they may organize for new institutional
arrangements implemented by the state that undermine the practices of those who have
adapted to open-access, earn inframarginal rents, and view the stock’s condition more
favorably. This di↵erential assessment creates a bargaining situation whereby some par-
2See generally Clark (1980); Heaps (2003)
3See generally Lueck (1995) (exploring open-access resources in the limited context of first possession
establishment of property rights).
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ties seek to implement new access and production rules whereas others seek to defend
their incumbent advantages. If the former anticipate su cient net gains from institu-
tional change, they ought to be able to compensate the latter for any individual losses.
Bargaining involves agreeing on the value of inframarginal rental streams—willingness to
accept—and matching it with the value of the net benefits gained—willingness to pay.
If these do not coincide, then there is no voluntary agreement and open-access persists;
distributional conflicts can have e ciency implications. We examine and discuss em-
pirically observed opposition to theoretically Pareto-improving rationalization attempts.
We present a framework of search and exploitation and formation of informal claims to
stochastic and heterogeneous resource rents by users who are heterogeneous in search
and production cost.
3.2 Analytical Framework
3.2.1 Sources of Inframarginal Rents in Open-Access
Understanding how informal institutions can emerge within open-access regimes re-
quires studying the factors that allow users to earn rents in the absence of formal, legal
property rights to resources. The most common explanation of inframarginal rents as-
sumes some users have lower costs than others and are able to earn rents even when
individuals on the margin earn zero profit (Johnson and Libecap, 1982). Although this
way of thinking about heterogeneity is analytically tractable, it is problematic because
it does not account for how cost advantages persist over time. Open-access settings are
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characterized by a lack of formal rules or restrictions, so all users are free to adopt similar
technologies and production practices as they become aware of them. Rent-generating
cost advantages can persist only through di↵erences in knowledge either about the re-
source or about production techniques. If that knowledge were common or costless to
obtain, costs would converge and inframarginal-rent earners would cease to exist. Di↵er-
ences in search and production knowledge that are di cult to copy or convey to others
must drive users’ ability to sustain inframarginal rents over time.
Di↵erences in knowledge about a resource will arise in settings where the resource
is spatially heterogeneous and large and where extraction is site-specific. If search is
costly and users are heterogeneous, those with lower search costs will find more pro-
ductive locations and potentially earn inframarginal rents because they can access the
most valuable part of the resource sooner than those who ultimately extract from less-
productive locations. If these users also invest in specialized knowledge about how to
produce the resource from particular locations, their production costs are also lower, fur-
ther increasing their rents. Rents derive from asymmetric information—over the resource
and over techniques—so settings where information is less stratified will be more subject
to rent dissipation. Acquiring site-specific production knowledge increases the expected
gains from searching for a productive location if site-specific resource abundance and user
productivity are complements.
Where the resource is small and homogeneous in quality and users are also similar in
search and production costs, the full-dissipation competitive setting described by Gor-
don (1954) occurs. Resource homogeneity reduces the incentive to search because all
locations are equally abundant and, if coupled with user homogeneity, prevents users
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from exploiting asymmetric information to earn rents. In this setting, users keep enter-
ing the resource as long as positive rents exist. Since all users are homogeneous, the
equilibrium level of resource extraction corresponds to zero rents for all users. Resource
and user homogeneity is also, paradoxically, the setting outlined by Ostrom (1990) for
successful communal management of a local common-pool resource (“CPR”). It cannot
be the case that homogeneity in the resource and agents leads to both success and fail-
ure. Accordingly, we seek a more general characterization of open-access that reflects
the asymmetric information problems that cause collective action for mitigation of rent
dissipation to break down.
Table 3.1 shows how our setting compares to those considered by Gordon and Ostrom.
We argue that the homogeneity and information assumptions of Gordon and Ostrom, as
shown in the upper left quadrant, are not representative of resources where sustained
open-access is observed. Our focus is on exploring the implications of relaxing these
assumptions. We argue that most of the world’s sustained open-access settings are located
where inframarginal rents are earned by some agents, but low or zero rents are earned by
new entrants, and there are no local communal arrangements to manage relatively small
resource stocks. These conditions arise in the bottom right quadrant of the Table.
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Table 3.1: Open-Access Conditions and Collective Action
Resource Characteristics
User Characteristics Small, Homogeneous Large, Heterogeneous
Homogeneous Ostrom (1990) /Gordon(1954).
No Search or Production Advan-
tages; Willingness to Pay = Will-
ingness to Accept; Collective Ac-
tion Agreement
No Search or Production Ad-
vantages; Willingness to Pay
= Willingness to Accept; Col-
lective Action Agreement
Heterogeneous No Search Advantages; Produc-
tion Di↵erences Observed; Will-
ingness to Pay = Willingness to
Accept; Collective Action Agree-
ment
Our Framework: Search and
Production Advantages; Will-
ingness to Pay Willingness to
Accept; No Collective Action
Agreement
3.2.2 Strategies to Defend Inframarginal Rents—The Sponta-
neous Emergence of de facto Property Arrangements
Productive locations and specialized search and extraction techniques can be thought
of as rent-generating factors of production. Low-cost users are able to sustain their rents
to the extent that they can maintain exclusive use of these factors of production. Despite
their advantages, low-cost users’ rents may be dissipated by high-cost users’ actions
in two ways. First, if high-cost users attempt to directly access specialized factors of
production by imitating low-cost users (either following them to productive locations or
adopting what they are able to observe about extraction techniques), they may reduce
inframarginal rents.4 Second, entry by high-cost users—though it generates little to no
rents—may deplete the aggregate stock in a way that reduces rents for inframarginal
users.5
Rent earners stand to lose if others are able to dissipate their rents through entry
4This scenario assumes that it is less costly for high-cost users to imitate low-cost users than for
low-cost users to initially discover the rent-generating factors of production.
5See Levhari and Mirman (1980) (providing an example of a resource harvesting problem with a
Nash Equilibrium in harvest strategies that may correspond to a declining resource stock).
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or imitation. The benefits of establishing informal claims under open-access derive from
streams of inframarginal rents that users seek to protect. There are a variety of ways in
which rent earners might defend rental streams, and the method chosen depends on the
characteristics of the resource, characteristics of the rent earners, informal norms, and
broad underlying political institutions. Where users can profitably invest to defend rents,
informal property rights spontaneously emerge. We define an informal property right as
the de facto ability to earn a stream of rents over time—to the exclusion of others—due
to search and production advantages or actions taken to exclude other individuals from
one’s stream of rents. These informal rights may cause open-access to persist longer than
would otherwise be expected if the spontaneously emerged rights do not easily convert
to de jure property rights. In this case, low-cost users would resist institutional change.
Hence, the type of informal property rights that emerges has important implications
for whether users will be willing to transition to a formal rights regime or some other
joint-management institution.
Depending on inframarginal-rent sources and other users’ attempts to compete those
rents away, inframarginal-rent earners may pursue numerous strategies to defend their
claims. Spatial exclusion may e↵ectively block competition in some settings. Threatened
or actual force, fencing, and continued occupation are possible strategies for establishing
exclusive access of a location. Spatially excluding other users produces greater returns
when rents derive primarily from knowledge of productive locations and when the spatial
distribution of the resource is stable over time. For example, informal spatial claims
within a fishery for a stationary species like lobster have higher expected returns than
spatial claims in the fishery for tuna, which migrate globally. If spatial exclusion and
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private information are costly or not e↵ective, or if competitive entry continues, infra-
marginal users will capture more of the resource rents in the short-term, but in the
long-term, Gordon’s (1954) prediction of full rent dissipation prevails. Accordingly, we
expect rent earners to invest in natural capital—to save some of the resource stock for
later—only if they successfully establish an informal, spontaneous property right.
Users may also use the existing legal framework to exert spatial claims. Many spatially
heterogeneous resources are relatively fixed and so correspond closely with the location
of land. Grazing lands, surface water flow, stationary marine species, and (to some
extent) oil reservoirs are a few examples. In these settings staking de jure claims to
land coinciding with productive resource locations allows de facto exclusion of outsiders
from the resource. Such de jure provisions quickly transform open-access resources into
limited-access resources because users must have a land right prior to occupation and
production. Like informal exclusion, this approach is much less e↵ective if the spatial
distribution of the resource is highly variable. For example, Lueck (1989) documents the
challenges associated with managing highly migratory wild game with private property
rights to land alone. Users of a resource will prefer formal, de jure claims over informal
spatial claims in settings where there is a low-cost and low-risk existing legal framework
for asserting title to land. In this case, users rely on the state to keep outsiders from
trespassing on land and extracting the resource in their valuable location.
Faced with the prospect of resource dissipation through knowledge dissemination,
users invest in knowledge and processes that are inherently di cult to communicate or
copy.6 As with search, users with lower costs of investment in knowledge and greater ca-
6This up-front investment in highly specialized, private, and tacit knowledge reduces the costs of
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pacity to pay up-front costs will earn di↵erential rents from their investments. Therefore,
choosing whether to invest in “cheap” or “costly” knowledge has important implications
for users’ ability to agree on compensation when faced with the prospect of joint man-
agement or rationalization by the state. The upshot is that asymmetric information is
endogenous in spatially heterogeneous resources with heterogeneous users. This same
asymmetric information, however, creates barriers in negotiations for rationalization be-
cause the claims of low-cost users will be di cult for others to verify. Hence, willingness
to pay and willingness to accept will diverge.
Spontaneous property rights to open-access resources tend to emerge in settings where
users and resources are both heterogeneous (large potential gains), the spatial distribution
of the resource is relatively stable over time, production is not fully transparent, and
there is potential for learning by experience (lowering costs of developing rights). The
greater the gains from asymmetric information, the more users will invest in keeping their
advantages private. As in any competitive setting, rents accrue from the exclusive use of
a factor of production. In our case, that factor may be an especially productive location
or a production technique. Either way, rents will dissipate if knowledge of the factor is
not kept private.
For those users who earn positive rents, information is valuable precisely because it is
asymmetric. Developing and protecting information advantages is costly, but incurring
these costs can allow users to assert an informal, de facto right to more of the resource
than others who do not possess these advantages. The value, strength, and extent of these
informal rights will shape users’ expectations about the future of the resource stock and
maintaining privacy later.
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their willingness to participate in any attempt at formal management of the resource.
3.2.3 Challenges in Transitioning to de jure Property Rights
The extent and character of spontaneously evolved, informal property rights in open-
access resources determines whether collective action to create formal property rights will
confront bargaining problems over rent distribution. Informal property rights emerge
after costly investments in search, knowledge, and exclusion. Creating formal property
rights may strand some of these investments by changing the way in which all users
interact with the resource. A user’s willingness to accept rationalization will depend
on their expected stream of rents both under open-access and under the new regime.
If the investments made to secure rents under open-access are not as productive after
rationalization, then the value of formal rights is reduced and inframarginal-rent earners
will demand compensation. Those investments, however, are likely di cult to value
because of endogenous information asymmetries.
While recognizing informal rights is important in any transition from informal to for-
mal property rights, rationalization of open-access resources presents unique challenges.
Users’ ability to earn rents in open-access derives from their ability to translate some
particular realization of the stochastic resource stock into output more e↵ectively than
others. Because o cial rationalization by the state involves formally open-access natural
resources with no legally recognized owners, it is understandable that o↵ered shares are
uniform. Uniform shares are, by definition, a direct translation of the aggregate resource
stock into individual output that works in the same way for every user. Rationalization
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puts all users on equal footing with respect to aggregate resource variability in a given
period, be it stream flow, fish stock, or rangeland. Rationalization harms low-cost users
of the resource by reducing their competitive advantage. Whereas, previously, users could
assert an informal right to more of the stock, rationalization makes that right conditional
on the structure of formal property rights. Though low-cost users will still translate an
open-access resource into output at an above-average rate, rationalization tends to reduce
low-cost users’ competitive advantage and artificially advantage high-cost users.
If low-cost users’ informal rights to the resource exceed their formal rights assigned
under rationalization, those users must formally acquire rights to the additional units
of output that they previously achieved informally. This acquisition reduces the value
of the information that generated rents under open-access. Users can no longer profit
directly from their specialized knowledge and cannot easily convey this tacit, private
knowledge to others to secure o↵setting shares. The corollary to this loss is that users
with higher search costs that face low probabilities of discovering productive spatial
claims stand to gain from being granted the right to a given amount of output. High-
cost users gain the right to the return on natural capital investments made by low-cost
users, forcing these parties to buy back their own returns through additional shares.
Thus, rationalization in certain settings may represent expropriation of informal property
rights and redistribution of the rents from investment in informal property rights. That
expropriation requires side payments—made feasible by the aggregate gains from formal
controls—to informal-property-rights holders to secure agreement over rationalization.
The aggregate gains from rationalizing open-access resources may be quite large, even
in settings where inframarginal users are made worse o↵. Costs associated with declin-
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ing stocks and externalities from overproduction in both renewable and nonrenewable
resources can be substantial from competition on the margin. The benefits—both im-
mediate and long run—of instituting sustainable resource management accrue especially
to high-cost, marginal users of the resource because they are most a↵ected by variation
in the stock and have the least specialized knowledge. Therefore, high-cost users ought
to be willing to pay low-cost users to agree to rationalize. This willingness to pay for
transfers should exceed the low-cost users’ minimum willingness to accept in any setting
where aggregate net gains from rationalization exist, provided that users agree about the
net gains from rationalization. Agreement will nonetheless fail in the presence of what
appear to be large aggregate gains if users’ knowledge about the resource and the source
of di↵erential returns from exploitation systematically di↵er.
Individuals form their beliefs about the aggregate resource stock based on observations
from particular locations in the spatial distribution of the resource. If low-cost users
defend the most productive claims, then the claims available for extraction by high-
cost users will be systematically less productive and lead to a more pessimistic view
of the resource. Holders of informal property rights learn more about the location-
specific dynamics of the resource in their location than do other users, giving them
a di↵erent estimate of the stream of rents associated with holding that informal right.
Alternatively, high-cost users develop a di↵erent sense of the potential rents from resource
use. Each type of user learns about the resource and responds to that knowledge in
sometimes fundamentally di↵erent ways. This can lead to di↵erent views about the
benefits of rationalization because, in spatially connected resources such as fisheries and
oil reservoirs, the productivity of each location a↵ects the productivity of the resource as
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a whole.
The key insight of our framework is that inframarginal rents in open-access resources
ultimately derive from di↵erences in highly specific knowledge. Users who develop spon-
taneous claims to the resource develop knowledge of the stock in their private location.
That knowledge generates inframarginal rents, shapes expectations of future rents, and
molds investment and production choices. High-cost users learn about the resource in
a di↵erent way because they observe less productive and more vulnerable parts of the
stock. Low-cost users invest to protect their rents by keeping their di↵erential knowledge
private. Through this process, informal de facto property rights emerge spontaneously
with no central organization or demarcation. Accordingly, these informal rights are in-
herently di cult to value because their basis is in asymmetric information, private, tacit
knowledge and related production and investment decisions. Users seeking to negotiate
over rationalization will find it di cult to credibly communicate their profitability under
either regime because their di↵erences in knowledge are the source of their di↵erences in
profitability.
Table 3.2 lists some hypotheses that structure our examination of the natural-resource
cases. We use two cases, fisheries and oil and gas, to explore these hypotheses. However,
we do not test these hypotheses because of limited data.
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Table 3.2: Hypotheses
Di↵erences in knowledge of specialized sites and/or production processes drive sus-
tained inframarginal rents.
Settings where users earn inframarginal rents will be characterized by asymmetric
information about the resource.
Inframarginal-rent earners are motivated to invest in strategies that generate private
knowledge of the resource and/or techniques and block others from imitating.
Informal rights spontaneously emerge as spatial exclusion when the spatial distri-
bution of the resource is not subject to high variation over time, generating durable
productive locations.
Informal rights spontaneously emerge as spatial exclusion to adjacent land when
bounding costs are lower than for the resource itself.
Informal spatial rights may complement valuable specialized knowledge when the
spatial claim limits observation.
Informal spatial claims may be marked and defended by foregone inframarginal
through under- or overexploitation.
Inframarginal-rent earners have an incentive to support rationalization if it recog-
nizes their informal claims.
Rationalization may not be Pareto improving even when there are aggregate benefits.
Distributional disputes result in delayed or blocked rationalization.
3.3 The Framework Applied
3.3.1 Oil and Gas
Nature of the Resource and Potential for Open Access
The size of oil and gas reservoirs generally is given in production potential.7 In the
United States, access to subterranean deposits is granted by surface landowners, thus
surface acreage is a more useful measure for this Essay. Sizes for some prominent oil fields
range from 213,543 acres for Prudhoe Bay in Alaska to 140,000 acres for East Texas to
26,400 acres for Yates in West Texas to 13,770 acres for Oklahoma City.8 Larger fields
7See, for example, the list of the worlds largest oil fields in The List: Taking Oil Fields O✏ine,
Foreign Pol’y (Aug. 14, 2006), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/08/13/the_list_
taking_oil_fields_offline.
8See Gatewood (Gatewood); BP plc, Fact Sheet: Prudhoe Bay 12 (2006), available at
https://dec.alaska.gov/spar/perp/response/sum_fy06/060302301/factsheets/060302301_
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with more fragmented surface ownership raise the potential for open-access as greater
opportunity exists for firms drilling from each parcel to compete to capture the resource.
Hydrocarbon reservoirs are heterogeneous in terms of the production potential, amounts
of oil versus natural gas, subsurface flows, porosity, and rock formations. Accordingly,
there are more productive areas in the reservoir, often above the deepest portion, and
less productive areas, often on the deposits periphery. Moreover, natural gas tends to
congregate in certain areas (the gas cap), whereas oil settles in other areas (the oil rim).
This heterogeneity a↵ects the value and productivity of those firms that hold productive
leases to the reservoir.
The problem of open-access losses in oil and gas production has been recognized since
they were first discovered in the United States in 1859 (Libecap and Smith, 2002). Entry
is limited based on the number of leases from surface landowners, but hydrocarbons mi-
grate, thus creating the potential for competitive drilling and draining of the reservoir.
Oil and natural gas deposits are under great pressure. When any part of the surround-
ing geologic formation is punctured by a well bore, a low-pressure area is created and
natural gas and oil migrate toward the opening. Movement depends upon subsurface
pressures, oil viscosity, amount of natural gas, and the porosity of the surrounding rock.
In the United States, surface-land owners generally grant search and production leases
to specialized firms. Both surface property owners and leaseholders have an incentive
to produce rapidly, and most leases contain production timelines. Oil and natural gas
cannot be left in the ground because property rights to the resource are secured only via
factsheet_PB.pdf; Julia Cauble Smith, East Texas Oil Field, Tex. State Historical Assn (June 12,
2010), http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/doe01; Julia Cauble Smith, Yates
Oilfield,Tex. State Historical Assn (June 15, 2010), http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/
articles/doy01.
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the rule of capture. This, combined with the spatial connectivity of reservoirs, makes
hydrocarbons a classic common-pool resource.
With fragmented surface ownership, multiple firms extract from the same reservoir.
Firms are motivated to drill and drain competitively to increase their shares of oil field
rents, even though these individual actions lead to aggregate losses. The rule of capture
results in various forms of rent dissipation. First, capital costs increase by drilling wells
beyond what geologic conditions or price and interest rate projections warrant. Addi-
tionally, firms invest in surface storage to protect against drainage by other firms, and
storage can lead to fire and other losses. Rents also dissipate by venting natural gas too
rapidly. Natural gas is lighter than oil and is necessary to push oil across subsurface
formations to the surface, necessitating early use of costly injection wells and reducing
total recovery because heavy oil becomes trapped in formations as gas passes by. Finally,
aggregate, long-term rent decreases because production patterns deviate from those that
would maximize the value of output over time.
Characteristics of Claimants and the Existence of Inframarginal Rents
Claimants invest in specialized search and production methods and have an incentive
to drain neighboring properties secretly. Though surface-land rights are secure, because
migratory hydrocarbons can be extracted from many parts of the field, and because of
the uncertainty as to location and size of deposits, there is an important benefit from
search. Certain small firms termed “wildcatters” specialize in search and risk taking,
while larger firms with multiple leases across many fields are termed “majors.” Majors
may also have integrated refining and retail operations along the supply chain and are
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more likely to agree to constraints on production to reduce open-access losses because
they capture more of the in situ rents, whereas smaller lease owners depend more on
drainage or hold rights to particularly valuable locations less vulnerable to overall field
conditions and hence, are more likely to resist those controls. For example, unconstrained
output from the East Texas field in the early 1930s led the Governor of Texas to place
the field under martial law, enforced by the National Guard. The production constraints’
main problem was rampant violation by small firms (Steven N Wiggins, 1987).
What is important for our purposes is that leaseholders all rely on private information
to develop their understanding of the resource and that small and large leaseholders get
di↵erent information about the reservoir based on the size and location of their claims.
Some leases are far more productive than others, and holders of leases to small, very
valuable portions of a reservoir are often favorably positioned to capture subterranean
hydrocarbon flows and earn rents, even in the presence of competitive open-access drilling
and production. These leaseholders have di↵erent assessments of the hydrocarbon stock’s
long-term viability and resist unitization or buyout as solutions.
Nature of Spontaneous Property Rights
Informal claims to hydrocarbons correspond to de jure property rights to surface land.
In competitive oil and gas production, firms secure rights to search and produce through
leases from land owners and property rights to oil via the rule of capture. Information
on lease output from individual wells is public, but it is descriptive only of the immedi-
ate vicinity of a well and does not necessarily reflect subterranean conditions (Wiggins
and Libecap, 1985). This creates incentives for competitive waste. Through drilling in-
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dividual leases, firms gain knowledge of their portion of the reservoir, though the full
extent of the deposit and the other areas’ production potential are revealed only through
other firms’ drilling activities. A lease’s production potential and commercial value are
a function of objective variables—such as the number of wells, current and past produc-
tion, and lease acreage—as well as subjectively evaluated geological variables—including
the amount of oil below lease lines, net oil migration, oil viscosity, permeability of the
surrounding medium, bottom hole pressure, net-acre feet of pay (nonporous and non-oil-
bearing rock are subtracted for estimates of gross acre feet of pay, which is the estimated
size of the producing formation), and assessments of remaining reserves below lease lines
and location of the lease above subsurface flows (some leases are well situated to capture
hydrocarbon movement across the formation). Interpreting data gathered from well bores
suggests the thickness of the formation, oil and gas migration, and surrounding medium
conditions and allows for estimating how production techniques might fracture the forma-
tion and release more hydrocarbons. Company engineers translate these interpretations
into long-term projections for production, revenues, and costs through subjective assess-
ments. Those assessments are private information and may di↵er importantly among
engineers from di↵erent firms, but they are the basis for lease owners’ individual value
estimates.9
9The likelihood that there will be di↵ering, and di cult to reconcile, valuations of particular leases
increases with the complexity and depth of a formation as well as with the amount of oil and natural
gas lodged within.
150
Formal and Informal Attempts to Rationalize
Local common-oil pool management occurs through unitization or by lease consol-
idation through buyout. In either case, the rule of capture is replaced by single-firm
extraction or ownership of the subsurface hydrocarbon stock. But leases are not uniform
in production potential or value and this heterogeneity blocks agreement on those op-
tions. When competitive extraction is eliminated, output timelines can maximize return,
capital investment in wells and storage occurs only if it is profit enhancing; and overall
recovery increases.
By the early 20th century, oil was valuable enough to raise concerns about open-
access losses and engineering information developed su ciently to understand potential
remedies. Despite this, neither the option for joint management through unitization or
lease buyout was widespread through the 20th century. Even where the numbers of lease
owners are relatively small, a local complete solution generally did not occur (Libecap
and Wiggins, 1984). As late as 1975, neither Oklahoma nor Texas had as much as 40% of
production from fully-unitized fields, and even the huge Prudhoe Bay field, discovered in
1968, su↵ered from competitive production until buyout was completed in 1999 (Libecap,
2008). In their analysis, Wiggins and Libecap (1985) and Libecap and Smith (2001) show
that opposition has not merely been held up by lease owners to extract more of field rents,
with lease owners defecting sequentially as purchase agreements are completed or as unit
agreements are finalized. Rather, certain lease owners systematically resist because they
believe their leases are more valuable than do those seeking to purchase or unitize with
them.
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Wiggins and Libecap (1985) identify small leaseholders above the deepest and po-
tentially longest-lived portion of the reservoir as the firms most likely to resist buyout
or unitization. Estimating long-term production patterns in these areas involves more
subjective private information and more uncertainty than for leases located in shallower
areas on the field periphery, where value assessments based on private and public infor-
mation often converge. Firms with large leases covering more of the reservoir, or with
many leases on the field, are also more likely to have value assessments agreed upon by
others because di↵ering value assessments across leases o↵set one another. Libecap and
Smith (2001) also emphasize the bargaining problems raised when lease owners special-
ize in oil or natural gas due to the di culty in valuing the two di↵erent hydrocarbons
and in developing an agreeable conversion factor to translate natural gas into oil or vice
versa. This is a significant issue because 63% of the largest U.S. oil fields have significant
volumes of natural gas along with oil; oil lease owners prefer to re-inject gas into the
formation to expel the oil, whereas gas lease owners prefer to sell the gas.
Another related asymmetric information problem that is not stressed by Wiggins and
Libecap or Libecap and Smith is valuing locational advantages and investments that
provide value under open-access but not under rationalization. Unitization changes field
and production dynamics such that lease locations above past reservoir flows and related
investment in resources knowledge and production may no longer have value. This is,
in e↵ect, stranded capital that a↵ected firm owners would seek to recover in voluntary
transactions as part of their willingness-to-accept calculations. At the same time, other
parties may disagree on the value claims made by those lease owners. Hence, willingness-
to-pay calculations may be too low to support side payments.
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In a detailed analysis of unitization e↵orts for seven reservoirs in Texas and New
Mexico, Wiggins and Libecap (1985) found that negotiations took from four to nine
years to complete. Negotiations for one of the fields, Empire Abo in New Mexico, took
six years and required 58 di↵erent votes on the distribution of shares. The division of net
revenue via shares is specified at unit agreement, and these are permanent; updates are
not possible because once the unit is formed, production dynamics change and the lease
loses its production role. Some wells are plugged and others are converted to natural gas
injection to maintain subsurface pressure, changing subterranean hydrocarbon flows. The
absence of contingent updates places particular pressure on long-lived leaseholders who
have the most asymmetric information and uncertainty associated with calculating lease
values. Moreover, in five of the seven cases, the final unit’s acreage was far less than
that involved in the early negotiations because not all parties would agree. Subunits,
however, are less complete solutions because they involve only part of the formation and
because they require drilling costly boundary wells to block the migration of hydrocarbons
to non-cooperating leases. Libecap and Smith (1999) examine 60 unit agreements and
find that those with distinct oil and gas deposits are most apt to be incomplete. They
detail the case of Prudhoe Bay where 31 years from discovery passed with competitive
subunits until lease owners on the gas area (gas cap) and the oil area (oil rim) agreed
to consolidate. In the meantime, there was substantial waste in lost oil production and
excessive, competitive capital.
Large firms, often majors, with multiple leases across many non-unitized oil fields
bear disproportionate costs from the failure to cooperate to control rent dissipation.
These leaseholders lobby state legislatures to impose field-wide unitization. This, how-
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ever, produced opposition from the same small lease owners that resist voluntary private
agreements (Libecap and Wiggins, 1985). Lease owners do not believe they would receive
su cient returns under the new arrangement, even with open-access, and forced uniti-
zation or rationalization does not o↵er compensation to align willingness to accept with
willingness to pay. Similarly, the State of Alaska could not force complete unitization
of Prudhoe Bay, and other states’ forced-unitization statutes implement assigned net
production shares to complete units only once a designated percent of the field acreage
agrees to unitize. In Oklahoma, compulsory unitization legislation was adopted in 1945,
which required unitization once 85% of the leased acreage supported unitization. This
percentage was gradually reduced to 63% by 1951 as production declined and information
asymmetries dissipated. In Texas, however, opposition by small-lease owners continues
to block a compulsory unitization law forcing lease owners to accept a share that they
believed undervalued their leases (Libecap and Wiggins, 1985).
Oil and gas search and production under open-access has not led to smooth and quick
responses to close the potential for rent dissipation. Rather, opposition of particular lease
owners that do well under open-access delayed or limited possible institutional responses.
Despite a general belief that gains are possible from defining more precise formal property
rights, the parties cannot agree upon the sharing of those rents. As described in the
framework above, distributional factors impede agreement on what otherwise would be
e ciency-enhancing institutional change.
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3.3.2 Fisheries
Nature of the Resource and Potential for Open Access
Depending on the species, fish stocks may be large and variable as to location in the
sea and migration patterns. Shellfish, such as oysters, lobsters, mussels, crabs, and clams,
tend to be located in specific sites with little movement, whereas demersal and pelagic fish
move more broadly. Distribution is often imperfectly known, and uncertainty increases
with range of movement and variation in currents and sea floor terrain. Accordingly, the
sea is heterogeneous in the probability of harvest, and this condition creates returns to
search and a race to locate the richest fishing areas. The potential areas involved are
very large, even within U.S. waters.10
In 2013, the largest fisheries by landings in the United States were Pollock, Menhaden,
Pacific Cod, Pink Salmon, and Pacific Hake (NOAA, 2013). Historical catch rates grew
rapidly beginning in 1940 before slowing dramatically by 1970, drawing attention from the
scientific community and from policymakers. That slowdown resulted in the passage of
the Magnusson-Stevens Act—the United States’ first national fishery legislation—which
established the extent of U.S. territorial waters and outlined fisheries management goals
(Magnuson, 1976).
The Magnusson-Stevens Act sets few restrictions on entry, either because of the migra-
tory nature of the species or due to legal requirements in the United States for open-access
by the general population. For this reason, wild ocean fisheries are classic open-access
10The length of U.S. coasts is 12,383 miles with tidal shorelines comprising 88,633 miles. The exclusive
economic zones (EEZs) of the U.S., in turn, extend out 200 miles into the open sea except where
constrained by the international boundaries of adjacent coastal states.
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resources. Fishers from many di↵erent ports can intercept migratory stocks, and ris-
ing fish prices encourages entry. But competitive access also means that fish stocks
are depleted from over-harvest; firms over-capitalize and invest excessive labor inputs;
catch-per-unit-of-e↵ort and incomes decline; and product value decreases by the rush to
harvest. Therefore, output is comprised of small or juvenile fish or frozen fish products
rather than more valuable larger and fresher products, which are possible only with mod-
erated fishing e↵ort. Indeed, fish stocks are the focus of the most complete discussion of
the theory and empirical evidence of the losses of open-access.11
Characteristics of Claimants and the Existence of Inframarginal Rents
Fishers invest in specialized search and production skills and capital, and in conceal-
ment through limited information sharing. As a result, they are heterogeneous in their
search and production skills, and di↵erential harvests and incomes persist. In fishing com-
munities, there is a hierarchy of fishers exploiting the resource, and more skilled fishers—
termed “highliners”—consistently outperform others (Johnson and Libecap, 1982). Scott
notes: “Fisheries experts repeatedly speak of durable groupings of skippers, vessels, and
crews according to the size of their catch or earnings, year in and year out” (Scott, 1979,
p. 733). These returns are primarily attributed to knowledge of how to set nets and
regulate their spread, where to set lines and their depth, correct trawling speed, and
identifying where to find fish.12 Skills develop over time and are not easily duplicated.
They cannot be readily conveyed or valued from fisher to fisher or from skipper to skip-
11See generally Gordon (1954); Devine et al. (2006); Grafton et al. (2000a); Myers and Worm (2003);
Scott (1955); Smith (1969)
12See generally Hilborn (1985); Kirkley et al. (1998) (discussing the relationship between sea captains’
experience and education and fishing productivity).
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per. Long-lasting, higher-than-average catches translate into inframarginal rents that
exist even when average fishers may earn no rents. Johnson and Libecap (1982) provide
evidence of persistent di↵erential harvest returns among fishers using data from the fall
1978 bay shrimp season on the Texas Gulf Coast. Fishers with catches one standard de-
viation above the sample mean were termed “good,” those at the mean, “average,” and
those one standard deviation below the mean, “poor.” These di↵erences across fishers
persist through the fishing season.
Similar to oil and gas lease valuation, public information on di↵erential success in-
cludes past and current harvests, vessel size, equipment, crew size, and departure and
arrival times at port. Private information includes the subjective interpretation of tides,
water temperatures, ocean currents, floor terrain, historical migratory patterns of the
stock, as well as the art of fishing itself.
Nature of Spontaneous Property Rights
Enforcing claims to fish stocks via land or other spatial claims is not feasible for highly
migratory fish species. Instead, control arises from investment in specialized search and
production skills and keeping information private or asymmetric. Because fishers for mi-
gratory fin fish cannot easily establish spontaneous, informal first-possession claims, they
rely upon secrecy and limited information sharing about productive fishing locations and
useful fishing techniques among vessels from their own community or fleet. There are
complex, quid-pro-quo information sharing practices that favor long-term, local knowl-
edge of the stock and of fishers. Other less-skilled, higher search-and-production-cost
fishers have incentives to free ride as much as possible, so highliners limit information
157
sharing (Wilson, 1990). As with hydrocarbons, secure property rights to open-access fish
are granted only by the rule of capture. Hence, first arrival at a spot and secrecy (as well
as superior skills and lower costs) form a type of spontaneous property right when more
formal ownership rights, such as those called for by Scott (1955), are not feasible.
Formal and Informal Attempts to Rationalize
Widespread open-access losses in fisheries since the 1970s prompted state and federal
governments in the U.S. to implement various regulations to constrain entry and harvest.
These constraints include limited entry, limited fishing seasons, vessel, and equipment
controls (Homans and Wilen, 1997). Fishers adapted around these regulations such
that stock and rent depletion continued. Grafton et al. (2000a) detail vessels and other
capital increases in the Pacific Northwest halibut fishery as seasons tightened to protect
the stock. Between 1980 and 1989, the number of vessels rose by 31% and as stock levels
fell, regulators progressively reduced the fishing season from 65 days to six days a year by
1990. The shortened season increased investment by fishers in larger and more powerful
vessels and created a competitive fishing derby to harvest as many fish as possible in the
limited time available.
Recent rationalization e↵orts involve assigning individual transferable quotas (“ITQs”)
and these arrangements increased fishery rents (Cosetllo et al., 2008). ITQs involve set-
ting an annual total allowable catch (“TAC”) and shares of that total allowable. Ratio-
nalization via ITQs was first proposed as a solution to open-access conditions in fisheries
in 1972, but the United States has been slow to adopt individual transferrable rights in
fisheries (Libecap, 2008). Our framework sheds light on why this might be the case, given
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the characteristics of the resource outlined above and the claimants themselves, which
we describe below.
Johnson and Libecap (1982) describe how spontaneous property rights and infra-
marginal rents based on those rights, earned by highliners, are at risk from rationaliza-
tion that imposes uniform quotas or in other ways undermine their skill and knowledge
advantages and investments. These advantages and related human and physical capital
investments allow highliners to out-compete others under regulated open-access. Un-
less they are compensated, rationalization is not Pareto-improving for highliners, even
though the overall fishery stock is better-conserved and total rents increase. Similarly,
Abbott and Wilen (2011) discuss how catch limits to reduce bycatch result in races to
harvest commercially valuable stocks before reaching the total allowable bycatch. These
regulatory-imposed races change optimal fishing strategies, potentially reducing returns
and inframarginal rents.
There are few documented cases of highliner-opposed rationalization. Deacon et al.
(2013) provide such a study of the short-lived Chignik Salmon Fishery Cooperative in
Alaska. In 2002, the Alaska Board of Fisheries approved a request from a group of fishers
to create a voluntary cooperative to coordinate harvests and limit e↵ort and vessels.
Eighteen highliners, whose catch histories exceeded those of members, chose not to join.
The Alaska Board of Fisheries increased the share of the total annual allowable catch
assigned to the cooperative as the number of cooperative members grew from 77 to 87.
The cooperative retired the proportion of permits and vessels that otherwise would be
used by its higher-cost members by 31%, reducing capital and labor costs per unit of
harvest. It also increased the fishing time or season for its members by about 48% by
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reducing the race to intercept fish in the open ocean.
Highliners and members generally agreed that the cooperative improved overall rents
by around 33%, but disagreed as to the division of the rents. The cooperative was granted
a growing share of the TAC as its membership expanded. Hence, allowable harvests
were not distributed according to historical catch shares, and the share granted by the
regulators to independents declined in 2004 by 40%. Independents’ share of the total
allowable catch threatened their inframarginal advantages, which were most valuable
under competitive conditions and entry controls. In the face of this, two of the most
successful highliners successfully sued to block the Alaska Board of Fisheries’ allocations
to the cooperative in 2005, and the cooperative was dismantled by court order.13
One might ask why allocation did not use historical harvest. The cooperative changed
fishing practices and location so that past practices reflecting fish interception in the open
ocean and uncoordinated harvest were no longer relevant. Highliners who invested in
those techniques demanded compensation or allocations based those techniques. Coop-
erative members, however, were earning rents based on new coordinated fishing practices,
not historical ones, and apparently did not have willingness-to-pay commensurate with
the willingness-to-accept demands of highliners. Although there is no information as to
the source of any bargaining breakdown, such a breakdown is consistent with di culties
in valuing stranded capital and skills appropriate for open-access and a race to capture
stock, but not relevant or valuable under rationalization. This bargaining breakdown in
the presence of aggregate benefits is similar to outcomes observed in oil field unitization
13The Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the co-op was inconsistent with Alaska’s Limited Entry Act
of 1973, which requires “present active participation” of any permit-holder in a fishery (Deacon et al.,
2008).
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e↵orts, and likely undermines other e↵orts to rationalize.
3.4 Conclusion
This Essay outlines a framework for understanding how informal property rights
emerge in open-access resource settings traditionally characterized as lacking any sort
of property right. Our approach elucidates why sustained open-access is observed, even
in the presence of apparently large aggregate benefits from transitioning to joint manage-
ment of the resource. Heterogeneous users of spatially heterogeneous resources will invest
in di↵erential levels of search and learning, accumulating knowledge that generates infra-
marginal rents. In response to threats of continued entry, replication, and other forms of
rent dissipation, inframarginal-rent earners invest in strategies to protect their expected
rental streams. These strategies create and entrench asymmetric information about any
particular institution’s costs and benefits for managing the resource, making bargaining
between parties costly, potentially to the exclusion of side payments for what otherwise
appears to be a Pareto-improving transition to formal management of the resource.
Our framework describes heterogeneous users’ behavior in settings lacking formal
property rights, but our predictions are inherently di cult to test. We argue that the
source of users’ ability to earn and protect positive rents is tacit—private knowledge
that is, by design, di cult to communicate. Our framework explains why some resources
have proven less amenable to rationalization. We document di↵erential skill in locating
hydrocarbons and fishery resources. Di↵erential search and learning in each setting
resulted in users with di↵ering knowledge about the resource. This di↵erential knowledge
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stymies rationalization attempts.
Rationalization is the chosen policy tool for spatially connected resources because each
user’s behavior a↵ects all other users by changing the aggregate stock available, even when
the resource is spatially heterogeneous. Hydrocarbons and fishery resource both fit this
pattern. In both cases, we show that users exhibit di↵ering levels of search, investment,
and knowledge, resulting in a heterogeneous distribution of rents that is correlated with
users’ knowledge of the resource itself. Both resources have seen repeated attempts at
rationalizing. When unsuccessful, rationalization fails due to users’ inability to reconcile
their contradictory “knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” to form
an agreement about characteristics of the aggregate resource (Hayek, 1944). The result
is sustained open-access with competitive losses that are larger for high-cost users who
tend to know less about the resource.
3.5 Permissions and Attributions
The content of chapter 3 is the result of a collaboration with Gary D. Libecap, and
has previously appeared in the Iowa Law Review (Leonard and Libecap, 2015). It is
reproduced here in accordance with the reprint policies of the Iowa Law Review.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Theoretical Appendix to Chapter 1
Proposition 1: Under prior appropriation, aggregate profits V PA are increasing and
concave in the number of appropriators for N < N¯PA and have a unique maximum at
N¯PA.
Proof: First, note that @V
PA
@N =
@
PN
i=1 V
PA
i
@N = V
PA
N ; the arrival of new claimants under
prior appropriation does not alter senior claimants’ behavior, so the change in aggregate
profit is just the profit of the new arrival. Burness and Quirk (1979) show that under the
appropriative system profits are strictly lower for junior claimants: V PAi > V
PA
j 8 i <
j. This implies that aggregate profits are increasing but at a decreasing rate: @
2V PA
@N2 =
V PAN   V PAN 1 < 0. Denote the marginal entrant who earns zero profit to be N¯PA. For
N < N¯PA, each user earns strictly positive profit so V PAi > 0 8 i < N¯PA. Similarly,
any additional claimants would earn negative profit after N¯PA: V PAj < 0 8 j > N¯PA.
By definition, V PAN¯PA=0. Hence, V
PA is increasing an concave in N with a unique maxi-
mum at N¯PA. QED.
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Proposition 2: V PA 7 V S. Either property rights regime can dominate.
Proof: We prove Proposition 2 by providing an example of either regime dominating.
Case 1: V PA > V S. We begin by noting that N¯PA is the maximum number of users
that establish rights under prior appropriation, even if the number of potential users N
exceeds N¯PA (see Proposition 1). Next, consider the first-order necessary condition for
the shareholder’s problem:
[1  F (Nxi)]R0(xi) = C 0(xi).
Since F (·) is a proper cumulative density function, lim
n!1
[1   F (Nxi)] = 0 and the first
order condition reduces to
0 = C 0(xi).
It follows that x⇤i = 0, V
S(0) = 0 < V PA. For su ciently large N , the expected share
size approaches zero and expected revenues do not exceed expected costs, resulting in
zero investment. In this same scenario, the prior appropriation system allows the first
N¯PA users to enter and make secure investments, resulting in positive (and thus higher)
aggregate expected profit.
Case 2: V S > V PA. Burness and Quirk (1979) establish that expected profits
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under the share system are higher than under prior appropriation for a given x, but that
investment is higher under prior appropriation for a given N . We want to show that it
is possible for NV Si (x
s
i (N)) >
PN
i=1 V
PA
i given Nx
S
i <
PN
i=1 x
PA
i for some N . Which is
equivalent to V Si (x
s
i (N)) >
1
N
PN
i=1 V
PA
i given x
S
i (N) <
1
N
PN
i=1 x
PA
i . That is, we need
to show that it is possible for a the profits of a share size smaller than the average prior
appropriation claim to exceed the average profits from prior appropriation.
Define x¯PA = 1N
PN
i=1 x
PA
i to be the size of the average prior appropriation claim for a
given N . From Jensen’s Inequality we have that V PA(x¯PA)   1N
PN
i=1 V
PA
i 8 N since
V PA is concave. Since V Si (x) > V
PA
i (x) for any given x, it must be that V
S
i (x¯
PA) >
V PAi (x¯
PA). Finally, we note that @V
S
i
@x > 0 (greater investment results in greater expected
profit, for a given N). Taken together, these inequalities imply that 9 xSi (N) < x¯PA
satisfying V Si (x
S
i (N) >
1
N
PN
i=1 V
PA
i (see graph) as long as V
S
i (x) is continuous in x.
Hence, we can have either V PA > V S or V PA < V S. QED.
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Figure 3.1: Proposition 2
Proposition 3: In the presence of a positive externality from prior claims (  > 0), V E
has a convex region for small N and for su ciently large  , V E > V S.
Proof: First, we establish that V E has a convex region (in N) for su ciently large
 .
@2V E
@N2
= V EN   V EN 1
= V PAN +  pN   V PAN 1    pN 1
= V PAN   V PAN 1 +  (pN   pN 1) > 0 ()   >
V PAN 1   V PAN
pN   pN 1 =
 @2V E@N2
xPAN
.
If the positive externality is the larger than the ratio of the change in profits to the
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investment of the marginal user, then V E is convex.
Next, we establish that V E > V S for su ciently large  . Note that V Ei = V
PA
i +  pi.
This implies V E =
PN
i=1 V
PA
i + x
PA
1 + (x
PA
1 +x
PA
2 )+...+ (x
PA
1 +...+x
PA
N 1) = V
PA(N)+
 
PN
i=1(N  i)xPAi . Recall that the case where shares dominate prior appropriation relied
on the fact that Jensen’s Inequality implies V Si (x) > V
PA
i (x), but since V
E
i (x) > V
PA
i (x),
the conclusion that 9 xSi (N) < x¯PA satisfying V Si (xSi (N) > 1N
PN
i=1 V
PA
i no longer
follows (see graph). QED.
Figure 3.2: Proposition 3
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Proposition 4: In the convex region of V E, profits are increasing for junior claimants
relative to senior claimants: V Ei > V
E
i 1 and users follow rather than search for a new
stream.
Proof:
Assume V E is convex in N
) @2V E@N2 = V Ei   V Ei 1 > 0
) V Ei > V Ei 1.
For the second part of the proof note that in the convex region of V E, V Ei > V
E
1 for
i > 1. Hence, junior claimants on streams earn higher expected profits than the earliest
claimants in the presence of a su ciently large positive externality. If expected flows
are equal across streams, being a junior claimant dominates claiming a new stream, and
users follow. QED.
Appendix B: G.I.S. Data Construction for Chapter 1
GIS Hydrologic data on basins, stream names, and network characteristics come from
the National Hydrography Data Set (NHD). The NHD has been programmed as a lin-
ear network geodatabase that allows for tracing elements’ relative positions along the
network, a feature which we exploit. Estimates of stream flow across this network were
obtained from NHDPLUS V2.14 Elevation data are measured at 30-meter intervals and
14NHDPLUS, provided by the Horizon Systems Corporation, is an augmented version of the National
Hydrography dataset that has been combined with the National Elevation Data Set and the PRISM
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come from the National Elevation Dataset. These data are used to compute the slope
and standard deviation of slope in the neighborhood of each right. Our soil data are from
the USDA Soil Survey Geographic Database (SSURGO).
We calculate measures of resource quality relating to both land and streams for each
grid square. We calculate the average and standard deviation of slope in each grid
square and construct the variable roughness, which is the average slope multiplied by the
standard deviation of slope.15 We use the SSURGO data to calculate the number of acres
of soil in each hydrologic soil group defined by the USDA. This measure of soil quality is
based on the structure of the soil itself rather than its current water content. This allows
us to use a current GIS measure of soil quality to estimate historical soil quality over the
period of our study. We focus on Soil group B, which is comprised primarily of loamy soil
and is the most productive for agriculture. We also calculate the total area (in acres) of
the watershed that a square resides in using the HUC8 classification of watersheds from
the NHD.
We perform a network trace to locate each square along the stream network defined
by the NHD and use this location to create a variety of variables relating to the water
resource itself. We calculate the distance from each grid square to the head of the
stream it lies on (as delineated by the NHD).16 The NHDPlus V2 dataset created by
Horizon Systems Corporation provides monthly and annual stream flow estimates for
each stream on the NHD network. We use this information to create a measure of the
climate dataset to produce a variety of flow-related statistics across the entire stream network.
15This construction captures the fact that both steeper terrain and more variable terrain contribute
to rugged topography and make various forms of development more di cult.
16For most streams the entire length of the stream is used. Major rivers are divided into reaches within
the NHD, and we maintain this division because we believe it reflects the fact that relative positive along
major rivers is less critical than relative position along smaller streams.
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total flow across May through August.17 We combine these contemporary estimates of
stream flow with contemporary and historical estimate of precipitation from the PRISM
dataset and elevation data from the NED to estimate a model for predicting historical
flows along the entire stream network. We use these estimates to calculate the average
summer flow and standard deviation of flow from 1890 to 2000.18 The variable Summer
Flow is the century-long average of total summer flow, based on flows in May through
August of each year. The variable Flow Variability is the standard deviation of stream
flow for a given reach over this period. Details on the hydrologic and econometric models
underlying these calculations are available upon request.
17These are the months during which irrigation is critical to support crop growth.
18PRISM data on historical precipitation are only available back to 1890. Rather than clip our
dataset and having yearly estimates of flow, we use century long averages to capture average stream
characteristics.
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Appendix C: Robustness Checks and Additional Re-
sults for Chapter 1
Table C1: Estimated Average Partial E↵ects on Prob(New Claims)
@Pr(NewClaims > 0) (1) (2) (3)
@x Probit Estimates, Y = 1(New Claimsjt >0)
1(Lagged Claims>0) 0.0456⇤⇤⇤ 0.0459⇤⇤⇤ 0.0365⇤⇤⇤
(0.00490) (0.00492) (0.00420)
Summer Flow 0.00000590⇤⇤⇤ 0.00000720⇤⇤⇤ 0.00000656⇤⇤⇤
(0.00000186) (0.00000209) (0.00000201)
Flow Variability  0.00000228  0.00000271  0.00000364
(0.00000459) (0.00000482) (0.00000479)
1(Drought)  0.00247⇤⇤⇤  0.00246⇤⇤⇤  0.00186⇤⇤⇤
(0.000341) (0.000353) (0.000325)
Roughness  0.00000254⇤⇤⇤  0.00000284⇤⇤⇤  0.00000386⇤⇤⇤
(0.000000911) (0.000000928) (0.000000986)
Acres Loamy Soil 0.000000115 0.000000126 0.00000133⇤⇤
(0.000000468) (0.000000475) (0.000000535)
Watershed Acres 0.000000968⇤⇤⇤ 0.00000107⇤⇤⇤ 0.00000100⇤⇤⇤
(0.000000202) (0.000000204) (0.000000211)
Homestead Claimsjt 1 0.000120⇤⇤⇤ 0.000124⇤⇤⇤ 0.000121⇤⇤⇤
(0.0000202) (0.0000209) (0.0000289)
1(Initial Claims>0) 0.0112⇤⇤⇤ 0.0113⇤⇤⇤ 0.00894⇤⇤⇤
(0.00139) (0.00132) (0.00104)
Total Water Claimed  2.04e-08⇤⇤⇤ 2.13e-08⇤⇤⇤
(cfs) (6.23e-09) (6.17e-09)
Total Homesteaded  0.000000122⇤⇤⇤
Acres (2.19e-08)
N 248,745 248,745 248,745
 2 2,081.90 2,148.38 2,326.26
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by stream and reported in parentheses.
N= 248,745 is the number of stream-year cells for which we have overlapping
data on all covariates. ⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
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Table C2: Coe cient Estimates - FE Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Y = New Water Claimsjt
Lagged Claims 0.352⇤⇤⇤ 0.364⇤⇤⇤ 0.362⇤⇤⇤ 0.310⇤⇤⇤
(0.0271) (0.0254) (0.0255) (0.0230)
Lagged Claims*Flow  0.0000412⇤⇤  0.0000653⇤⇤  0.0000646⇤⇤  0.0000668⇤⇤⇤
(0.0000196) (0.0000269) (0.0000269) (0.0000208)
1(Drought)  0.646⇤⇤⇤  0.621⇤⇤⇤  0.638⇤⇤⇤  0.502⇤⇤⇤
(0.0715) (0.0732) (0.0802) (0.0730)
Homestead Claimst 1 0.0137⇤⇤⇤ 0.0159⇤⇤⇤ 0.0158⇤⇤⇤ 0.0181⇤⇤
(0.00240) (0.00272) (0.00274) (0.00787)
Total Water Claimed  0.00000303⇤⇤  0.00000302⇤⇤ 0.00000675⇤⇤⇤
(cfs) (0.00000145) (0.00000144) (0.00000149)
Lagged Claims* 0.000000247 0.000000225  0.000000351
Total Water Claimed (0.000000311) (0.000000306) (0.000000258)
Lagged Claims*1(Drought) 0.0584
(0.0783)
Total Homesteaded  0.0000350⇤⇤⇤
Acres (0.00000789)
N 112,217 112,217 112,217 112,217
 2 292.8 427.0 423.4 422.2
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. N= 112,217 is the number of
stream-year cells for which we have overlapping data on all covariates. Streams that never
receive a claim are dropped from the fixed e↵ects specification. ⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
195
Table C3: Coe cient Estimates - Fixed E↵ects Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Y = 1(New Claimsjt >0)
1(Lagged Claims>0) 1.935⇤⇤⇤ 1.930⇤⇤⇤ 1.963⇤⇤⇤ 1.720⇤⇤⇤
(0.0820) (0.0711) (0.0851) (0.0855)
1(Lagged Claims>0)*Flow  0.0000602  0.0000184  0.0000157  0.0000939
(0.0000605) (0.0000105) (0.000131) (0.000128)
1(Drought)  0.544⇤⇤⇤  0.524⇤⇤⇤  0.458⇤⇤⇤  0.414⇤⇤⇤
(0.0622) (0.0605) (0.0632) (0.0560)
Homestead Claimst 1 0.0176⇤⇤⇤ 0.0177⇤⇤⇤ 0.0179⇤⇤⇤ 0.0225⇤⇤⇤
(0.00282) (0.00341) (0.00310) (0.00760)
Total Water Claimed  0.00000246  0.00000235 0.00000797⇤⇤
(cfs) (0.00000417) (0.00000368) (0.00000337)
1(Lagged Claims>0)*  0.00000184  0.00000175  0.00000238
Total Water Claimed (0.00000526) (0.00000566) (0.00000793)
1(Lagged Claims>0)*1(Drought)  0.437⇤
(0.225)
Total Homesteaded  0.0000317⇤⇤⇤
Acres (0.00000710)
N 112,217 112,217 112,217 112,217
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. N= 112,217 is the number of
stream-year cells for which we have overlapping data on all covariates. Streams that never receive
a claim are dropped from the fixed e↵ects specification. ⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
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Table C4: Marginal E↵ects of Priority on Cooperation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Divisions 1-3 Division 1 Division 3
1st Priority Decile 0.123⇤⇤⇤ 0.119⇤⇤⇤ 0.0207 0.194⇤⇤
(0.0359) (0.0390) (0.0779) (0.0861)
2nd Priority Decile 0.0541 0.0725 0.0154 0.123
(0.0456) (0.0472) (0.0929) (0.102)
3rd Priority Decile 0.0882⇤ 0.119⇤⇤  0.00675 0.202⇤
(0.0468) (0.0488) (0.0861) (0.119)
4th Priority Decile 0.0318 0.0419 0.0624 0.00619
(0.0432) (0.0431) (0.0855) (0.0905)
6th Priority Decile  0.0154  0.00285  0.0558 0.0391
(0.0518) (0.0495) (0.0698) (0.0997)
7th Priority Decile 0.0366 0.0359  0.0761 0.146
(0.0401) (0.0421) (0.0674) (0.107)
8th Priority Decile  0.0591  0.0910⇤  0.181⇤⇤  0.0301
(0.0447) (0.0485) (0.0753) (0.0902)
9th Priority Decile  0.160⇤⇤⇤  0.211⇤⇤⇤  0.238⇤⇤  0.292⇤
(0.0465) (0.0522) (0.0939) (0.175)
99th Priority Percentile  0.236⇤⇤⇤  0.330⇤⇤⇤  0.488⇤⇤⇤  5.193⇤⇤⇤
(0.0643) (0.0774) (0.189) (1.314)
Homesteads  0.00399⇤⇤  0.00320⇤  0.00345  0.00159
(0.00166) (0.00190) (0.00295) (0.00350)
Summer Flow 0.0000155⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000211⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000354⇤ 0.0000383⇤⇤
(0.00000591) (0.00000636) (0.0000186) (0.0000159)
Flow Variability  0.000282  0.000609 0.00189  0.00300⇤
(0.000252) (0.00144) (0.00293) (0.00169)
Roughness  0.000134  0.000111 0.000368  0.000840
(0.000120) (0.000141) (0.000373) (0.000746)
Acres of Loamy 0.00000849 0.0000125 0.0000630  0.0000436
Soil (0.0000132) (0.0000205) (0.0000433) (0.0000285)
Acreage Along  0.00000346  0.00000743  0.0000245⇤ 0.0000101
Stream (0.00000461) (0.00000823) (0.0000146) (0.0000107)
Watershed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes
Year E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,756 4,354 1,206 937
Standard errors are clustered by watershed and resorted in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
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Table C5: E↵ects of Cooperation and Priority on Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Divisions 1 & 3 Division 1 Division 3
1st Priority Decile 3,891.1 3,179.9 3,230.5 15,898.6⇤⇤⇤  13,274.3
(7,957.6) (6,944.3) (6,908.2) (5,321.7) (11049.2)
2nd Priority Decile  4,638.4  3,609.0  3,463.8 9,612.0 -16908.4
(9,036.7) (8,451.1) (8,399.5) (6,847.9) (12398.0)
3rd Priority Decile  5,055.8  348.8  267.3 18,908.4⇤⇤⇤  14,920.8
(8,657.2) (7,454.8) (7,410.0) (5,773.6) (11363.1)
4th Priority Decile  3,142.4  6,221.5  6,157.4 1,630.6 -12,027.0
(7,991.9) (7,506.7) (7,466.0) (6,647.8) (10,047.3)
6th Priority Decile  4,690.8  1,487.7  1,568.5 10,418.2 -14,269.1
(8,450.9) (7,975.6) (7,975.1) (7,351.9) (12,226.6)
7th Priority Decile  5,845.4  4,365.9  4,384.2  972.1  8,698.5
(8,353.6) (6,887.6) (6,837.7) (5,670.3) (12,088.3)
8th Priority Decile  8,103.3  5,729.3  5,778.6  2,603.8  7,205.5
(8,450.3) (7,065.3) (7,026.3) (5,652.6) (12,387.4)
9th Priority Decile  8,720.3  6,641.4  6,747.5 5,386.8 -12,553.9
(8,491.4) (7,512.1) (7,480.5) (7,462.0) (10,847.0)
99th Priority Percentile  550.4  751.9  986.2 9,380.4  14,208.5
(12,560.4) (9,532.2) (9,616.6) (9,735.9) (13,410.6)
CoOp 5,963.9⇤⇤ 4,461.5⇤⇤ 4,472.0⇤⇤ 10,197.9⇤⇤  2,202.6
(2,736.0) (2,199.0) (2,195.7) (4,004.1) (2,139.6)
Claim Size 244.7⇤⇤⇤ 255.7⇤⇤⇤ 256.3⇤⇤⇤ 352.2⇤⇤⇤ 130.0⇤⇤⇤
(60.72) (68.96) (69.14) (100.5) (34.75)
Summer Flow 1.706 0.723 0.669 0.445  0.604
(1.144) (0.968) (0.967) (1.963) (1.023)
Flow Variability 56.94 349.2⇤ 350.0⇤ 173.2 287.1⇤
(139.2) (190.7) (190.8) (278.3) (168.6)
Roughness  19.79  61.18  61.21 22.55  60.57
(23.60) (59.05) (59.04) (71.02) (67.32)
Acres of Loamy Soil 0.904⇤⇤⇤ 0.773 0.760  2.842⇤⇤ 4.660
(0.293) (2.195) (2.197) (1.353) (4.045)
Claim Year 1.268 2.425 2.426  5.042 85.42
(4.376) (4.755) (4.736) (6.011) (131.9)
Homestead Claims  284.3
(227.0)
Homesteaded Acres  1.664 0.709  1.954
(1.481) (1.782) (1.702)
Watershed Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 550 550 550 292 258
R2 0.317 0.454 0.454 0.569 0.317
Spatial HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
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Table C6: Income Per Acre Pre-1960
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Division 1 Division 3
Reduced Irrigated Income Reduced Irrigated Income
Form Acres Per Acre Form Acres Per Acre
CoOp 105.7⇤⇤⇤ -251.7 81.04⇤⇤⇤  7.934  162.5  10.51
(28.60) (165.4) (28.94) (51.50) (230.5) (51.30)
Claim Size 1.139⇤⇤  3.963 1.162⇤⇤ 0.664⇤  5.044 0.525
(0.468) (3.819) (0.444) (0.354) (4.783) (0.547)
Summer Flow 0.0249⇤ 0.0448 0.0133 0.0348  0.0726 0.0349
(0.0128) (0.0995) (0.0128) (0.0230) (0.117) (0.0237)
Flow Variability  16.74⇤⇤⇤  41.80  15.87⇤⇤⇤  2.871  22.34  3.046
(4.991) (29.78) (5.036) (4.676) (21.96) (4.738)
Roughness  0.157 4.510  0.212  0.587  0.893  0.546
(1.679) (10.43) (1.659) (0.645) (4.196) (0.649)
Percent Loamy Soil  0.638  3.239  0.244 155.0 -234.3 155.0
(2.953) (7.928) (2.981) (147.5) (502.5) (154.4)
Ditch Meters 0.0723⇤⇤⇤ 0.00208⇤ 0.206⇤⇤⇤ 0.00239
(0.0101) (0.00117) (0.0449) (0.00424)
Irrigated Acres 0.0109  0.00433
(0.0107) (0.00911)
Homesteaded Acres  0.0883⇤⇤  0.433⇤⇤  0.0873⇤⇤  0.0108 0.0797  0.0119
(0.0356) (0.172) (0.0337) (0.0173) (0.0599) (0.0178)
1st Priority Decile 43.19  60.89 19.98 158.0⇤⇤ 356.4 156.0⇤⇤
(37.52) (190.1) (38.39) (63.24) (452.8) (64.16)
2nd Priority Decile 11.28  450.8 19.50 136.5⇤ 213.5 137.7⇤
(60.62) (589.5) (55.27) (75.81) (304.0) (75.19)
3rd Priority Decile 142.3⇤⇤⇤ 626.8 116.1⇤⇤ 82.67 106.5 84.03
(45.50) (434.9) (50.68) (64.20) (316.5) (62.52)
4th Priority Decile 35.01  27.43 27.69 132.0  103.8 130.1
(49.52) (218.3) (46.03) (96.47) (355.8) (96.95)
6th Priority Decile 75.06 65.17 86.39⇤ 126.2⇤ 22.23 126.2⇤
(50.32) (265.8) (47.11) (69.30) (340.2) (67.82)
7th Priority Decile 153.8  107.9 143.5 121.1 758.3 133.3⇤
(97.15) (312.2) (101.3) (74.07) (527.0) (75.88)
8th Priority Decile 146.6⇤ 119.6 149.9⇤ 113.7  245.0 97.70
(77.84) (255.1) (75.92) (87.59) (687.2) (97.28)
9th Priority Decile 218.7⇤⇤⇤  29.53 201.8⇤⇤⇤ 190.0⇤  358.2 189.7⇤
(50.71) (256.7) (51.83) (97.70) (350.1) (97.79)
99th Priority Percentile 106.5 15.38 96.04 76.97  541.8 69.67
(99.42) (334.4) (94.73) (83.40) (601.3) (81.17)
Watershed Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 169 169 169 178 178 178
R2 0.873 0.830 0.879 0.692 0.735 0.698
Spatial HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses. Soil quality in Division 3 is collinear
with watershed fixed e↵ects.
⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01
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Table C7: Division 1 vs. 3
Division 1 Division 3
Total Income 785,035.7 323,869.8
(139,492.2) (111,086.7)
Irrigated Acres 1,397.6 671.0
(240.1) (175.3)
IPA 561.9 523.4
(17.8) (26.9)
Claim Size 22.2 19.4
(2.6) (1.9)
Claim Date  29,936.76  29,163.77
(316.8) (354.3)
Acres Loamy Soil 60.2 11.1
(8.1) (1.7)
Ditch Meters 13,522.2 7,724.0
(1532.2) (965.1)
Potential Riparian Claims 50.42 28.43
Per Stream (72.93) (47.46)
Actual Appropriative Claims 3.11 2.48
Per Stream (9.77) (9.58)
Actual Homestead Claims 84.68 11.1
Per Township (146.38) (41.37)
Number of Streams 625 439
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Appendix D: Data Appendix to Chapter 2
Table D1: Robustness Checks of Parcel-Level Tobit Estimates of Days Elapsed
Baseline Includes Omits City Omits Includes
Parcel Parcels Neighborhoods Federal &
Coordinates with >50% State Govt.
City Parcels Parcels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Parcel acres -5.808⇤⇤⇤ -5.733⇤⇤⇤ -5.687⇤⇤⇤ -5.683⇤⇤⇤ -4.732⇤⇤⇤
Parcel longside -749.2⇤⇤⇤ -733.1⇤⇤⇤ -685.2⇤⇤⇤ -648.9⇤⇤⇤ -787.5⇤⇤⇤
St. dev. of neighbor size 27.70⇤⇤⇤ 26.30⇤⇤⇤ 29.47⇤⇤⇤ 19.47⇤⇤⇤ 26.30⇤⇤⇤
Fee parcel indicator 131.5 -92.76 80.28 -72.06 352.9
(245.2) (290.5) (247.3) (244.1) (229.8)
Allotted trust 15.95 -153.3 7.468 -76.69 164.5
parcel indicator (213.0) (226.8) (221.3) (232.2) (189.8)
Tribal parcel indicator 32.94 -132.6 79.73 31.56 144.8
(228.2) (232.5) (240.4) (260.2) (218.0)
No. of tenure regimes 106.5⇤⇤ 103.5⇤⇤⇤ 113.1⇤⇤⇤ 108.2⇤⇤⇤ 29.53
(42.11) (40.14) (42.51) (39.69) (32.42)
O↵ reservation neighbors 8.058⇤⇤⇤ 8.276⇤⇤⇤ 7.063⇤⇤⇤ 7.067⇤⇤⇤ 7.451⇤⇤⇤
(1.701) (1.793) (1.671) (1.660) (1.134)
Fee neighbors 7.283⇤⇤⇤ 7.387⇤⇤⇤ 6.211⇤⇤⇤ 9.898⇤⇤⇤ 6.832⇤⇤⇤
(1.355) (1.424) (1.212) (1.429) (1.098)
Allotted trust neighbors 14.92⇤⇤⇤ 14.48⇤⇤⇤ 13.51⇤⇤⇤ 12.89⇤⇤⇤ 12.30⇤⇤⇤
(3.113) (2.779) (2.846) (2.778) (3.122)
Tribal neighbors 0.200 -2.804 -9.864 -12.45 -2.806
(8.318) (8.186) (6.904) (7.731) (8.452)
Covariates All All All All All
Oil field fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City parcels Yes Yes No No Yes
>50% city parcels Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Parcel coordinates No Yes No No No
Neighborhoods w/gov. land No No No No Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.050 0.051 0.039 0.038 0.048
Observations 27,480 27,480 23,438 22,397 41,452
Censored at 3772 days 16,687 16,687 12,987 12,194 23,764
Notes: We do not show some standard errors in order to save space. Column 1 is the baseline specification from column 4 of table 2.
Column 2 includes oil field fixed e↵ects and the x and y coordinates of the parcel’s centroid. Column 3 drops all parcels that are within
a city. Column 4 drops all parcels that are within a city and also non-city parcels in neighborhoods with greater than 50 percent city
parcels. Column 5 includes neighborhoods that have federal and state owned parcels. Column 5 also includes the following controls:
(a) indicators for Bureau of Land Management (BLM), U.S. Forest Service (FS), and North Dakota (ND) state-owned parcels and
(b) the number of BLM, FS, and ND parcels in each neighborhood. Standard errors are clustered by oil field and shown in parentheses.
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Table D2: Parcel-Level Estimates of Days Elapsed with Spatial Error Cor-
rections
Tobit Estimates OLS Estimates
Y = Days elapsed between Jan. 1, 2005 and Y = 1 if at least one
first horizontal line (as of May 1, 2015) horizontal line
cuts parcel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parcel acres -6.226⇤⇤⇤ -5.418⇤⇤⇤ -2.876⇤⇤⇤ -3.051⇤⇤⇤ 0.00159⇤⇤⇤ 0.00163⇤⇤⇤
(0.141) (0.138) (0.133) (0.137) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Parcel longside -371.0⇤⇤⇤ -320.3⇤⇤⇤ -362.6⇤⇤⇤ -336.1⇤⇤⇤ 0.217⇤⇤⇤ 0.203⇤⇤⇤
(30.15) (29.42) (30.39) (29.16) (0.0169) (0.0161)
St. dev. of neighbor size 44.56⇤⇤⇤ 44.61⇤⇤⇤ 10.93⇤⇤⇤ 10.53⇤⇤⇤ -0.00611⇤⇤⇤ -0.00609⇤⇤⇤
(1.707) (1.721) (1.117) (1.402) (0.00067) (0.00082)
Fee parcel indicator 336.6⇤⇤⇤ 419.0⇤⇤⇤ 117.5⇤⇤⇤ 73.16⇤ 0.0203 0.00781
(31.09) (29.38) (27.35) (38.00) (0.0142) (0.0189)
Allotted trust 55.52 154.7⇤⇤⇤ 100.6⇤⇤⇤ 79.83⇤ 0.0601⇤⇤⇤ 0.0286
parcel indicator (38.64) (37.52) (34.48) (40.91) (0.0218) (0.0244)
Tribal parcel indicator 163.6⇤⇤⇤ 273.6⇤⇤⇤ 151.3⇤⇤⇤ 107.7⇤⇤⇤ 0.0146 -0.00777
(38.67) (37.58) (33.77) (41.08) (0.0217) (0.0251)
Neighbor Variables
No. of tenure regimes -14.44 -10.53 37.30⇤⇤⇤ 37.03⇤⇤ -0.0236⇤⇤ -0.0266⇤⇤⇤
(12.24) (11.29) (8.597) (8.513) (0.00581) (0.00572)
O↵ reservation neighbors 1.891⇤ 7.974⇤⇤⇤ 2.284⇤⇤⇤ 3.162⇤⇤⇤ -0.0236⇤⇤⇤ -0.0266⇤⇤⇤
(0.0265) (0.214) (0.171) (0.219) (0.000121) (0.000151)
Fee neighbors 1.113⇤⇤⇤ 6.073⇤⇤⇤ 2.290⇤⇤⇤ 2.818⇤⇤⇤ -0.00124⇤⇤⇤ -0.00164⇤⇤⇤
(0.0356) (0.178) (0.140) (0.176) (0.00009) (0.00012)
Allotted trust neighbors 0.0277 0.723 5.156⇤⇤⇤ 6.995⇤⇤⇤ -0.00209⇤⇤ -0.00334⇤⇤⇤
(0.743) (0.763) (0.716) (0.920) (0.00046) (0.00058)
Tribal neighbors 3.591⇤⇤⇤ 2.719⇤⇤⇤ 0.804 -0.233 0.00117⇤⇤ 0.00165⇤⇤
(0.800) (0.805) (0.763) (1.086) (0.00495) (0.00067)
Covariates
Thickness-to-depth ratio 4,833⇤⇤⇤ 52,574⇤⇤⇤ -56,723⇤⇤⇤ -51,905⇤⇤⇤ 36.91⇤⇤⇤ 34.61⇤⇤⇤
Feet to water (000s) 31.28⇤⇤⇤ 29.87⇤⇤⇤ 15.21⇤⇤⇤ 18.33⇤⇤⇤ -0.00596⇤⇤⇤ -0.0118⇤⇤⇤
No. Neighbors underwater 13.95⇤⇤⇤ 13.25⇤⇤⇤ 6.475⇤⇤⇤ 9.034⇤⇤⇤ -0.00397⇤⇤⇤ -0.00575⇤⇤⇤
Topographic roughness 2.597⇤⇤⇤ 2.034⇤⇤⇤ 0.565⇤⇤⇤ 0.314⇤⇤⇤ -0.000371⇤⇤ -0.000241⇤⇤⇤
City indicator -24.92 -1.458 48.07⇤⇤⇤ -0.00921 -0.0533⇤⇤⇤
Feet to railroad (000s) 15.57⇤⇤⇤ 3.248⇤⇤⇤ 8.378⇤⇤⇤ 0.000366 -0.00498⇤⇤⇤
Road density in radius -0.0768⇤⇤⇤ -0.0247⇤⇤⇤ -0.0351⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000124⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000205⇤⇤⇤
x coordinate of parcel (000s) 0.293 -0.00255⇤⇤⇤
y coordinate of parcel (000s) 0.674⇤⇤⇤ 0.00001⇤⇤⇤
Oil field fixed e↵ects No No No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.937 0.940 0.956 0.959 0.552 0.585
Observations 27,480 27,480 27,480 27,480 27,480 27,480
Notes: Spatial HAC standard errors reported in parentheses. Following Hsiang (2010), these models are estimated using a
GMM approach that allows for arbitrary forms of spatial correlation in the error term, as described in Conley (2008).
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Table D3: Parcel Level Estimates of Days Elapsed for Sample of O↵-
Reservation Parcels
Tobit Estimates OLS Estimates
Y = Days elapsed between Jan. 1, 2005 and Y = 1 if at least one
first horizontal line (as of May 1, 2015) horizontal line
cuts parcel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parcel acres -4.893⇤⇤⇤ -4.561⇤⇤⇤ -4.706⇤⇤⇤ -5.138⇤⇤⇤ 0.00108⇤⇤⇤ 0.00117⇤⇤⇤
(0.552) (0.535) (0.576) (0.587) (0.000127) (0.000132)
Parcel longside -922.5⇤⇤⇤ -869.1⇤⇤⇤ -880.6⇤⇤⇤ -764.3⇤⇤⇤ 0.255⇤⇤⇤ 0.230⇤⇤⇤
(78.80) (67.69) (69.65) (68.60) (0.0205) (0.0202)
St. dev. of neighbor size 27.06⇤⇤⇤ 27.28⇤⇤⇤ 27.79⇤⇤⇤ 12.21⇤⇤ -0.00649⇤⇤⇤ -0.00327⇤⇤
(5.516) (5.768) (5.770) (5.537) (0.00127) (0.00133)
US BLM parcel indicator 401.8⇤⇤⇤ 434.5⇤⇤⇤ 432.6⇤⇤⇤ 406.3⇤⇤ -0.119⇤⇤⇤ -0.115⇤⇤⇤
(155.7) (154.3) (153.7) (171.9) (0.0384) (0.0413)
ND state 190.6 212.4 216.6 217.5 -0.0215 -0.0394
parcel indicator (146.8) (139.7) (140.8) (138.5) (0.0499) (0.0476)
Neighbor Variables
No. of tenure regimes 66.83 42.92 39.46 -1.970 -0.0134 -0.00298
(54.71) (51.74) (50.61) (42.44) (0.0114) (0.00972)
O↵ Res. Fee neighbors 1.598⇤⇤⇤ 6.376⇤⇤⇤ 6.726⇤⇤⇤ 6.744⇤⇤⇤ -0.00149⇤⇤⇤ -0.00181⇤⇤⇤
(0.615) (1.418) (1.404) (1.033) (0.000323) (0.000289)
US BLM neighbors 8.953 2.247 1.943 0.907 -0.00117 -0.000645
(7.087) (6.427) (6.499) (5.794) (0.00131) (0.00167)
ND state neighbors -43.79⇤⇤⇤ -44.91⇤⇤⇤ -47.50⇤⇤⇤ -37.57⇤⇤⇤ 0.0106⇤⇤⇤ 0.00927⇤⇤⇤
(16.98) (14.80) (13.37) (8.761) (0.00393) (0.00262)
Covariates
Thickness-to-depth ratio -101792⇤⇤⇤ -95842⇤⇤⇤ -129675⇤⇤⇤ -109854⇤⇤⇤ 37.58⇤⇤⇤ 31.24⇤⇤⇤
Feet to water (000s) 33.96⇤⇤⇤ 35.99⇤⇤⇤ 32.06⇤⇤⇤ 32.95⇤ -0.00809⇤⇤⇤ -0.0111⇤⇤
No. Neighbors underwater 28.51⇤ 32.46⇤⇤ 29.99⇤⇤ 41.05⇤⇤⇤ -0.00757⇤⇤⇤ -0.00845⇤⇤⇤
Topographic roughness 0.383 0.0313 0.0475 -0.0936 -0.000107 -0.0000110
City indicator 526.2⇤⇤ 493.2⇤ 394.9⇤⇤ -0.0842 -0.0710
Feet to railroad (000s) 13.95⇤⇤ 14.76⇤⇤ 20.47⇤⇤ -0.00129 -0.00230
Road density in radius -0.0663⇤⇤⇤ -0.0686⇤⇤⇤ -0.0718⇤⇤⇤ 0.000016⇤⇤⇤ 0.000021⇤⇤⇤
x coordinate of parcel (000s) 2.985 -0.00192⇤⇤⇤
y coordinate of parcel (000s) 2.516 -0.000336
Oil field fixed e↵ects No No No Yes No Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.033 0.035 0.035 0.048
Adjusted R-squared 0.237 0.307
Observations 31,556 31,556 31,556 31,556 32,057 32,057
Censored at   3,772 days 17,622 17,622 17,622 17,622 NA NA
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by oil field and shown in parentheses. ⇤ p < .1, ⇤⇤ p < .05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < .01. A parcel’s
neighborhood includes all parcels touching a one-mile radius extending from the parcel’s exterior boundary. All specifications
control for the slight variation in the total area of the one mile radius, due to variation in the size of parcels on the exterior
of the radius. US BLM indicates parcels owned by U.S. Bureau of Land Management and ND state land denotes parcels
owned by the state of North Dakota. The sample excludes all parcels on the Fort Berthold reservation.
203
F
ig
u
re
D
1
:
E
x
a
m
p
le
s
o
f
o
u
r
M
a
p
p
in
g
fr
o
m
S
p
a
ti
a
l
D
a
ta
to
E
m
p
ir
ic
a
l
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
204
Appendix E: Theoretical Appendix to Chapter 2
Collective agricultural profit, ⇡A, is equal to agricultural revenue minus costs, where
is the output price and F (K,L) is the production function. Agricultural output and
costs are a function of aggregate investment, K, which includes digging ditches, planting
trees, fertilizing soil, etc. Investment is a function of output price, land area, the price
of investment (r), and N , the number of claimants with use rights. Total profit from
agriculture is
⇡A = pAF (K,L)  rK
If the land is subdivided into N parcels, then each individual chooses per-acre capital
investment to maximize agricultural income across the L/N acres they own. Suppose
that constant returns to scale in land dominate for parcels larger than LA and that
N  L/LA so that each user faces constant returns to scale and we can write per-acre
investment as
f(k) = F
✓
K
L
, 1
◆
Then each individual chooses per-acre capital investment to maximize agricultural income
across the L/N acres they own:
max
ki
⇡i =
✓
L
N
◆
[pAf(k)  rk]
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Optimizing with respect to kI and solving we have:
kSDi = f
0 1
✓
r
pA
◆
and KSDi =
✓
L
N
◆
f 0 1
✓
r
pA
◆
The superscript SD denotes the subdivided regime. In aggregate, we have
KSD = N
✓
L
N
◆
f 0 1
✓
r
pA
◆
= Lf 0 1
✓
r
pA
◆
When land is subdivided and privatized, we see that aggregate agricultural investment
depends on land area and output and input prices. Aggregate agricultural investment,
however, does not depend on N .
Next, consider the case when land is not subdivided into private parcels but instead
remains held in common. Under this common property regime, each of the N individuals
has use rights but lacks exclusion rights. Hence, returns on agricultural investments are
not excludable. Each individual user solves
max
ki
⇡i =
✓
L
N
◆
pAf(
NX
i=1
ki)  rLki
The individual users optimize by choosing kI , taking as given the investment choices
of all other users. If we assume symmetric behavior in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the
solutions for kI are:
kCPi =
f 0 1
⇣
Nr
pA
⌘
N
and KCP = Lf 0 1
✓
Nr
pA
◆
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Comparing the outcomes, we see that KSD   KCP if
f 0 1
✓
r
pA
◆
  f 0 1
✓
Nr
pA
◆
The second-order condition for profit maximization requires f 00(·) < 0, which implies that
f 0 1
⇣
r
pA
⌘
  f 0 1
⇣
Nr
pA
⌘
holds for all positive prices and rental rates.
Next, we show that the solution to the subdivided problem is identical to the in-
vestment level that a sole owner would choose to maximize the value of the resource
from agriculture. Suppose a sole owner chooses per-acre investment to maximize total
agricultural income of the land area L. The sole owner’s problem is to choose per-acre
investment for each of the L acres to maximize total profits.
max
k
⇡ = L[pAf(k)  rk]
The first-order necessary condition for a maximum is:
@⇡
@k
= L[pAf
0(k)  r] = 0
)
k⇤ = f 0 1
✓
r
pA
◆
) KSO = Lf 0 1
✓
r
pA
◆
= KSD
Hence, it must also be that ⇡SD   ⇡CP , where the inequality is strict for N > 1.
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